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This thesis focuses on the development of a malaria vaccine as an avenue 
to explore global health partnerships.  In the last twenty years, public-private 
partnerships have become a prominent organizational form in global health.  
Hundreds of large transnational collaborations and countless smaller collaborations 
between the public, private and non-profit sectors have been established.  
Partnerships have been supported by the large increase of donor funding for 
research and control of infectious diseases in impoverished countries and many aim 
to develop or provide vaccines, medicines or interventions.  Analysts generally 
agree that partnerships are saving many lives and revolutionizing drug and vaccine 
development for infectious diseases.  However, while partnership is a notion that 
connotes equity and mutuality, often global health partnerships operate in contexts 
that involve vast disparities in power and resources and there is little known about 
the impacts of partnerships on the places where they operate.  This raises the 
questions: How do global health partnerships operate in practice?  What are their 
impacts in the places where they operate?   
Addressing these questions, this thesis examines a partnership established 
to develop the most advanced malaria vaccine, named RTS,S.  Based on 17 
months of ethnographic research in Tanzania and interviews with representatives of 
partnering organizations in Belgium and the United States, I trace the development 
of the RTS,S vaccine from laboratories to its clinical trials across Africa.  I explore 
the social relationships formed between private companies, philanthropic institutions 
and non-profit organizations in the North, and research institutions and communities 
in north-eastern Tanzania, where a malaria vaccine clinical trial was conducted.  
Analyzing the impacts of the malaria vaccine partnership, I focus on community 
development, construction of infrastructure, the building of human capacity, 
provision of health care and extraction of data.  The focus on partnerships is 
intended to improve understanding about this ever-increasing social, political and 
economic formation in global health, and contributes to discussions and debates 
about how partnerships operate and their role in international development, global 





Global health partnerships comprise of public, private and non-profit 
organizations and institutions joining together to address global health challenges, 
such as the creation of new vaccines or drugs.  The formation of these partnerships 
has been on the rise over the last 20 years and analysts generally agree that 
partnerships have saved numerous lives and improved vaccine and drug 
development for infectious diseases.  However, little is known about how global 
health partnerships operate and their impacts on the places they operate.  
This thesis examines global health partnerships established to develop the 
most advanced malaria vaccine, named RTS,S.  Drawing on ethnographic research 
conducted in Tanzania and interviews with representatives of partnering 
organizations in Belgium and the United States, I explore the social relationships 
formed between private companies, philanthropic institutions and non-profit 
organizations in the North, and research institutions and communities in north-
eastern Tanzania, where a malaria vaccine clinical trial was conducted.  Particular 
focus is placed on community development, the construction of infrastructure, the 
training of clinical trial staff, provision of health care, and collection of data, both 
before and after the malaria vaccine clinical trial concluded.  This examination of 
partnerships contributes to an understanding of how partnerships operate and their 
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What is the most repeated failure in all of global 
health?  It could well be the commitment to eradicate 
malaria.  So why would anyone want to follow a long line of 
failures by becoming the umpteenth person to declare the 
goal of eradicating malaria? 
There’s one reason.  We should declare the goal of 
eradicating malaria because we can eradicate malaria.  
Today, I want to make the case that we have a real chance 
to build the partnerships, generate the political will, and 
develop the scientific breakthroughs we need to end this 
disease. 
My optimism starts with the rush of new actors who 
are bringing fresh ideas and new energy to the fight against 
malaria.  The biggest players today were not in the game five 
years ago.  The Global Fund for AIDS, TB, and Malaria had 
just been created.  President Bush had not yet announced 
his major initiative against malaria. Neither had the World 
Bank.  In the past five years, companies like Novartis, 
GlaxoSmithKline, Exxon Mobil, and Sumitomo have become 
very involved in the fight.  All these groups are now doing 
more than they’ve ever done, all at the same time, with a 
renewed commitment. 
The infusion of new money is allowing countries with 
high rates of malaria to look for the first time at 
comprehensive, national programs where they can 
coordinate a wide variety of tools and efforts for maximum 
effect.  No single approach will work alone, but several 
partially effective approaches can have a huge impact. 
    - Bill Gates, Malaria Forum: Seattle, October 17, 2007 (Gates 2007) 
 
In October 2007 at the First Gates Malaria Forum in Seattle, Bill Gates urged 
malaria eradication.  While Gates touched upon scientific breakthroughs that would 
enable eradication, he spoke triumphantly about the building of partnerships 
between different actors and groups, including the pharmaceutical industry, 
governments, multilateral institutions, and newly formed global health organizations.  
At the time, the process of malaria eradication re-emerged as a priority in global 
health illustrated contemporary practices and thinking that had profoundly changed 
since the 1990s.  Over the previous decade, partnership had ascended as a guiding 
principle in global health and the number of partnerships established to address 
critical health issues that affected the poor had grown rapidly (Buse and Walt 2000a; 
Gerrets 2010).   
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This upsurge in the creation of partnerships has been encouraged by the 
World Health Organization (WHO), United Nations (UN), and other global health 
actors.  For example, by the late 1990s, the WHO had suffered decades of 
underfunding, with its influence and prestige eroding.  During this time, a large 
number of institutions became involved in global health and since the early 1990s, 
the World Bank had become the largest health donor.  In order to revitalize the 
WHO, Dr. Gro Harlem Brundtland, the Director-General of the WHO from 1998 to 
2003, encouraged partnership in health (Richter 2004).  Giving a speech at the 51st 
World Health Assembly in May 1998, Brundtland (1998) said, 
WHO can and must change.  It must become more 
effective, more accountable, more transparent and more 
receptive to a changing world… Without a sense of 
partnership between the Organization and its owners, our 
work will prove exceedingly difficult. With a unity of purpose 
we can unleash real momentum for health… 
To succeed there are a few basic requirements.  
First, we need a stronger partnership with the Member 
States … Second, we must reach out to others.  The global 
health field has seen a steady increase in the number of 
actors and stakeholders.  This we should not fear.  I wish to 
invite those who have real contributions to make to join us … 
We must reach out to the international financial institutions, 
the World Bank, IMF and the regional development banks … 
We must reach out to the NGO community.  Their reach 
often goes beyond that of any official body … We must reach 
out to the private sector. 
Emphasizing a new mindset for those within the WHO, Brundtland called for 
partnerships with the private sector, financial institutions, and NGOs in order to 
“unleash real momentum for health” (Brundtland 1998).  Three months after taking 
office, Brundtland proposed Roll Back Malaria, or RBM, in 1998 as a way to revive 
the battle against malaria and to help the WHO to transform their institution and 
improve relationships with outside institutions (Balter 2000).  Sponsored in joint with 
the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), The United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP) and the World Bank, Roll Back Malaria was formed to bring 
together UN agencies, bilateral donors, donor governments, industry, research, non-
governmental organizations, and control organizations in the countries affected by 
malaria.  Aimed at reducing the burdens of malaria, Roll Back Malaria was formed to 
ensure that malaria-affected countries had access to technology, information and 
financial resources.  Since its inception, Roll Back Malaria has raised the profile of 
malaria, helped countries develop national control programs and persuaded 
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Novartis, a large pharmaceutical company, to provide their malaria drugs at cost.  
As well, the investments into vaccine development dramatically increased due to 
this partnership (Packard 2007).    
The formation of Roll Back Malaria initiated a surge of partnerships.  Key 
among those was the Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, which 
was formed in 2002.  Within a few years, the Global Fund became the leading 
funding source for infectious disease control and research.  Receiving US$33 billion 
in funding as of 2015, this partnership is estimated to have helped 9.2 million to gain 
access to antiretroviral treatment for HIV (human immunodeficiency virus), 15.1 
million to obtain tuberculosis treatment, and it has distributed 659 million mosquito 
nets to avert malaria infection (GFATM 2016).  The Global Fund is just one of an 
estimated hundred global health partnerships that have been established to tackle 
infectious disease control and research.  Globally there are unknown numbers of 
national- and regional-level partnerships between the private and public sectors 
(Gerrets 2010).  For example, partnerships established between Northern and 
Southern1 universities and research organizations have expanded the range and 
number of partnerships (Crane 2010).  Together, these partnerships vary in size, 
composition and scope, although most tend to have a limited focus on a specific 
health problem (e.g. vaccination, nutrition, diagnostics) or disease (e.g. malaria, 
tuberculosis) (Gerrets 2010).       
Partnerships have been remarkable in their ability to channel funding to fight 
disease.  Partnerships have stimulated research and development for products and 
interventions, improved access to health care interventions and put health issues on 
international and national agendas (Buse and Harmer 2007).  As a relatively new 
way to support the development of new technologies, partnerships have become a 
dominant and unavoidable modality of engagement in global health (Buse and Walt 
2000a; Richter 2004).  With unprecedented technological and financial resources, 
partnerships account for over half of the funding for malaria control and research, 
with US$800 million spent in 2007 through partnership-like schemes (Gerrets 
2012b; Chataway et al. 2010; Brown 2015).  As their institutional form has grown, so 
                                              
1 Although there are complex histories and politics surrounding the terms, “North” and “South”, in 
this thesis North denotes those countries that donate aid and the South denotes countries that 
receive aid.  It is also broadly geographically correct, as Europe and North America are located to 
the north of Africa.    
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has their influence, transforming practices and thinking (Buse and Walt 2000a and 
2000b; Gerrets 2015).  
An area that has seen considerable partnership activity has been in the 
development of drugs and vaccines for diseases that predominantly afflict the poor.  
This sub-type of public-private partnerships is called product development 
partnerships, or PDP.  For-profit companies are largely disinclined to develop 
technologies to combat diseases of poverty, which are likely to see little financial 
return.  Pharmaceutical companies are forming partnerships with public and private 
organizations—usually large foundations or governments—to fund products that 
address the needs of the poor when there is insufficient potential for profit (Biehl 
2016; Chataway et al. 2007b).  Thus, product development partnerships link 
products to markets in situations where there is need but a lack of resources or 
economic incentive (Chataway et al. 2007b; Kale, Hanlin, and Chataway 2013).  
This shift towards partnerships demonstrates a move away from large 
pharmaceutical companies carrying out the product development process from 
beginning to end (Chataway et al. 2007a).  Channelling money through these 
partnerships reduces or removes the financial risks of pharmaceutical companies 
being involved in the process of product development.  These formations have 
made great strides in developing drugs and vaccines to combat infectious diseases 
(Widdus 2005; Buse and Walt 2000a; Chataway et al. 2008).  Developing 
medicines, diagnostics and vaccines for Southern contexts necessitates 
experiments to be conducted in the places where they will be later employed (Street 
2014).  To support this, product development partnerships established collaborative 
relationships and partnerships with researchers and institutions in Southern 
countries (Hanlin 2008; Chataway et al. 2007b).     
As a new governance structure, partnerships command great financial 
resources.  Through their interventions and research, these entities impact the lives 
of millions around the world.  Partnerships have become an “established mechanism 
of global health governance” (Buse and Harmer 2007: 259) and even staunch critics 
describe partnership as “an unavoidable necessity” (Richter 2004: 45).  Analysts 
generally agree that global health partnerships are saving many lives and 
revolutionizing vaccine and drug development for infectious diseases (Gerrets 
2010).   
Despite triumphant statements of achievement, a growing number of 
scholars (Buse and Walt 2000b; Birn 2014; Crane 2010) have assumed a neo-
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Marxist/critical stance towards the rise of partnership in global health and raised 
concerns about their implications for governance, potential for conflicts of interest, 
and perpetuation of hierarchical colonial relations.  Birn (2014) argues that with 
partnership, new opportunities have opened for private sector involvement in health, 
which was once largely the preserve of the public sector.  This allows private 
interests to shape the global health agenda in ways that can benefit industry over 
people and health systems.  Additionally, Buse and Harmer (2007) contend that 
partnerships alter the distribution of power among organizations, including between 
the private and public sectors, and between North and South.  They caution against 
the assumption that partnership leads to equality between involved parties, arguing 
that through the use of the term ‘partnership’, unequal power relations are disguised.   
There is a growing anthropological scholarship about global health 
partnerships (see, for example, Gerrets 2010, 2012 and 2015; Crane 2010 and 
2013; Sullivan 2011; Street 2014; Brown 2015; Nading 2015; Okwaro and Geissler 
2015).  Some of these anthropologists employ science and technology studies 
(STS), a theoretical framework that addresses the inherently social aspects of 
scientific practice.  Although this is important to consider when researching science 
and medicine, this theoretical framework often lacks attention to relations of power 
and hierarchy, topics of keen interest to many of the anthropologists listed above.  
Thus, some anthropologists combine STS with neo-Marxist or post-colonial 
theoretical frameworks to examine the role of wealthy partners in dominating their 
Southern counterparts and shaping partnerships, institutions and the allocation of 
resource.  However, others contest the idea that power and wealth determine 
outcomes.  Some draw on Foucault, a social theorist who viewed power less as a 
form of domination coming from above and more as a heterogeneous and diffuse 
force emerging from all directions.  Others employ the anthropologist Mosse (2005) 
who has written about development projects, which he theorized as operating in a 
dynamic way to incorporate people’s intentions, goals and desires, rather than 
simply being governed from the top-down.   
The anthropologists Street (2014), Brown (2015) and Sullivan (2011) have 
explored the role of public-private partnerships in health care provision in the global 
South from within institutions.  In a chapter of Street’s (2014) book, she analyzes 
partnerships forged between non-state institutions and a public hospital in Papua 
New Guinea.  She found that hospital administrators valued the ability to establish 
relationships with non-state actors, which allowed for economic independence from 
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the government for building infrastructure and procuring equipment.  Yet, health 
care providers felt ambivalent about the limited impacts these investments had on 
health care delivery, finding that funding from wealthy partners led to the building of 
enclaved wards rather than improvements for the entire hospital.  Sullivan (2011) 
researched a partnership formed between non-state actors from the North and a 
Tanzanian hospital to provide HIV/AIDS (acquired immunodeficiency syndrome) 
treatment.  Although this partnership improved infrastructure and equipment, these 
improvements were enclaved, which set up a division between parts of the hospital 
that benefitted from donors, and parts that did not.  While these two anthropologists 
focus on the limitations of partnerships and the ability of wealthy donors to dictate 
the distribution of resources, Brown (2015) discovered something different when 
exploring partnerships forged between the Kenyan Ministries of Health and US-
based global health organizations.  Brown uncovered that foreign governments and 
international agencies were increasingly involved in health care delivery.  Although 
this meant that the power to provide resources had become separated from the 
state, the legitimacy of the state was actually reinforced because non-state actors 
were working through state infrastructure to deliver health care.   
Anthropologists (Crane 2013; Okwaro and Geissler 2015; Gerrets 2015) 
have explored partnerships formed to conduct medical research in East Africa.  
Crane (2013) combines STS and a critical post-colonial perspective to examine 
power and hierarchical relationships created through a partnership between US 
universities and Ugandan research institutes to conduct HIV/AIDS research in 
Uganda.  She found that through transnational research relationships between 
researchers in wealthy countries and researchers in impoverished countries, 
unequal post-colonial power dynamics were created, whereby Southern researchers 
had less power to shape the course of research or allocation of resources.  Okwaro 
and Geissler (2015) interviewed African researchers at an East African university 
and learned that due to insufficient government funding, researchers were required 
to forge partnerships with Northern research institutions to support research 
activities.  This situation engendered stark difference in power and hierarchy 
between partners because Northern partners, by virtue of their wealth, had the 
ability to dominate research activities.  However, these author’s analysis diverged 
from Crane’s (2013) and they found that despite power asymmetries between 
partners, African researchers adopted strategies to navigated unequal partnerships 
and maintain their dignity.  Gerrets (2015) draws on Mosse when analyzing a 
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partnership between Tanzanian- and US-based research organizations to conduct a 
malaria research and control project.  Critiques of medical research partnerships 
contend that they are a form of scientific colonialism, advancing neoliberal agendas 
and Northern priorities by virtue of the greater wealth and resources that Northern 
partners command.  But Gerrets found that Tanzanian actors and institutions 
shaped the partnership by supporting, hindering, exploiting and jeopardizing its 
aims, and that the partnership facilitated some people in pursuing agendas that 
strengthened state institutions in Tanzania.                 
In these accounts, material objects and social relationships played integral 
roles in the operation of partnership.  Although some anthropologists focused on the 
material inequalities and hierarchies inherent in many North-South partnerships, 
Brown (2015) and Gerrets (2015) described the ability of resource-poor states to 
adapt and become integral actors in partnership.  Furthermore, instead of focusing 
on the familiar narrative of hierarchy and domination between unequal partners, 
Gerrets (2015) and Okwaro and Geissler (2015) shifted the critical narrative put forth 
by Crane (2013) by uncovering that people in subordinate positions can maintain 
dignity and enact change through partnership.   
Anthropological accounts of medical and scientific research partnerships 
largely explore how partnerships operate as they are ongoing or examine people’s 
reflections on them after they have ended.  Less focus is placed on these kinds of 
partnerships as they are in the process of ending.  Endings are often poignant 
moments when affect and reflection are heightened.  They are a time when people 
contemplate events that have transpired, try to find meaning, and look to the future.  
This thesis addresses this gap in the study of partnerships.  I bring forth the 
experiences and reflections people have on partnerships as they end and I examine 
not only the technical aspects but also the labour, affect and care that people 
brought to partnership.  I focus on three research questions: 1) How do global health 
partnerships operate and what happens as they end?; (2) What kind of impacts do 
partnerships have on the places where they operate?; and (3) What are the roles of 
infrastructure, technology, social relationships, affect, exchange and practices of 
care in the operation of partnerships? 
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These questions inspire analysis of the formation and function of 
partnerships to develop a malaria vaccine named RTS,S2.  This is the most 
advanced malaria vaccine to date and has been developed by the British 
pharmaceutical company GlaxoSmithKline (GSK).  RTS,S stimulates human 
immunity to the most lethal malaria parasite, Plasmodium falciparum, and has been 
formulated for use amongst children.  Development of this vaccine has taken over 
three decades of research and testing.  A costly and risky endeavour, RTS,S was 
made possible through technological and scientific advancements, as well as shifts 
in funding and institutional structures that promoted product development 
partnerships and collaborative research relationships.  In order to develop RTS,S, 
partnerships were established among public and private organizations in the United 
States (US) and Europe, and collaborative relationships were arranged with 
research institutions across Sub-Saharan Africa to test the RTS,S vaccine in 
randomized clinical trials from 2009 to 2014 (Cohen et al. 2010; Cohen et al. 2011; 
Vekemans et al. 2009; Sherman 2009, Chataway et al. 2010).  This thesis is based 
on 17 months of ethnographic research carried out in Tanzania from November 
2012 to April 2014.  This thesis largely focuses on the last six weeks as the RTS,S 
vaccine trial and partnerships were ending and two weeks after they concluded, 
from November 2013 to February 2014.  This period of fieldwork was built upon 
several months of fieldwork carried out amongst malaria researchers and policy 
makers in Dar es Salaam.  As well, from January 2014 to June 2015, in-person and 
video call interviews were conducted with malaria vaccine scientists at a 
pharmaceutical company in Belgium, a malaria researcher in the United Kingdom, 
and clinical trial coordinators/funders in the US. 
In order to situate the subsequent analysis, I review relevant literature about 
partnerships in theory and practice and bring to the fore debates about the impacts 
of partnership on governance, transnational relationships, and medical research.  
After the literature review, I describe my methodology and the research sites, 
followed by a summary of the thesis chapters.  
                                              
2 “RTS,S is a scientific name … [that] represents [the vaccine’s] composition.  The ‘R’ stands for 
the central repeat region of Plasmodium (P.) falciparum ‘circumsporozoite protein (CSP); the ‘T’ 
for the T cell epitopes of the CSP; and the ‘S’ for hepatitis B surface antigen (HBsAg).  These are 
combined in a single fusion protein (‘RTS’) and co-expressed in yeast cells with free HBsAg. The 




Partnerships in Theory and Practice 
The development of the RTS,S malaria vaccine and its testing in Tanzania 
has led to the establishment of partnerships and collaborative relationships between 
public, private and civil society organizations.  Partnership was established as part 
of nation-state governance, took hold in international development, and became 
popular in global health and medical research.  In order to draw theoretical insights 
to the study of partnership, I review key literature on intersecting realms of inquiry: 
international development, global health, malaria control and research, health care, 
and transnational medical research.    
International Development 
Escobar (1995) argues that we are unable to think of the world outside of the 
lens of development and underdevelopment.  For over 60 years, the concept of 
development has been a framework to understand the relationship between the 
affluent North and less affluent South (Mosse 2005; Crane 2013).  Development 
discourses and practices are built upon the premise that certain places are not only 
economically deprived but also temporally behind or stuck in the past (Hornborg 
2008; Fabian 1983).  Africa and places in Asia and Latin America are often 
conceptualized as underdeveloped places of poverty, backwardness and need.  In 
order to overcome underdevelopment, development practices aim to modernize and 
bring low-income settings forward in time and up to the same level of progress and 
growth as is found in Europe and North America.  This is typically done through 
improved infrastructure, health outcomes, education, and access to science and 
technology (Escobar 1995).   
Global health has arisen as a sub-field of international development.  Since 
the colonial era, policy makers have perceived a connection between health and 
development and tried to improve health outcomes in order to improve economic 
development.  Thus, health has been considered a prerequisite for economic 
development, and vice versa (Packard 2016).  Despite being portrayed as 
something new, global health has its roots in international development and 
operates in a similar manner: wealthy Northern donors intervene and provide tools 
to change circumstances in resource-poor settings so as to bring about 
improvements in development.  Due to this intertwining of the fields, it is important to 
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understand international development and the rise of partnerships to better 
understand global health partnerships.  Furthermore, literature about partnerships in 
international development explore shifts in governance and power, which will shed 
light on ways to understand partnership in global health.   
First, some background: Partnerships and collaborations, such as the ones 
established to develop and test the RTS,S malaria vaccine, are relatively recent 
entities in global health and only came to prominence in the late 1990s.  However, 
over the past 50 years, partnerships have been a burgeoning governance formation 
around the world, taking on multiple forms.  Partnerships between the public, private 
and non-governmental sectors is a practice that began in government administration 
in the 1970s and expanded to other sectors over time (Bovaird 2004; Brinkerhoff 
2002).  As a liberalizing mechanism, partnerships arose as a way to scale back the 
role of governments and public organizations in the production and delivery of public 
services and products.  With the rise of neoliberal ideology, government and public 
organizations began to be perceived as overly bureaucratic, clumsy and plagued by 
fiscal problems.  Markets were viewed as able to allocate resources effectively and 
reduce costs, while non-profit organizations were seen as values driven, more 
efficient, and able to take the place of government in service delivery.  Additionally, 
societal issues began to be thought of as increasingly complex with governments 
unable to tackle them in isolation.  Partnerships that combined the public, non-profit 
and private sectors were thought to allow each sector to bring its strengths to bear 
on a particular issue.  Governments that partnered with the private and non-profit 
sector allowed for the scaling back and creation of a lean government more focused 
on support of the voluntary and private sectors with minimum interference and 
regulation.  This process was thought to bring efficiency and cost-effective provision 
of products and services to the public (Bovaird 2004; Broadbent and Laughlin 2003; 
Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff 2002). 
Neoliberal ideology impacted nation-state governance, bringing forth greater 
numbers of partnership.  By the 1980s and 1990s, similar forces were at work in 
international development.  Before partnership, alternative forms of governance 
operated between Northern nation-states and Africa.  During colonialism, colonial 
governments governed colonies in a hierarchical fashion.  Propagating a child and 
adult metaphor, colonizing countries presented themselves as guardians of 
colonized people and lands, protecting the colonized from their own irrationality and 
foolishness (Abrahamsen 2004; Crewe and Harrison 1998).  At independence, 
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African states took over governing from colonizing governments.  However, from the 
1960s onwards, resource-rich countries and institutions of the North, including the 
Bretton Woods institutions—the World Bank, United Nations, International Monetary 
Fund—maintained a central role in the governance and provision of aid to African 
countries (Fowler 2000).      
This level of involvement through development aid led to accusations and 
fear of neo-colonialism, imperialism and a continuation of hierarchy and inequality 
between North and South (Abrahamsen 2004; Crewe and Harrison 1998).  Critics of 
development argue that donors treated local organizations as passive recipients that 
were unable to conduct their own affairs because they were unevolved, acting with 
childlike incompetence in corrupt and undemocratic ways.  Although the 
mechanisms of governance have changed, development aid in the 1980s and 1990s 
evoked fears of neo-colonialism due to the conditions donors placed on the aid 
provided to Southern states.  An example of conditions placed on aid were structural 
adjustment programs (Crewe and Harrison 1998).  Many African nations 
experienced structural adjustment programs, which were instituted by the 
International Monetary Fund, World Bank and other national and international 
organization.  Structural adjustment included a package of reforms that reduced 
state spending and increased revenue through privatization, international trade 
liberalization, market deregulation and state devolution.  African governments had to 
adhere to these conditions in order to receive a lower interest rate for existing loans 
or access new loans (Rottenburg 2009).  As Crewe and Harrison (1998) contend, 
these conditions placed on aid were symptoms of donors who assumed that they 
understood what a country needed more than its own government.  With over a 
hundred countries subjected to these programs, criticism grew that governments 
lacked local ownership of the development process (Fowler 2000).   
Several scholars (Fowler 2000; Abrahamsen 2004; Crewe and Harrison 
1998) assert that the shift towards partnerships was a reaction to the preceding 
policy era that focused on top-down, hierarchical relationships between North and 
South.  Abrahamsen (2004) argues that donors employ the concept of partnership 
as a response to long-standing and persistent charges of intervention.  Partnership 
signals an attempt to demonstrate a return of influence and power to African states.  
Recipients of aid are no longer commonly called “counterparts” or “beneficiaries”, 
terms that are perceived as passive.  Rather, those receiving aid are portrayed on 
equal terms, as partners, and the process of aid provision is conceived of as a 
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cooperation between equals.  With paternalistic approaches being unpopular, those 
receiving aid are expected to assume greater responsibility for development, 
improving institutional or organizational capacity to sustain programs after donors 
have stopped providing aid (Crewe and Harrison 1998).   
At the same time, emphasis shifted from governments acting as principle 
actors and engines of development.  Non-governmental organizations and market 
forces had been at the fringes of development until the 1980s, marginally 
contributing but not fully accepted into the official aid system (Fowler 2000).  But 
with the rise of neoliberal ideology and the rolling back of the state through structural 
adjustment programs, non-governmental and private organizations became more 
involved in development, filling gaps left by a less-funded public sector.  Through 
this process, partnerships began to include a larger range of actors (Rottenburg 
2009; Fowler 2000).          
Fowler (2000) asserts that partnerships came to the fore in international 
development in the 1970s, providing a guide for the quality of relationship that 
should be attained between non-governmental organizations and their Southern 
beneficiaries.  Partnership became a key word indicating a political, moral, 
ideological, humanitarian solidarity between Northern and Southern organization.  
However, Crewe and Harrison (1998) contend that partnership in development 
describes a vast range of relationships between actors and that the word ‘partner’ 
encompasses a spectrum, without differentiation about the types of partner, their 
context, or history.    
As I will be exploring the organizational structure and relationships between 
Northern and Southern actors and entities throughout this thesis, it is important to 
expand on the debates about hierarchy and domination in partnership.  Several 
scholars question if partnerships return power to resource-poor countries.  For 
some, partnerships are a positive shift in international development.  As Maxwell 
and Riddell (1998), two international development analysts, argue, partnership can 
offer the chance to establish an aid relationship that is founded on equality and 
mutual respect.  Partnership can also increase Southern actors’ capacities for 
leadership and ability to design and implement development strategies.  However, 
these analysts acknowledge that there are intrinsic difficulties in achieving equality 
in relationships and contend that there are different degrees of partnership, 
anywhere from strong to weak.  Donors prefer weak forms of partnership as they 
fear losing their influence over how development resources are used.  This makes 
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“genuine partnerships” difficult to achieve, leading to “potential pit-falls” to the 
transferring of power to aid recipients (258).  But from the perspective of these 
analysts, partnership is still a worthwhile goal to strive for. 
Some scholars draw on the neo-Marxist idea of “dependency theory”, which 
critiques development as a way to sustain the economic order of class inequality 
and keep impoverished nations poor (Lewis and Mosse 2006; Escobar 1995).  From 
this critical viewpoint, partnership is a form of rhetoric, disguising old policies and 
practices that perpetuate the domination of the North over the South (Abrahamsen 
2004).  Much like the terms, “participation”, “community” and “empowerment”, which 
are buzzwords in development, partnership evokes a sense of warm mutuality.  But 
this term is vague, making it attractive because it legitimates donors, allowing them 
to claim equality between actors while the specifics of the arrangements are left 
unclear to outsiders (Crewe and Harrison 1998; Cornwall 2007).  Fowler (2000) 
claims that the use of the term partnership makes arrangements between North and 
South seem inclusive, harmonious and benign, subtly precluding other 
interpretations.  This legitimizes the intrusiveness of foreign concerns into the 
domestic concerns of resource-poor countries.  Thus, for these critics, partnership in 
development is a veiled continuation of unequal colonial relationships.   
The anthropologists Crewe and Harrison (1998) take a similarly critical 
stance towards partnerships in international development.  They assert that in 
practice, there can be difficulties creating mutuality and equality between partners 
when there are vast differences in resources and power.  Crewe and Harrison 
(1998) found through their respective experiences in development projects in Sri 
Lanka and Kenya that despite partnership being the ideal, in practice equal 
partnership was difficult to attain.  Although colonialism had ended, donors still tend 
to be Europeans who assist or provide aid to former colonies.  This arrangement 
allows donors more power and control over recipients who are unable to repay 
donors for their assistance and aid.  Often, development projects reflect the 
preferences of the donor instead of the partner or recipients.  Structures of power 
created by people’s identities (skin colour, age, gender, nationality and class) and 
their institutional position in the partnership also shaped interactions between 
people, making it difficult for people to interact as equals.  Thus, Crewe and 
Harrison (1998) argue that the very nature of exchange between Northern donors 
and Southern recipients is inherently unequal and, at times, coercive.  Donors rarely 
acknowledge this inequality.  Although the move towards ‘partnership’ is a laudable 
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ideal, they emerge in a context rife with structural inequalities.  Thus, in practice, 
partnership does not redress inequality. 
A third position employs Foucauldian critiques, whereby the development 
“order” is sustained by a power-knowledge regime that is enabled through discursive 
and non-discursive means that has effects beyond the intentions of the state, 
bureaucracies, institutional actors or individuals (Lewis and Mosse 2006).  
Abrahamsen (2004) and Ferguson (1994) draw on Foucault to argue that rather 
than a form domination, partnership is a productive form of power.  Governmentality, 
to apply Foucault’s term, is operating in partnership, whereby people’s subjectivities 
are shaped in such a way that they come to govern themselves.  In this formulation, 
power does not come from above but is diffuse and heterogeneous, stemming from 
all directions.  This is a useful way to understand governance when territorial, state 
and bureaucratic frameworks have expanded and shifted in a global era, with 
decision-making and power centres decentralizing and pluralizing towards non-
governmental and semi-autonomous institutions and organization.  In this situation, 
rather than donors setting the agenda and coercing Southern states into behaving in 
particular ways, people monitor and govern themselves.   
Abrahamsen (2004) argues that partnerships produce modern and self-
disciplined people and states.  This process leads to their enlistment as responsible 
actors who develop themselves.  This is because over time, people internalize 
neoliberal ideals that not only structure behaviour but constitute people’s values, 
norms and identities.  Governmentality works by the inscription of developing 
countries as agents, active creators of their own development and future.  This 
configuration confers not only freedoms, opening new possibilities for action and 
decisions, but also duties and obligations.  In order for states to receive aid, they 
must demonstrate a level of self-governance and learn to practice freedom in a 
responsible manner.  Once aid has been received, auditing technologies are 
employed as instruments of power and governance in order to bring about new 
forms of conduct.   
Some anthropologists draw on Foucault’s theory of power to write about 
international development.  Lewis and Mosse (2005) contest the idea that 
development has an inner logic that leaves little room for disjuncture and contingent 
practices.  These authors contend that rather than there being a bureaucratic 
rationality, the inner workings of development present complex practices and 
discourses of diverse actors that work in different institutions and organizations.  Li 
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(1999) conducted long-term research in Indonesia and argues that claims to order 
are contested, fragile and built on compromise, which means that hegemony cannot 
be imposed but must be worked out.  This complex way of understanding 
development can be applied to partnership.  Instead of viewing partnerships as a 
mechanism for imposing order or domination, partnership can be understood as a 
productive force.  Mosse (2005) furthers this argument, drawing on his experience of 
a UK Department for International Development (DfID) funded development project 
in India.  He found that even in situations of inequality and power imbalances, 
marginalized people can manipulate project discourse, refuse participation, and 
make claims for investment, employment and social protection.  Rather than 
partnership being achieved through imposition and domination, they can work 
through promises of inclusion and incorporation.     
This section of the introduction has described the rise of partnership as a 
form of governance and organizational formation in the international development 
sector and provided an overview of the various scholarly debates about partnership 
and hierarchy between donors and receivers.  A majority of the literature offers 
various theorizations of partnership and how they operate, largely drawing on the 
critical/neo-Marxist or Foucauldian traditions.  However, anthropologists provide 
ethnographic insights into how partnerships in international development function.  
Crewe and Harrison (1998) uncovered that although partnership—with its attendant 
meanings of equality and mutuality—is an ideal, historically-rooted economic, 
political and social differences place Southern partners at a distinct disadvantage in 
respect to Northern institutions and actors.  This situation makes genuine 
partnership difficult to attain.  And yet, Li (1999) and Mosse (2005) describe with 
their ethnographic research that partnerships—even hierarchical ones—can be 
contested and productive.  These various interpretations of partnership provide 
valuable insights to analyzing how partnerships operate in global health.  I turn now 
to an examination of the literature about global health partnerships. 
Global Health  
Global health is a field concerned with improving the health of people in 
countries once called Third World, or underdeveloped, and now often termed as 
low-income countries.  The roots of global health began with 19th century 
endeavours to contain infectious diseases and offer development assistance.  At the 
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time, large-scale campaigns to prevent infectious diseases were largely conducted 
in the colonies of the global South by colonial authorities (Packard 2016).  When 
colonialism ended, health campaigns were dominated by the public sector through 
the WHO.  Although philanthropic organizations—such as the Rockefeller 
Foundation—played a role in health interventions, there was little direct involvement 
of the private or non-profit sectors. Partnership did exist but they usually were 
limited to relationships between the public sector, donor agencies and the 
governments of recipient countries.  Often relations between different sectors were 
adversarial and competitive (Birn 2014; Buse and Walt 2000a).   
This situation shifted 20 years ago when the global health field experienced 
“revolutionary” changes (McGoey et al. 2011: 2).  Due to a broad range of factors, 
an increasingly diverse group of actors came to populate the global health 
landscape, changing it dramatically.  What led to this exponential growth in global 
health partnerships?  First, there was increased public awareness of re-emerging 
and new infectious diseases that accompanied the spread of HIV/AIDS and 
increased prevalence of malaria and tuberculosis.  Second, political attention to 
global health rose in the late 1990s with the G8 and UN General Assembly meetings 
focusing on infectious diseases, their potential to destabilize political and economic 
systems, and impact on national security (Huckel Schneider 2008; McGoey et al. 
2011).  Third, the prevailing ideology of the 1980s and 1990s favoured privatization 
and market forces.  Donors perceived the UN system as inflexible, wasteful and 
overly bureaucratic and the WHO had its core budget frozen.  This led to an 
increase in public funds being channelled through non-governmental organizations, 
a phenomenon that also occurred in the international development field.  These 
factors led to a growth in financial aid available for health, initiated a discourse about 
new forms of collaboration between the private, civil society and public sectors, and 
led to the formation of numerous partnerships (Walt and Buse 2000a; Packard 2016; 
Gerrets 2010 and 2015).   
The proliferation of partnerships is entwined with the dramatic increase of 
funding for global health.  In 1990, US$2.2 billion of financial aid went towards 
health globally (Michaud 2003: 1) and by 2007, this reached US$21.8 billion 
(Ravishankar et al. 2009).  While in the 1990s a majority of newly formed 
partnerships were unable to attract funding from traditional donors, such as UN 
agencies, bilateral donors and the World Bank, there was a substantial increase in 
funding for them a decade later (Gerrets 2010).  This was due in large part to the 
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emergence of new philanthropic donors, especially the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation.  Since launching in 2000, the Gates Foundation has provided funding 
for global health that has dwarfed contributions by most national governments 
(McGoey et al. 2011).  The Gates Foundation have made several high-profile and 
substantial contributions to partnerships, with US$750 million to The Global Alliance 
for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI)3 in 1999 and large contributions to launch the 
multi-billion-dollar Global Fund in 2002.  Becoming the largest global health funding 
mechanisms for infectious diseases, these partnerships in turn spend a large share 
of their funding through partnerships.  Through this substantial funding for 
partnership, a clear signal was sent that this was the way forward (Gerrets 2010). 
Once the Global Fund had been launched in 2002, new organizations 
entered the global health field, including the US President’s Malaria Initiative (PMI) 
and PEPFAR—the US President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (Gerrets 2010).  
As well, the Gates Foundation marshalled other donors to support their global health 
initiatives.  This includes bi-lateral donors, which contribute ten times what the Gates 
Foundation gives each year (Birn 2014).  These organizations increased funding for 
communicable diseases research and control in resource-poor countries to 
previously unseen levels, with funding often channelled through partnerships.  With 
this increase in donor funding for global health, an enormous shift occurred and 
relations between institutional actors rearranged.  Traditional health donors, like 
bilateral agencies and UN organizations such as the WHO, no longer dominated as 
they had up until the 1980s (Gerrets 2010).  Partnership allowed businesses to 
demonstrate increased social responsibility, and for the public sector, there was an 
infusion of much needed funding and resources for neglected health issues (Walt 
and Buse 2000a and 2000b).   
This shift in global health has led to several impacts on the way global health 
actors and entities operate.  Birn (2014) critically examines these developments and 
contends that although business and philanthropic interests have been involved in 
international health for some time, in contemporary global health they have become 
central figures and their role has been formalized through partnerships.  Business 
interests play a key role in global health with pharmaceutical companies being 
                                              
3GAVI was formed in 1999 with a grant from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and brings 
together the World Bank, WHO, UNICEF, the pharmaceutical industry, donor governments and 
representatives of developing countries.  Having received US$7.2 billion from donors between 
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granted an unprecedentedly large role in policymaking by joining partnerships.  
Through its financial support and partnerships, the Gates Foundation has also 
assumed a dominant role in global health by funding and collaborating with the 
WHO, the World Bank, multi-lateral agencies and a range of partnerships.  This 
allows the Foundation to shape the global health agenda.  With the influence of 
business and philanthropy, global health policies draw on business principles that 
focus on profit-making as the propeller of product development, policies and other 
activities.  Overall, Birn (2014) argues that partnerships allow corporate agendas to 
be imposed.  Public sector organizations like the WHO have had their authority and 
functionality undermined through underfunding and vilification.  Consequently, global 
health programs focus on narrow, top-down and single disease programs.   
  McGoey et al. (2011) are also critical of recent global health practices, 
asserting that despite the steep hike in funding for health, global health inequities 
have thus far not diminished.  In fact, the world is more inequitable than it was 50 
years ago.  This has led experts and activists to question the funding priorities of 
global health organizations and point out that when one disease or approach is 
prioritized over others, others are neglected.  Birn (2014) points out that the Gates 
Foundation, with its large endowment and ability to influence global health policy, 
has focused global health initiatives on the innovation and delivery of technological 
fixes and targeted interventions, despite the plethora of demographic and public 
health research that demonstrates that improved working and living conditions 
account for gains in life expectancy.  For example, the Foundation’s most prominent 
efforts have been the support of vaccine development.  In 2010, the Gates 
Foundation pledged US$10 billion over 10 years to vaccine development and 
delivery and sizeable grants were given to the Malaria Vaccine Initiative and GAVI 
(Birn 2014).  Over time there has been a reduction of health care to the simple 
delivery of drugs on both international and national levels (Petryna 2009).  Biehl 
(2007) has called this the “pharmaceuticalization” of health.  Often, donors have 
insisted on funding only technological and disease-specific vertical programs.  This 
focus on vaccines and drugs means there is less money given to improving health 
care systems (Biehl 2016).  Therefore, although analysts generally acknowledge 
that there have been many lives saved through partnerships (Gerrets 2010), these 
                                                                                                                                
2011 and 2015, this partnership influences market mechanism to develop and procure vaccines 
(Storeng 2014; Muraskin 2004; GAVI 2017). 
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scholars argue that global health partnerships have a narrow scope and respond to 
the symptoms of inequity—illness and disease—and neglect to address the root 
causes of ill health, which is global inequities in wealth.  
Partnerships and leading global health institutions, with their narrow and 
technological focus, divert attention from the need for health care infrastructure, 
access to comprehensive medical care, better housing, environmental protections, 
and the strengthening of health systems in resource-poor countries (Kelly and Beisel 
2011; Biehl 2016; Petryna 2009).  However, this focus on technological solutions to 
ill health is, as Birn (2014) contends, a way for private partners to commercialize 
their products and channel public money into the private sector.  McGoey (2012) 
argues that this is the entire goal of philanthropic and business involvement in 
health, that it is a strategy to accrue profit.  The involvement of philanthropies and 
businesses also enhances reputations, provides tax subsidies and expands 
markets, which all generate capital (Birn 2014).  
With large sums of funding going towards technological solutions, this 
accounts for the great amount of activity around product development partnerships 
(Buse and Walt 2000a).  Private, for-profit organizations tend to be uninterested in 
developing technologies for diseases of poverty, which are anticipated to see little 
financial return.  To overcome public and market ‘failures’ to develop drugs and 
vaccines for neglected diseases, partnerships have been formed between industry, 
public, philanthropic, and non-profit organizations (Chataway, et al. 2007b; Kale et 
al. 2013; Buse and Walt 2000a and 2000b; Widdus 2005).  Funding for these 
partnerships largely stem from public or philanthropic sources and allow industry to 
share the costs, risks and benefits of scientific research into new drugs and 
vaccines (Buse and Walt 2000a; Widdus 2005).  These partnerships are born out of 
the idea that private and public sectors cannot resolve historically rooted inequalities 
in isolation (Chataway and Smith 2006; Gerrets 2015).  Product development 
partnerships, like the one to develop the RTS,S malaria vaccine, blur traditional 
distinctions between private and public sector’s responsibilities and aims (Buse and 
Walt 2000b).     
The first product development partnership was the International AIDS 
Vaccine Initiative (IAVI), which was launched in 1996 (Wheeler and Berkley 2001).  
By the mid-1990s, there was an unprecedented growth of partnerships to tackle 
diseases found in low-income countries.  Commanding vast sums of public and 
private funding, partnerships were formed between public, non-governmental 
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organizations (NGOs) and private, for-profit organizations (Widdus 2005; Walt and 
Buse 2000a; Gerrets 2010).  For the private sector, partnerships have allowed 
corporations to demonstrate increased social responsibility, and for the public 
sector, partnerships have brought an infusion of much needed funding and 
resources for neglected health issues (Walt and Buse 2000a).   
Although there has been a great amount of partnership activity around 
vaccine and drug development in the last 20 years, the development of drugs and 
vaccines occurred differently in the past (Walt and Buse 2000a; Chataway et al. 
2010).  After the Second World War, there was a clear division of labour between 
health research and drug development.  Public research institutions, usually 
universities, carried out basic research and major pharmaceutical companies 
typically conducted applied research and developed and manufactured the drugs 
they produced.  In the 1970s, attempts were made to form partnerships between 
private and public entities involved in health research and development.  Taking 
some time to be established, the new public-private partnerships began 
consolidating relationships between universities and pharmaceutical companies.  By 
the 1980s, both public and private sectors were anxious about reduced revenue 
flows and productivity as collaboration was increasingly encouraged by policy 
makers.  In 1980, the Bayh-Dole Act was passed in the US as a piece of legislation 
that aided technological transfers between universities and industry, allowing for 
rapid commercialization of research.  In the 1990s, institutional environments 
changed with biotech firms growing and coming to serve as upstream suppliers to 
pharmaceutical companies, and pharmaceutical companies subcontracting work at 
various stages of research and development to other organizations.  However, large 
pharmaceutical companies maintained dominance in the pharmaceutical sector 
because clinical trials remained so costly, which limited the ability of small firms and 
public institutions to develop drugs and vaccines (Sunder Rajan 2006; Chataway et 
al. 2010).   
During the 1980s and 1990s, there was a growing recognition that actors in 
health research and product development could not meet broad health goals in 
isolation.  Expenditures for research and development have concentrated in 
Northern countries with only 10% of money for health research being spent in the 
South, even though 90% of the global burden of disease resides in the South.  This 
10/90 health research gap raised concerns about the withdrawal of the 
pharmaceutical industry from developing and manufacturing medicines, diagnostics 
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and vaccines for the diseases of poverty (Buse and Walt 2000b, Jentsch and Pilley 
2003, Kale et al. 2013).  To improve this, product development partnerships began 
to be formed, largely initiated by the public sector.   
While gaining popularity as a governance formation and funding mechanism, 
product development partnerships have opened new paths for innovation and 
widened the space for participation in health research and development (Buse and 
Walt 2000a).  These partnerships have benefited from increased investment from 
public sector and philanthropic donors that prefer to see their money given to a 
partnership rather than to public or for-profit organizations and companies.  Backed 
by major institutions and foundations, partnerships have grown in credibility, filling a 
vacuum that established private and public organizations alone were unable or 
unwilling to fill (Chataway et al. 2010, Gerrets 2015).   
Since product development partnerships are a relatively new way to 
organize, fund and govern the development of products for neglected diseases, little 
social science research has been conducted on how they operate.  Many scholars 
address product development partnerships in a theoretical way, drawing on 
literature to describe their organizational structures and their impacts on governance 
(Widdus 2005; Buse and Walt 2000a and 2000b; Chataway et al. 2007a; Chataway 
et al. 2010).  Chataway et al. (2010) have described product development 
partnerships in a positive light.  These scholars state that partnerships bring 
together different actors around objectives, facilitating cooperation and sharing 
information collectively, and that the organizations involved in partnerships have the 
capacity to devise creative solutions that surpass the limited perspectives of the 
individual partners.  But little evidence has been collected about whether 
partnerships actually live up to these assertions (Gerrets 2010).  Furthermore, Buse 
and Harmer (2004) find that a majority of literature on global health partnerships lack 
a focus on power relations and yet relations of power are at the centre of 
partnerships.  These two public health researchers raise the concern that 
partnerships allow powerful actors undue influence in global health to promote their 
own interests.  For example, partnerships open new opportunities for private 
companies to influence and exercise power in domains once controlled by the public 
sector, such as setting priorities in health and diseases control.  From the 
perspective of these two scholars, the discourse of ‘partnership’ is a rhetorical 
device that portrays partnership as inevitable and a ‘win-win’ for those involved and 
thus effectively denies inequalities exists between actors and institutions.  This 
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discursive construction means that power differences are left unarticulated, making 
it difficult to criticize partnerships and contest the influence of powerful actors.    
Some qualitative research has been conducted about product development 
partnerships.  Chataway and Smith (2006) examine IAVI when it was a burgeoning 
organization.  Through a literature review and interviews with IAVI partners, staff 
and funders, the authors find that IAVI serves as a case study of how partnerships 
have shaped capacity building and awareness of HIV/AIDS in the places it operates.  
Hanlin (2008) conducted qualitative research on IAVI in Kenya, exploring 
collaborative activity and the role of innovation in health care, knowledge exchange 
and capacity building.  The anthropologist, Nading (2015), conducted ethnographic 
research on the partnerships formed to develop a dengue vaccine at the US Centres 
for Disease Control in Puerto Rico, uncovering the intersection of biosecurity, capital 
and humanitarian interest in shaping the aims and activities of global health actors.  
Few of these scholars, save for Nading (2015), critically examine product 
development partnerships by focusing on power relations, hierarchy, dominance and 
inequality between actors, organizations and places.  As well, none of these 
accounts describe the end of partnerships, people’s reflections on partnership as 
they draw to a close, or the affect, labour and exchange that is involved in 
partnership.  My thesis fills these gaps in the literature through analysis of the 
RTS,S vaccine partnerships and clinical trial.        
Once product development partnerships have been formed to develop a 
drug or vaccine to combat infectious diseases found in resource-poor countries, 
often partnerships and collaborative relationships are formed between Northern and 
Southern institutions to test products.  I now shift to a description of malaria and an 
overview of the history of malaria control and research. 
Malaria Control and Research 
Until this point, I have explored the rise of partnerships in international 
development and global health.  However, partnerships have also arisen in the field 
of malaria control and research.  In this section, I draw on historical, scientific and 
social science literature to provide background on malaria, malaria research and 
control, and the rise of partnerships aimed at addressing malaria.  
Malaria is a parasite that has been infecting humans for over 500,000 years, 
shaping our evolution and our societies (Shah 2010).  Mal’aria, meaning ‘bad air’, 
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was a term used by medieval Italians who believed the disease was caused by 
poisonous vapours emanating from swamps.  During the medieval period, the 
incidence of malaria often mapped onto impoverished areas and was associated 
with people who were unfortunate to sleep without a roof over their head, work in 
marshes, or those who fought in the trenches.  Thus, the disease was associated 
with class and place (Packard 2007; Kelly and Beisel 2011). 
Through scientific research, it began to be understood that malaria was 
caused by something other than marsh vapours.  Through many decades of 
scientific research, human malaria is now understood to be caused by a protozoan 
parasite transmitted by female mosquitoes4.  To date, six species of this single-
celled parasite are known to infect humans, although three5 are largely zoonotic 
diseases found amongst non-human primates.  Of the six species, Plasmodium 
falciparum and P. vivax most commonly infect humans.  While all malaria species 
can cause debilitating illnesses, P. falciparum is accountable for the vast majority of 
deaths (Ashley et al. 2018).  Currently, half the world’s population is at risk of 
contracting malaria, which is transmitted through the bite of a mosquito.  However, a 
vast majority of malaria cases occur in sub-Saharan Africa where P. falciparum is 
endemic in many countries.  In estimates from 2016, there were 216 million cases of 
malaria and 445,000 deaths.  Those most vulnerable to malaria are children under 
the age of five, who make up two thirds of malaria deaths (Crawley et al. 2010; 
WHO 2018).   
The life cycle of malaria requires two hosts—a human and a female 
Anopheles mosquito—and begins with a human being bitten by an infected 
mosquito.  While a mosquito feeds on a human, sporozoites (the infective form of 
the malaria parasite) enter the human blood stream.  The parasites travel to the liver 
and invade it, dividing into as many as thirty thousand daughter cells over several 
weeks, months or years, depending on the malaria species.  These daughter cells 
are then released into the blood stream, invading the red blood cells.  Inside the red 
blood cells, the parasites grow and multiply and eventually cause the red blood cells 
to burst with new parasites, which then spread and invade other red blood cells.  
The continuous destruction of the red blood cells leads to anaemia, as well as the 
periodic fever and chills that characterize malaria.  After several days, male and 
                                              
4 Of the 450 known species of Anopheles mosquitoes, only 70 transmit malaria (Shah 2010).   
 
24 
female gametes form and when the human host is bitten by a mosquito again, these 
sexual forms are ingested by the mosquito where they produce new sporozoites.  
After seven to fourteen days, the mosquito is ready to infect a human with malaria 
once again (Vekemans et al. 2009; Casares, Brumeanu and Richie 2010).   
Malaria affects the blood, kidneys and brain, leading people to suffer from 
anaemia, fever, headache and vomiting.  P. falciparum can develop into cerebral 
malaria, which blocks the capillaries and small blood vessels in the brain, stopping 
oxygen from properly circulating.  This can lead to neurological or learning deficits, 
or even death.  This strain of malaria particularly affects pregnant women, who have 
a lower immunity to malaria, and those who are not immune, such as children.  
People living in malaria endemic regions tend to develop tolerance to malaria if they 
are continuously exposed to it for many years and by the time people reach their 
early teens they often attain functional, clinical immunity.  This means that although 
they still experience the symptoms of malaria, they do not tend to suffer from severe 
malaria and have a lower chance of dying from the disease.  However, that 
resistance diminishes if people spend time in other areas where no malaria or a 
different species of malaria is transmitted (Doolan et al. 2009; Sherman 2009; 
Ashley et al. 2018).   
Malaria is more likely to be found between 45º north and 40º south and is 
endemic in many regions of Africa.  However, it has not always been confined to 
tropical regions and was once found in some regions of Europe and North America, 
including Britain.  It is thought that malaria came to Europe from either Africa or Asia 
Minor.  Malaria spread across Europe over the centuries, reaching England by the 
14th century and the Americas through European explorers, African slaves, 
colonists, and conquistadors (Packard 2007; Sherman 2009).   
Although one of the oldest diseases in existence, population growth and 
changes to the environment have put malaria mosquitoes in closer contact with 
humans and increased its transmission.  Agricultural pursuits, especially rice 
production, have altered the natural tropical ecosystem in some regions, creating 
open areas of water that are ideal for mosquito breeding sites.  Destruction of 
forests, development of irrigation systems, cash crop cultivation and man-made 
lakes also result in increased mosquito populations and malaria prevalence in 
                                                                                                                                




endemic regions.  Instead of attaining progressive development, as was the aim with 
many of these ecological changes, these activities have often resulted in higher 
rates of malaria (Packard 2007; Packard and Brown 1997; Desowitz 1991).  This is 
one illustration of the way that malaria is social, “connected with the economic and 
political life of the people who inhabit the regions where it dominates” (Celli 1900, 
cited in Packard 2007: 111). 
During colonialism, Africa was dubbed “the white man’s grave” due to the 
high rate of death from malaria.  Since malaria made colonization difficult, 
Europeans had an interest in understanding and controlling the disease.  It was 
understood that people native to Africa were comparatively less affected by malaria 
but the nature of this immunity was unknown (Doolan et al. 2009; Sherman 2009).  
Despite little understanding of malaria, drug therapy was developed with the 
discovery of cinchona trees in Peru in the 16th century.  The bark of these trees was 
used to successfully treat malaria and by 1820 the active agent was isolated to 
make quinine.  Development of this drug made it possible for Europeans to live in 
Africa (Rocco 2003; Sherman 2009). 
In order for prevention and treatment of malaria to expand beyond the use of 
quinine, people had to gain a better understanding of how malaria was transmitted.  
The Plasmodium parasite was first observed by Charles Laveran, a French army 
physician posted in Algeria in the late 1870s.  Laveran examined blood from a 
feverish artilleryman, using a microscope to spot the parasite.  In the 1890s, Ronald 
Ross, an English surgeon who worked in India as part of the Indian Medical Forces, 
discovered the association between mosquitoes and the malaria parasite, 
uncovering the life cycle of Plasmodium in the mosquito.  In 1898, Giovanni Battista 
Grassi, an Italian scientist, was able to identify that it is the Anopheles mosquito that 
transmits malaria6,7 (Packard 2007; Shah 2010; Sherman 2009). 
                                              
6 These discoveries were first documented by Western physicians but might not have been 
uncovered had it not been for conflict, the expanding French and British Empires and the 
assistance of non-Western people (Packard 2007; Kelly and Beisel 2011). 
7 Europeans were not the only people to think there was a connection between mosquitoes 
and malaria.  Robert Koch, a German scientist, was sent by the German government to the 
Usambara Mountains in Tanganyika, then part of German East Africa.  He stayed there 
between 1897 and 1898 and found that the locals called malaria “Mbu” because they thought 
it was carried by the mbu, which is the Swahili word for mosquito.  But with the use of 
European technologies such as the microscope and with employment of the scientific 
method, this connection became well understood and documented by Europeans (Sherman 
2009).   
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With malaria better understood, various control measures were developed in 
the twentieth century, spanning from the technical-biomedical to the socio-medical.  
These various approaches related not only to a spirit of optimism upon discovery of 
the connection between parasites and mosquitoes but also the institutional 
arrangements that involved a multitude of international, national, private and public 
actors.  However, it was unclear how best to combat malaria around the world.  
Following from Celli, an Italian physician and parasitologist, some believed that high 
disease prevalence related to general squalor and was best tackled with 
development measures, including economic reforms, agricultural innovation, and 
improvements in housing.  Others, influenced by British and American scientists, 
thought that the fight had to target the vector, an approach termed ‘species 
sanitation’.  This approach involved systematic identification and destruction of the 
breeding grounds of the Anopheles mosquito through draining marshes, oiling 
ponds, and filling ditches with concrete (Packard and Brown 1997; Packard 2007; 
Kelly and Beisel 2011; Eckl 2017).   
Most prominent twentieth century malariologists acknowledged the economic 
and social forces that shaped malaria epidemiology and the need for economic and 
social development.  Yet malaria control efforts seldom incorporated these broader 
views and control efforts increasingly relied on narrow solutions.  By the 1950s, 
malaria control largely took the form of long lasting pesticides and antimalarial 
drugs.  Mass distribution of pharmaceutical drugs (chloroquine at the time) was 
cheaper because it did not require much pre-existing infrastructure or specialist 
knowledge.  And dichlorodiphenyl trichloroethylene (DDT), a pesticide created by a 
Swiss company in the 1930s, was found to kill insects at low concentrations.  World 
War II created the capacity and impetus to produce large quantities of this pesticide 
and it was found that irrespective of dire sanitary conditions or a lack of shelter, 
blanket application of DDT could quickly control insect-related disease (Packard 
2007; Kelly and Beisel 2011).   
This shift in control methods was accompanied by a change in institutional 
arrangements.  During the post-war period, an international system of governance 
was developed through the Bretton Woods Institutions.  Growing out of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the WHO was established, which was a 
separation that institutionalized public health.  This institutional separation led 
people to consider malaria as a public health problem and not a problem of 
economic or social development.  This narrowed the scope of possible interventions 
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to those focused on the health of individuals and populations and not on the 
boosting of local economies or improving ecological management.  Also, colonial 
governments were being dismantled, public health was internationalized, and 
medical expertise became centralized with public health decisions largely made in 
New York and Geneva by large multinational organizations, which shifted control 
from local governments.  Additionally, there was great faith in technology and 
science to develop underdeveloped countries.  Under these circumstances, policy 
makers set the goal of eradicating malaria through the deployment of technology 
with the aim of developing poorer nations and expanding markets (Packard and 
Brown 1997; Packard 1997 and 2007)   
At this time, DDT was the tool of choice and by 1950 many countries 
depended on routine spraying for their antimalarial programs.  So promising were 
the results that the global program to eradicate malaria from the world was launched 
in 1955 with technical aid provided by the WHO and funding from UNICEF, USAID 
and local governments.  This program led to the distribution of drugs for those 
infected and the widespread spraying of DDT in many regions of the world, which 
led to striking short-term beneficial outcomes.  Costing nearly US$1.4 billion over 14 
years, this funding peaked by 1965 and by 1970 eradication was achieved in 18 
countries, mainly in places with stable economies and well-developed infrastructure, 
and/or island nations (Packard 2007; Kelly and Beisel 2011).   
In other places, widespread spraying was more costly and difficult.  The 
mosquito species Anopheles eventually adapted and rates of malaria surged in 
many places.  As well, the excessive use of DDT in the Tennessee Valley and 
elsewhere helped launch the modern environmental movement and calls were made 
for this spraying to end.  Donors one by one withdrew funding and in 1969 the WHO 
abandoned its strategy of eradication, seeing no end to the demands on funding.  It 
was recommended that control programs be carried out by individual states and 
integrated into primary health care systems (Packard 2007; Desowitz 2002; 
Sherman 2009; Carter 2014). 
Africa was never truly figured into widespread malaria control programs at 
the time.  Policy makers thought that extensive DDT spraying would lead to long-
term problems as it would interrupt naturally acquired immunity to the disease.  In 
this conceptualization, malaria in Europe and the Americas was not the same as 
malaria in Africa (Packard 2007) 
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By the 1970s, malaria eradication was no longer on the agenda and malaria 
control and research funding was greatly reduced.  Countries that had been 
dependent on international funding for vertical programs found their health care 
infrastructures weakened and they were unable to adequately deploy malaria 
prevention methods.  Anti-malaria programs shifted toward treatment, involving the 
delivery of drugs to those in need, with preventive methods being abandoned.  
However, resistance to chloroquine grew and the incidence of malaria resurged as 
the malaria parasite developed resistance.  This situation lasted for decades 
(Packard 2007; Kelly and Beisel 2011).  New drugs for malaria and mosquito 
prevention tools have been created over time8 but the story is the same: it works 
miracles at the beginning but eventually resistance grows along with the number of 
malaria cases.  Plasmodium has a great ability to develop resistance to drugs, while 
the Anopheles mosquito has a rapid and ongoing speciation process.  Thus, both 
parasite and mosquito develop resistance to drugs and sprays in a quick pace, 
complicating malaria prevention and control.  Each method, unless 100% effective, 
forces the mosquito or the malaria parasite to adapt and evolve.  In this way, malaria 
control and prevention shape the biology of the parasite, vector, and the disease 
epidemiology (Mackinnon and Marsh 2010; Desowitz 2002; Packard 2007; 
Vekemans, Leach and Cohen 2009; Dondorp et al. 2009).   
For decades after the failed attempt to eradicate malaria, funding for malaria 
research and control fell drastically.  But as described at the beginning of this 
introduction, since the 1990s there has been a paradigm shift amongst global health 
actors.  Armed with new tools and unprecedented funding, the Gates Foundation 
has reignited efforts to not only tackle malaria but to eliminate it.  Unlike the previous 
elimination program, sub-Saharan Africa is the primary focus of these renewed 
efforts.  Also, where elimination efforts during the 1950s and 1960s were 
spearheaded by international governance structures like the WHO and underpinned 
by social welfare systems, contemporary efforts are directed by public-private 
partnerships, large-scale development donors and international research 
collaborations.  The Gates Foundation, WHO, PMI and other organizations have 
entered into public-private partnerships and ushered in an era of 
philanthrocapitalism, applying business techniques to philanthropy, whereby actors 
                                              
8 For more information on the various ways that people have fought, controlled or eliminated 
malaria, see Mitchell 2002, Carter 2012, Packard 2007, Desowitz 1991 and 2002. 
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aim to make a profit while doing good socially (McGoey 2015; Kamat 2013; Kelly 
and Beisel 2011; Packard 2007).  As discussed above, the first of such partnerships 
for malaria was RBM, which as of 2015 had over 500 partners from the private 
sector, multilateral organizations, malaria-endemic countries, and academic and 
research institutions.  As partnerships for malaria research and control have 
proliferated, RBM has played an important role in coordinating these partnership, as 
well as mobilizing resources and action, and developing a global strategy (Chandler 
and Beisel 2017; Gerrets 2015b). 
Although this period began with an emphasis on the social dimensions of 
malaria, it eventually turned towards more narrowly focused methods.  
Organizations involved in malaria control have increasingly tackled the disease with 
a particular vision of public health, one linked to neoliberalism and growth and 
supported by capital, science, technology and expertise.  Framing malaria control 
and research for two decades, emphasis has been placed on research that seeks 
technological solutions, such as vaccines or new drugs, and programs that deploy 
technological solutions.  It is thought that through infusions of funds, advances in 
genomics and application of technological tools, malaria can be out-paced (Eckl 
2017; Litsios 2015; Kamat 2013; Packard 2007; Kelly and Beisel 2011; Chandler 
and Beisel 2017).   
Current malaria control programs to address P. falciparum and the 
Anopheles mosquito include the provision of artemisinin-based combination 
therapies (ACTs), insecticide-treated nets, intermittent preventive treatment (IPTp) 
for pregnant women, indoor residual spraying (IRS) of buildings, larvicide treatment 
of standing water in cities, improved malaria diagnosis, including the use of rapid 
diagnostic tests (mRDTs), and behavioural change and communication (PMI 2013; 
THMIS 2012; Mandike 2013).  With resistance growing to ACTs and insecticides, 
malaria research is aimed at devising new drugs, insecticides and vaccines, and 
monitoring malaria rates, the rise of mosquito and parasite resistance, and the 
impacts of malaria programs (Dondorp et al. 2009; Ranson et al. 2011; Greenwood 
and Targett 2011).  Funding for research and control programs derive from 
institutions, governments, foundations, companies and organizations working in 
partnership with in-country malaria control programs and research institutions 
(Gerrets 2010).      
Several social scientists (Packard 2007; Birn 2014; Kelly and Beisel 2011; 
Kamat 2013) criticize contemporary malaria control programs.  They argue that 
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although malaria is back on the health agenda and health outcomes have improved 
due to public-private partnerships, these efforts have taken a narrow focus.  Disease 
research and the creation of technological solutions have been chosen over broader 
development and public health initiatives.  As Kelly and Beisel (2011: 84) state:  
The current shift in commitment from management to 
technological fixes represents an abandonment of local 
capacity.  The innovative solutions … are a matter of 
transfer: technologies invented somewhere are retooled and 
relocated to improve life elsewhere (emphasis in text). 
But as Packard and Brown (1997: 187) point out, this narrow focus ignores the 
economic and social determinants of malaria, allowing global health actors “not to 
be concerned with thorny problems of poverty and inequalities in the distribution of 
land and capital resources”.  Kamat (2013) contends that the factors that underpin 
persistent malaria, including historically and structurally entrenched inequalities, 
widespread poverty and climate change, are enormous challenges but they need to 
be addressed in order to truly eliminate malaria.      
In the last two decades there has been a growing interest in malaria amongst 
anthropologists.  In 1997, a special issue was published in Medical Anthropology, 
edited by Packard and Brown.  Since then, two other special issues have been 
published: In 2015, ‘Re-imagining malaria - A Platform for Reflections to Widen 
Horizons in Malaria Control’ in Malaria Journal, edited by Dr. Julian Eckl and Dr. 
Susanna Hausmann-Muela; and in 2017, ‘The Anthropology of Malaria: Locating the 
Social’ in Medical Anthropology, edited by Clare I.R. Chandler and Uli Beisel.  These 
special issues have included articles that explore malaria control through time and in 
a range of places around the world.  These special issues join anthropology books, 
journal articles and PhD theses that examine malaria from many angles.  Some 
publications have explored how people understand and address malaria (Marsland 
2005 and 2007; Iskander 2015; O’Neill et al. 2015; Langwick 2008; Kamat 2006, 
2009 and 2013).  Others examine various malaria control methods, including drugs 
(Kamat 2013; Kamat and Nyato 2010; Gerrets 2010), IRS (Montgomery et al. 2010), 
ITNs (Marsland 2005; Shum 2010), mRDTs (Chandler et al. 2012; Beisel et al. 
2015; Umlauf 2017), larviciding (Kelly and Lezaun 2014; Kelly and Beisel 2011; 
Kelly 2015), repellents (Kelly et al. 2017) and the development of malaria vaccines 
(Geissler et al. 2008; Turnbull 1989).  A few anthropologists have described the 
institutional arrangements that underpin malaria control and research (Litsios 2015; 
Eckl 2017), while others have charted the rise of data collection and audit in tracking 
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malaria and control measures (Gerrets 2012a; Tichnor 2017).  Also, quite a few of 
these publications have focused on malaria in Tanzania (i.e. Marsland 2005; Kamat 
2006, 2009 and 2013; Kamat and Nyato 2010; Kelly 2011; Kelly and Beisel 2011; 
Kelly and Lezaun 2014; Langwick 2008; Gerrets 2010, 2012b and 2015).          
Of particular salience to my thesis is Gerrets’ PhD thesis (2010), which is 
currently the only in-depth ethnography written about a public-private partnership 
aimed at carrying out malaria research and control.  In his thesis, Gerrets explains 
that many actors, including the Gates Foundation and WHO, have encouraged and 
funded the formation of partnerships.  These actors often claim that partnerships are 
the best way to fund and carry out malaria research and control.  However, some 
critique partnerships, questioning their ability to attain equality between Northern 
and Southern actors when these relationships are marked by dependencies and 
large financial differences.  However, little research has been conducted about the 
social dynamics and inner workings of partnerships in context and over time to 
support either argument.  To fill this gap in the literature, Gerrets explores the 
research activities and internal organization of a global health partnership (given the 
pseudonym of CONTACT) formed to research the ability of ACTs to delay or reverse 
malaria drug resistance in south eastern Tanzania.  Throughout the thesis, he uses 
the term ‘partnership’ to describe both a type of organization (a public-private 
partnership) and a type of relationship based on equality, respect, mutuality and 
consensus (157).   
In one ethnographic chapter, Gerrets (2010) complicates assumptions often 
made of global health partnerships, finding differences between the theory and 
practice of partnership while exploring labour relations between the different levels 
of staff at CONTACT.  Staff held aspirations for egalitarianism and viewed labour 
relations as ideally upholding social justice and morality.  Additionally, Tanzanian 
cultural particularities tend to favour communitarian beliefs and values.  However, 
Gerrets finds that the ideals of partnership are difficult to sustain when they come up 
against stratification, which is a necessary feature of most complex organizations, 
and neoliberal economics.  Although Southern actors higher up the strata were able 
to use their influence and power to shape decision-making, further down the 
hierarchy inequalities were particularly pronounced.  This creates tension between 
the ideal of partnership and the realities.  What resulted was instances when staff, 
particularly those at a lower stratum (especially data collectors) felt unequal and 
even abused by those at a higher stratum.  This impacted how much staff worked 
 
32 
and if they recorded data correctly, with rumours circulating about data collectors 
fabricating data when they felt disrespected.  These experiences of staff at different 
strata complicates simplistic conceptualizations of partnership, demonstrating that 
under local and global political-economic pressures, partnership can be a way to 
gain power for some while leading to oppression and exploitation of others.   
   In the next chapter, Gerrets (2010) explores the inter-organizational 
dynamics and structures of the CONTACT partnership.  First, he attempts to map 
the various infrastructures, actors, funds and objects that constitute the partnership 
over time and space, although their multitude and complexity makes this difficult.  
Gerrets highlights not only the highly visible actors involved in the partnership but 
the less visible, ordinary ones, such as electricity, roads, and so on.  Second, he 
describes the fluidity of the partnership.  Gerrets finds that the agency of actors was 
enabled or constrained at different times and that a level of flexibility was necessary 
in the operation of the partnership.  This flexibility allowed staff to handle the various 
challenges that arose, such as periods when funds or drugs were difficult to obtain.  
During times of difficulty, actors within and outside of Tanzania came together to 
enable the research to proceed.  This chapter effectively demonstrates that 
partnerships are complex processual and relational networks.       
In the final ethnographic chapter, Gerrets (2010) further describes the social 
dynamics and inner workings of the CONTACT partnership.  He explains that public-
private partnerships face increasing demands from donors and recipients for 
measurable results of success.  In response, partnerships multiply techniques and 
mechanisms of monitoring and auditing as a way to govern from a distance.  
However, this has implications for the production of knowledge.  Despite the 
contextual and fluid meaning of malaria, through data collection, the CONTACT 
partnership “shapes the production of authoritative scientific facts” (341), which 
impacts how malaria is seen and understood.  Data collectors act as linguistic and 
conceptual brokers who shape the contours of data by “mediating between local 
discursive realities and global biomedical science represented through surveys and 
interviews” (403).  This means that the composition of the data is highly impacted by 
the context of data collection, including how data collectors engage with and ask 
questions of informants.  The wider political-economic and socio-cultural aspects are 
rarely addressed during data collection and the ambiguities and miscommunications 
between data collectors and informants went unrecorded.  The data that was 
recorded was moved, digitized and thus reified, making its veracity impossible to 
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verify.  In this way, data collectors—and the CONTACT partnership more widely—
play a role in shaping scientific knowledge about malaria and how the disease is 
acted upon.   
Overall, Gerrets’ (2010) PhD thesis has many parallels to my own.  It offers 
an in-depth examination of a particular partnership and demonstrates its wider 
impacts on knowledge production and malaria control.  His thesis, along with other 
anthropological research about malaria, serve as important work that my thesis 
builds upon as a I explore a specific research partnership that produces new 
knowledge that may impact future malaria control programs.  However, none of 
these anthropological accounts describe a malaria research partnership as it is 
ending, which is a gap in the literature that my thesis fills.  Turning from a discussion 
about partnerships in malaria research and control to focus on the local level, below 
I provide historical background about health care provision in Tanzania and the rise 
of partnerships as a mode of providing resources in low-income settings.   
Health Care in Tanzania 
To understand the role of global health partnerships in health care provision, 
I weave together secondary literature and ethnographic studies of health care in 
Tanzania.   
The Tanzanian health care system was created during German colonial rule 
of East Africa, which spanned 1884 to 1918 (Iliffe 1998; Turshen 1984).  Malaria, the 
leading public health issue in Tanzania, has impacted much of the country 
throughout its history, save for high-altitude regions that are malaria free (Iliffe 
1979).  Under German colonial rule, attempts were made to reduce death and 
sickness caused by malaria, several years after it became understood that the 
disease was transmitted by the anopheline mosquito.  This discovery, made by 
Ronald Ross in 1896, led to efforts to protect groups considered relevant to the 
economy, including urban residents, some African labourers, and Europeans (Clyde 
1967; Beck 1977; Sherman 2009).  After the First World War, the British assumed 
control of the colony, renaming it Tanganyika.  From 1919 to 1961, health services 
grew under British rule with the rural health system expanding (Turshen 1984; Iliffe 
1998).  Over that time, a growing proportion of the population was exposed to 
measures to control malaria (Clyde 1967; Beck 1977). 
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During the colonial era, health care provision for Africans was patchy and fit 
an enclave pattern, whereby most health care investment was found in places that 
were directly productive to the economy.  The health system was unsuited to the 
geographical realities and population distribution, as well as the financial difficulties 
of a poor country.  Most doctors in Tanganyika were European and a majority of 
health services were provided to military personnel, or in urban centres and near 
plantations to keep the mostly male labour force healthy and able to work.  These 
medical services were qualitatively better than those available in other places that 
were not economically productive or of interest to colonial governments, including 
places that served as labour reserves (Giblin 2005; Iliffe 1998; Turshen 1984; 
Vaughan 1991; Feierman 1985).  Mission hospitals provided health care and 
became the only places that would treat African women and children (Feierman 
1985; Vaughan 1991).   
This situation changed after independence from British rule in 1961 
(Heggenhougen and Lugalla 2005).  From the 1950s to the late 1970s, 
decolonization and national independence movements across Africa were in full 
force and there were aspirations for ameliorating policies centred on the ability of the 
state to bring about self-determined development.  Administrative structures 
established during colonialism were dismantled, replaced with modern state 
administrative apparatuses.  National infrastructure projects were undertaken, 
including the establishment of factories, roads and power stations (Rottenburg 
2009).   
In Tanzania, Julius Nyerere, a graduate of the University of Edinburgh, was a 
teacher who rose to power and pushed for independence from British rule.  He is 
fondly called mwalimu, or teacher, or Baba wa Taifa (Father of the Nation) by people 
throughout Tanzania and to this day, his picture hangs in many rooms throughout 
the country.  In 1960, Nyerere became Chief Minister under British Trusteeship and 
in 1961, he became president when the colony of Tanganyika became independent 
from British rule.  Joining with the island of Zanzibar in 1964, the country acquired 
the name of Tanzania.  From 1961 to 1967, socialist policies began being instituted 
but this period did not significantly differ from the colonial period.  Although racial 
discrimination was put to an end, the private sector—particularly religious 
organizations—remained the dominant health care provider and the focus was on 
curative rather than preventative health care provision (Heggenhougen and Lugalla 
2005).  However, the number of health care providers increased and from 1961 to 
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1970, the number of Tanzanians who became doctors increased in number from 12 
to 123 on the mainland of Tanzania (Iliffe 1998).   
In 1967, the government of Tanzania was headed by the Tanganyika African 
National Union (TANU), the only official political party at the time.  TANU redefined 
its development direction and political ideology and with the publishing of the Arusha 
Declaration, became professedly socialist.  Rejecting the capitalist route to 
development, TANU vowed to create a socialist society through the principles of 
“ujamaa” (family hood) and self-reliance (Nyerere 1968; Heggenhougen and Lugalla 
2005).  Nyerere’s vision for Tanzania was based upon enlarging government control 
over social and economic life (Gerrets 2015).  Banks, schools, insurance firms, and 
health institutions and other companies and institutions were nationalized 
(Heggenhougen and Lugalla 2005).  The Arusha Declaration contained little about 
health but the adoption of socialism opened the country to the influence of medical 
systems found in other socialist countries, such as China (Iliffe 1998).  Health care 
was made universally accessible for all citizens and there was an effort to improve 
access to health services and distribute them equitably in an attempt to eliminate 
poverty and disease (Heggenhougen and Lugalla 2005).  The government viewed 
health care as both an ends and a means of developing Tanzania.  Health care 
could improve development by improving health outcomes and making healthier 
communities, and simultaneously, improvement in health care provision 
demonstrated how far Tanzania had come in its development (Harrington 1999).   
From 1973 to 1976, the Tanzanian government engaged in the ujamaa 
village campaign, whereby some 6 million people were relocated into nucleated 
settlements.  This was largely undertaken as a welfare and development project by 
a relatively weak and benign state.  The aim was to facilitate communal farming, 
make communities easier to control, and provide social services, such as clinics, 
schools and clean water.  Some communities resisted relocation and in some 
instances the government used force to move people into planned villages.  This 
campaign had a disastrous effect on agricultural production and the state was forced 
to import large quantities of food between 1973 and 1975.  In the end, the planned 
villages failed as human communities, units of production, and as a way to deliver 
social services.  The government subsequently abandoned this form of social 
engineering (Scott 1998; Jennings 2002).  
The Tanzanian government found other ways to improve access to health 
care and drugs.  During the 1970s, Nyerere banned commercial involvement in 
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health care (Gerrets 2015).  Large investments were made into constructing a few 
big hospitals, as well as health care centres and dispensaries in rural settings.  A 
study conducted in 6 of the country’s 20 regions indicated that by 1979, 92% of the 
population lived within 10 kilometres of a health facility and 70% within 5 kilometres.  
Rural Medical Aids, Medical Assistants and Community Health Workers (inspired by 
China’s ‘barefoot doctors’) were trained, and emphasis was placed on preventative 
over curative health care provision.  Health care provision was largely dominated by 
public institutions, such as the Ministry of Health (Heggenhougen et al. 1987; 
Heggenhougen and Lugalla 2005).   
Until the mid-1980s, Tanzania experienced economic growth, providing free 
health care and building social infrastructure (Shiner 2003; Evans and Ngalwea 
2003).  The Tanzanian government expanded health services, building more rural 
health facilities than many other resource-poor countries.  By 1985, one-third of 
villages had a health facility.  By the 1990s, Tanzania had four large national referral 
hospitals, a regional hospital in every region, 152 district hospitals for the 106 
districts, and 3,000 dispensaries.  This extensive system of rural health care was the 
envy of many African countries.  As well, by 1991, about 700 doctors were 
produced, along with hundreds of nurses and medical officers (Iliffe 1998).  
However, the equitable distribution of health services in rural parts of the country 
were not fully realized due to economic and personnel shortages (Heggenhougen et 
al. 1987; Heggenhougen and Lugalla 2005; Gerrets 2015).   
By the 1980s, much of the fervor of decolonization in Africa ended with many 
of the ambitious goals left unachieved (Rottenburg 2009).  At that time, an economic 
crisis hit Tanzania due to a rise in oil prices in the late 1970s coupled with a fall in 
export values (Shiner 2003).  The elements of failure that led to this crisis were built 
into post-colonial settlements that rooted the economies in old trading and 
commodity dependence that continued to benefit Europe and industrial countries 
(Bush 2007).  By the 1980s, Tanzania had a deficit that led to heavy borrowing in 
the form of loans from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.  These 
organizations instituted structural adjustment programs, a set of strict stipulations 
that governments had to follow in order to access new loans or receive a lower 
interest rate for existing loans (Heggenhougen and Lugalla 2005; Rottenburg 2009).  
These structural adjustment programs were a new form of governance and adhered 
to the prevailing neoliberal ideology of the times.  Structural adjustment led to the 
reduction of state spending and increased revenue through privatization, 
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international trade liberalization, market deregulation and state devolution 
(Rottenburg 2009).   
Structural adjustment was primarily imposed to cater to the interests of 
loaning banks and countries and to secure the international financial system 
(Packard 2016).  However, it had a devastating effect on the health care system in 
Tanzania.  Public health care and other welfare systems eroded and this either 
directly affected health through the cutting of financing for the health care system, or 
indirectly affected health through changing the economy and the scaling back of 
welfare programs.  The government privatized state run services, the role of the 
private health care sector increased, and health care services became decentralized 
(Heggenhougen and Lugalla 2005; Buse and Walt 2000b; Rottenburg 2009).   
In 1993, the Tanzanian state began to recover health care costs by charging 
user fees for access to services, making access to these health facilities more 
difficult for those who were impoverished (Shiner 2003; Bush 2007; Ake 1996).  
Current neoliberal models of health care provision emphasize the need to cut costs 
and shift costs onto users with user fees, termed “cost sharing” (Green 2000: 404; 
Dilger 2009; Ellison 2014).  The health of the Tanzanian population declined, 
reflected in rising mortality and morbidity rates and increased barriers to accessing 
medical care in rural areas (Shiner 2003).   
Tanzanian health care is currently provided by a mixture of government, 
private for-profit and private not-for-profit (e.g. mission hospitals) services.  The 
government delivers care in more than half of the facilities throughout the country 
and health coverage is better than in many other Sub-Saharan African countries.  As 
well, children under the age of five and pregnant women are exempt from user fees.  
Yet, the quality of services can be poor, infrastructure decaying or non-existent, and 
there can be inconsistent supplies of drugs in government health facilities (Shiner 
2003; Sullivan 2011).  In 2014, US$137 per capita was spent on health care in 
Tanzania9 (WHO 2015a).  Even with greater investment from government and 
international donors, years of underfunding and a general lack of funding for rural 
areas has profoundly impacted Tanzania’s public health care and people’s 
engagement with it (Green 2000).   
                                              




Estimates suggest there are only 0.39 nurses and 0.25 clinical staff (doctors, 
clinic officers and assistant medical officers) for every 1000 people (Manzi et al. 
2012).  Although this number is low, there are a variety of health care providers in 
Tanzania.  There are medical doctors with five-year degrees; clinic officers with 
three-year degrees; assistant medical officers with two-year diplomas; and assistant 
clinic officers with two-year certificates.  These health care providers are often 
trained at the medical schools in Tanzania (Heggenhougen and Lugalla 2005).  
There are also three kinds of nurses: assistant nurse, certified nurse and registered 
nurse, with each receiving increasing amounts of training.  Community health 
workers also play a role in improving access to health care.  Although not a panacea 
for an underfunded health care system, community health workers can be on hand 
in communities to provide emergency care and advice on sanitation, nutrition and 
hygiene and link patients to primary health care providers (Heggenhougen et al. 
1987; Mubi et al. 2016; Haines et al. 2007; World Vision 2015). 
Rottenburg (2009) argues that although structural adjustment programs were 
instituted with the aim of improving ailing economies and securing debt repayment, 
they had the effect of hollowing out already dysfunctional states and diminishing the 
core meaning of citizenship.  This hollowing out and loss of institutions that could 
negotiate the claims and interests of different actors has meant that conflicts have 
flared up across Africa, and there have been various kinds of state failure, including 
corruption, abuse and violations of law, and constant humanitarian disasters.  With 
state structures often ailing, the policies of international development organizations 
shifted from the support of state functions to the direct support of populations to 
bring about their own development.  The bypassing of governments shifted from 
being an illicit act and became a sign of a genuine concern for impoverished 
populations.  
Attracted by catastrophes and emergencies, there has been an increase and 
expanding range of heterogeneous actors and networks of public and private 
organizations involved in the operation of states and their health care and medical 
research activities.  With crises being viewed as humanitarian emergencies, public 
and private organizations intervene by deploying biomedicine.  State privatization 
and devolution led to a process of projectification, whereby corporate civil society 
agencies such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) assumed the functions 
of project agencies from government institutions by receiving aid and became 
accountable for achieving project goals.  Often this shift in responsibility was a 
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conditionality set by donor agencies (Rottenburg 2009).  However, over time, it has 
become difficult to distinguish emergencies from chronic poverty.  Rottenburg (2009) 
argues that by articulating the impacts of chronic poverty as a humanitarian 
emergency, Western public and private organizations legitimate their interventions in 
Africa, undermining the sovereignty of Africa states.  Thus, systemic creation of 
zones of exclusion and humanitarian emergencies—a product of structural 
adjustment programs—may be an intended outcome that legitimates Western 
intervention in Africa. 
The shift towards projectification and increase in non-state actor involvement 
has impacted the Tanzanian health care system.  Gerrets (2015) contends that 
despite decades of structural reforms that hollowed out government institutions in 
Tanzania, they remain stable, strong and prominent since the Nyerere era.  
However, as Sullivan (2011) found in Tanzania, the health care system is highly 
reliant on donors and NGOs for funding.  Often, transnational NGOs provide 
targeted interventions for particular diseases, like malaria and HIV/AIDS, within 
government health facilities.  In this way, NGOs not only provide health services in 
parallel to the state, services are often provided from within the state.  This makes it 
difficult to discern what is public and private health services.  Sullivan (2011) 
describes these situations as biomedical enclaves within the Tanzanian public 
health system, which seek to mobilize and improve biomedical practices and 
technologies to expand the provision of health care to the poor.       
Since the implementation of health sector reforms in 1999 to 2000, the 
Tanzanian Ministry of Health has aimed to increase salaries, improve working 
conditions and update training for workers through the implementation of health 
sector reforms.  Although some progress has been made towards these goals, other 
initiatives, including the reforming of management systems and equipment and drug 
supply, has been prioritized by outside donors who provide funding for these 
activities.  Through these initiatives, NGOs and other donors have sponsored 
programs to make available resources that the state has promised but been unable 
to deliver (Sullivan 2011).   
Transnational Medical Research  
Much like Tanzanian health care provision, funding for medical research in 
Tanzania was routed through public institutes up until the 1980s.  Currently, the 
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National Institute for Medical Research (NIMR) operates all medical research 
institutes in the country but this institution has its roots in colonial medical research.  
The colonial East Africa Bureau of Research in Medicine was established by the 
British to conduct and coordinate medicine and science in Tanganyika, Kenya and 
Uganda.  In 1961, at the tail end of the British colonial era, the East African Medical 
Research Council (EAMRC) was established in place of the colonial institution.  
However, funding ran out for the EAMRC in 1977 in the wake of the collapse of the 
East African community.  NIMR was founded in 1979 by the Tanzanian Parliament 
as a para-statal organization under the Tanzanian Ministry of Health and took the 
place of the EAMRC.  But during the 1980s and 1990s, public sector institutions like 
NIMR had their funding cut, leading to an inability to support research activities 
(Gerrets 2015).   
At the same time, Northern researchers required places to test new 
vaccines, drugs and medical devices for infectious diseases in the places where 
they would potentially be deployed (Street 2014).  Several anthropologists (Angell 
1997; Cooper 2008; Sunder Rajan 2007; Sariola and Simpson 2011; Petryna 2005 
and 2009) have examined transnational medical research conducted in resource-
poor settings, an activity that has sharply increased over the past few decades.  This 
increase has largely been precipitated by regulations put in place in the early 1990s 
that limited medical research conducted on prisoners in the US.  To make up for the 
loss of human volunteers, the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) actively 
encouraged clinical trials to be conducted outside of the US in order that the safety 
and efficacy of new drugs be ascertained.   
With Southern research institutions lacking funding and Northern 
researchers requiring human bodies for medical research, Northern researchers 
saw an opportunity and established partnerships with Southern research institutes 
and researchers.  In the last two decades, partnership has become a dominant 
mode for supporting research activities in resource-poor settings.  It supplants 
earlier concepts, such as colonial surveys and expeditions of imperial science or 
post-colonial provisions of expertise and funding in the name of developmental 
solidarity.  Using the phraseology of partnership and collaboration—which typically 
denotes relationships between equals—this indicates a wish to distance current 
global health practices and structures from previous traditions of tropical medicine 
and international health that were paternalistic and top-down in relation to poor 
nations.  Indeed, global health partnerships are often lauded as involving 
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collaboration and an equal balance of control and responsibilities for activities 
(Crane 2010; Okwaro and Geissler 2015).  Partnership can also bring about material 
benefits for Southern institutions.  As the anthropologist Gerrets (2010 and 2015) 
discovered in Tanzania, when NIMR established partnerships with foreign 
organizations in the North, this led to multiple benefits, including improvements in 
human capacity building, infrastructure and health care provisions.  However, 
partnerships and collaborative relationships formed between Northern and Southern 
institutions often involve stark differences in funding and resources between 
partnering organizations and actors (Crane 2013; Okwaro and Geissler 2015).   
The dominant form of transnational scientific production in sub-Saharan 
Africa (outside of South Africa) operates not as corporate drug trials, as is found in 
Eastern Europe and Asia (e.g. Petryna 2009; Sunder Rajan 2007), but as publicly 
funded collaborative research centres or field stations.  These research centres are 
often run by a para-statal organization affiliated with a Northern scientific 
organization.  Although the main source of funding stems from national government 
institutions, a growing number of public-private partnerships have been funding 
medical research in Africa.  These public-private partnerships, receiving private 
funding from sources such as the pharmaceutical industry, shape and contribute to 
public medical research.  Operating in many ways like corporate research, much 
research conducted in Africa involves a predominantly local staff conducting 
research on short-term work contracts.  Northern institutions control the scientific 
production process, with data often moved to and analyzed in Northern institutions 
(Geissler 2012).  This description mirrors how the RTS,S vaccine partnership and 
clinical trial functioned in Korogwe, Tanzania. 
Scholars have interpreted these shifts in the operation and funding of African 
medical research in various ways.  Partnership in health research is “imbued with 
positive moral value” and is a term that is accompanied by ideas of equality, 
freedom, mutuality, shared responsibility, balance of power, and reciprocal 
obligations (Okwaro and Geissler 2015: 3).  As well, the discourses about 
transnational research are largely about how partnerships are beneficial for both 
wealthy donors and impoverished African centres and employees.  Binka (2005) 
argues that North-South partnerships have a positive impact on medical research.  
He describes how North-South relationships were once predicated on steep 
hierarchies, with Northern institutions acting as donors and Southern institutions as 
a receiver of aid.  This arrangement was often described as scientific colonialism, 
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with the North dictating the agenda and providing the funding, which left Southern 
researchers at the mercy of partners in the North.  However, Binka contends that 
since the 21st century, partnerships are closer to “true partnerships” (2005: 207).  
This shift towards more equal, “true partnerships”, largely stems from Northern 
institutions attempting to redress inequalities, include researchers from the South in 
decisions and policy planning, and improve capacity and professional networks.   
Although Binka (2005) views contemporary partnerships as an improvement 
over past relationships, others scholars remain skeptical of medical research 
partnerships.  Relationships between the actors involved in global health are diverse 
and challenging and partnerships are performed in contexts of profound inequalities 
in resources and power that stem from colonial and post-colonial relations.  In 
practice, partnership and collaboration between actors and organizations may not 
be emancipatory or equal, leading to conflict (Crane 2010; Okwaro and Geissler 
2015).  Jentsch and Pilley (2003), having worked at a UK university and conducted 
qualitative research in Thailand and Bangladesh, question how equal partnerships 
can be when there are historically shaped structural inequalities that privileges 
Northern actors and allows them to dominate over Southern actors.   
The anthropologist Crane (2010) examined research partnerships between 
US academic institutions and African research institutions.  She contends that the 
term ‘partnership’ describes a wide range of ideal relationships and activities, 
including public health interventions and building of capacity to administer research 
funding.  These different interpretations of the term indicate that partnership is a 
loose term, one that is hard to pin down.  Due to this lack of attention to the activities 
and meanings of partnership, the complex power dynamics and diverse 
arrangements at play are obscured and collaborative relationships between North 
and South can resemble a donor/aid recipient relationship.  Partnership may bring 
material benefits, such as buildings, scientific infrastructure and employment 
opportunities.  However, these benefits may come with expectations that Northern 
funders can impose their will on African partners.  Due to this arrangement, Crane 
(2010) contests the idea that contemporary global health relationships have shifted 
from colonial power relations.   
Okwaro and Geissler (2015) argue that there is little examination of African 
scientists and their experiences.  As discussed above, they filled this gap by 
conducting ethnographic research amongst African scientists in East Africa and 
found partnership brought employment, research infrastructure, and built technical 
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capacity.  However, African scientists were dependent on Northern collaborators 
because government support for research was limited.  This situation led to conflict 
and a sense of ambivalence amongst many African scientists towards collaborative 
research relationships.  Building on this research, my thesis explores the 
experiences and reflections of African researchers and staff who were involved in 
the RTS,S vaccine partnerships and clinical trial in Tanzania, and I describe the 
views and experiences of their Northern partners.  
While I have discussed the rise of partnerships between Northern and 
Southern research organizations, transnational medical research necessitates the 
formation of social relationships between researchers and the people and 
communities involved in medical research.  These relationships are shaped by 
ethical research codes and guidelines.  Ethical codes articulate how people and 
organizations should relate to one another, including the care that needs to be 
provided to research participants.  Ethical codes arose in response to the Tuskegee 
experiment, which involved African Americans purposely denied treatment for 
syphilis, and Nazi atrocities during scientific experiments in Germany.  In the last 
three decades, medical research ethics has been a growing area of debate, 
coinciding with the rise of research conducted in resource-poor contexts.  Ethical 
regulations, such as the Nuremburg Code, the Belmont Report and the Declaration 
of Helsinki, have been increasingly refined to regulate medical research conducted 
in impoverished settings (Molyneux and Geissler 2008).  Additionally, the FDA has 
played an active role in shaping ethical protocols by establishing a set of standards 
in commercial pharmaceutical drug testing with the guideline, Good Clinical Practice 
(GCP), set by the International Conference on Harmonization (ICH).  In multi-sited 
research, these standards allow resulting data to be comparable across research 
sites.  Many countries signed on to the ICH-GCP, eager to attract investments in the 
production of pharmaceuticals.  National agencies were set up to monitor and 
standardize the conduct of clinical trials and countries created ethical review boards 
that monitored and regulated the conduct of globalized research to ensure the 
protection and rights of participants (Sunder Rajan 2007; Simpson and Sariola 2012; 
Petryna 2005 and 2009).    
Anthropologists have criticized transnational medical research and the 
ethical codes devised to control medical research practices.  Some anthropologists 
(Crane 2013; Street 2014; Petryna 2009) contend that medical research 
organizations have been attracted to conduct research in impoverished settings due 
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to the ill health that arises from poverty and gaps in health care provision, which 
creates sick and treatment naïve populations willing to be tested with new 
interventions.  In this way, research organizations working in impoverished places 
have been opportunistic or exploitative, benefiting from global inequalities.  Petryna 
(2009) employs Foucault’s theorization of power and subjectivity to argue that the 
globalization of clinical trials has reconfigured impoverished populations to be 
objects of governmentality and central to knowledge production and 
experimentation, a process she refers to as “experimentality” (30).  And Farmer 
(2002: 1266) argues that transnational “research is a reminder that some 
populations are not really developing but rather are being left behind by the same 
economic processes that enable powerful [institutions] to do research in poor 
countries.”   
Although ethical codes for medical research have been modified to regulate 
how medical research is carried out, these codes have been difficult to apply in 
practice and have led to the rise of national and local oversight in the hopes that it 
might lead to equitable research collaborations.  But these changes have not put to 
rest concerns about exploitation and inequality.  These debates about and shifts in 
ethical regulation relate to a recognition of the wider global inequities in wealth and 
health.  However, this broader context is generally considered outside the remit of 
medical research ethics.  Instead, the focus has been on improving the individual 
rights of research participants and strengthening relationships between researchers 
and study communities.  This includes expanding and improving informed consent 
procedures, as well as refining ethical guidelines and regulations, and tightening 
oversight of studies (Molyneux and Geissler 2008).  Yet, the strengthening of the 
processes of review and refinement of guidelines may inadvertently depoliticize 
ethical debates and narrow ethical reflection.  Additionally, the move towards the 
raising of standards has not always led to greater public trust and engagement.  In 
fact, in Africa there has been a move towards transnational collaboration with 
Northern research institutions, over African national institutions, and use of high-end 
technologies that are protected inside research enclaves.  This situation can lead to 
the strengthening of research capacity but creates challenges for building 
relationships with the public and local health systems.  Refinement of ethical 
documents and greater oversight does not inevitably improve this situation 
(Molyneux and Geissler 2008; Geissler 2014).   
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There have been calls from scholars (Kelly 2011; Kelly et al. 2010; Jentsch 
and Pilley 2003; Molyneux and Geissler 2008; Gikonyo et al. 2008; Whyte 2011) to 
shift medical ethics beyond matters of standardization, regulation and written 
documents to consider the interests of populations, the role of research institutions, 
and the process of collaboration.  This perspective emphasizes the recognition that 
research is carried out in an unequal world with disparities in wealth, and that 
research in this context includes vulnerable people who are not often able to 
experience the benefits of medical research, which includes the development of new 
drugs.   
Geissler et al. (2008) explored these issues by researching a malaria 
vaccine trial in The Gambia conducted by the British Medical Research Council 
(MRC) from 2001 to 2004.  From the perspectives of trial participants, many 
expressed their appreciation of the free medical care and a desire that the trial 
continue to provide material benefits after its end.  People invoked the idiom of 
family when describing their relationships with trial staff.  Although this kind of 
relationship was not represented in ethical codes or research protocols, it enabled 
the trial to operate.  Gikonyo et al. (2008) found something similar during a malaria 
vaccine trial in Kenya.  Most people the authors spoke to desired a form of 
recognition after the trial ended.  Participation in medical research created new 
kinds of social relationships, which research staff played a key role in establishing 
and maintaining.  Overall, the authors found that ethical standards were an 
inadequate response to complex and shifting ethical dilemmas in the field.  Rather 
than focus on formal ethical standards, they argue that there needs to be greater 
attention to social relationships since they shape people’s involvement in, and 
perceptions of, research.  In another example, Kelly (2011) returned to the Gambian 
communities where Geissler et al. (2008) conducted research about a malaria 
vaccine clinical trial a few years earlier.  She found that former trial participants 
desired connection and expressed a sense of disappointment at the discontinuation 
of health care services.  The ending of the trial made it obvious that it had served 
the needs of researchers more than communities and that the trial had not lived up 
to its obligations to protect people’s welfare.  In this article, Kelly (2011) calls for the 
changing of scientific research protocols to focus on the production of social 
relationships between researchers and research participants over time, and that 
those relationships be held stable over time so they can lead to social progress.   
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From what these anthropologists found, expanding the meaning of research 
ethics to include a consideration of the needs of communities and placing social 
relationships at the centre of activities would be a way to acknowledge the 
importance of, and respect for, research participants and communities.  This might 
include the provision of benefits, such as medical care infrastructure, provision of 
health care and ongoing social engagement, both during and after research ends.  
This expansion of benefits and increased engagement with communities are 
important aspects to consider when research is carried out in impoverished settings.  
These debates about ethics, social justice and inequality figure prominently in the 
narratives of my informants and will be returned to throughout the thesis.           
Although the anthropologists above largely focused on the establishment of 
social relationships between communities and researchers from the perspectives of 
lay people, the experiences and perspectives of research staff are under-
represented in the literature.  Molyneux et al. (2013) and Chantler et al. (2013) 
explored the roles of fieldworkers and village reporters in medical research to find 
they served as important intermediaries between communities and research 
institutions.  Biruk (2012) also approached medical research from the perspective of 
research staff and discovered that the maintenance of social relationships between 
researchers and communities over time was essential, allowing for research to be 
conducted.   
Building on this scholarship, this thesis focuses on the experiences, 
perceptions, and aspirations of staff working for the RTS,S vaccine trial in Tanzania, 
and brings in reflections from their Northern partners.  Clinical trial staff were middle 
figures10 that negotiated social relationships and partnerships with Northern 
institutions and companies, as well as communities and trial participants in 
Tanzania.  These actors were involved in partnership to develop a technology, the 
RTS,S vaccine.  Although the vaccine had already been invented in laboratories, it 
required testing outside of the laboratory to ensure it was safe and effective for 
widespread use.  Hence, the vaccine was in a process of becoming.  This process 
required technologies and material objects, which I describe throughout the thesis.  
But it was the social relationships, how people cared for, about and through 
                                              
10 This term is borrowed from Hunt’s (1999) analysis of nurses, assistants and servant who 
provided medicine in the Belgian Congo during colonialism.  As she argues, paying attention 
to these middle figures shows how global practices are negotiated and translated in specific 
contexts, times and places. 
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technologies, the exchanges of material objects between actors, and the moments 
of affect, including doubt, joy, frustrations, misunderstandings, and connection, that 
were of key importance in the vaccine’s becoming.  It is these aspects that are 
central to this thesis.     
Reflections on these aspects of medical research were particularly 
meaningful at the end of the RTS,S partnerships and vaccine trial.  This was a time 
that was laden with reflections on the past, present and future as people tried to 
understand their involvement in the development of the vaccine and the impacts of 
the trial and partnerships on Tanzania.  My research at this time brought forth 
various narratives, including people’s expectations and aspirations, which is an 
imaginary of the future that often is left out of institutional readings of partnership.  
Global inequalities, hierarchy and unequal power relations also formed part of 
people’s reflections on the partnerships, as did the many exchanges between 
institutions and people, which shaped social relationships between actors.  
Additionally, practices of care were central to people’s narratives and actions.  
Although critical analysis of global health partnerships and science is necessary in a 
stratified world, de la Bellacasa (2011) argues for a feminist theory about science 
and technology.  She calls for an analysis of care in technoscience since science 
requires care and affective labour to bring things like vaccines into being.  Care is a 
largely dismissed and undervalued form of every day labour but as de la Bellacasa 
states, “nothing holds together in a liveable way without caring relationships.” (100)  
I draw on this theory of care to highlight that people put affective labour and care 
into their social relationships with partners, research participants and communities 
and they extended this care to the maintenance of scientific and technological 
systems.  In this context, care for human bodies, social relationships and material 
objects was not simply carried out to maintain ethical protocols, it was central to how 
informants perceived their jobs and the value of the RTS,S partnerships and vaccine 
trial.   
What held all of these aspects together—despite acknowledgement of 
inequality and provision of a tremendous amount of affective labour on the part of 
trial staff—was a desire to be involved in creating a technology that has the potential 
to save many African lives.  This desire helped trial staff to conceptually overcome 
issues of inequality between Northern and Southern partners, and researchers and 
communities in Tanzania.  In this thesis, I examine the materiality, social 
relationships, power dynamics, practices of care, and exchanges on the local and 
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global scales, and explore the varying impacts and interpretations of partnership and 
scientific activity in Tanzania as they came to an end.  I now turn to a discussion of 
my research methodology and field sites, as well as the ethical issues encountered 
over the course of the research. 
Methodology, Field Sites and Ethics 
This thesis traces the development of the RTS,S malaria vaccine as a way to 
understand broader issues in global health and transnational medical research.  
RTS,S was developed in the US and Belgium and tested in clinical trials in the US, 
Asia and across Africa.  Its development involved a number of research institutions, 
companies, non-profit organizations, researchers, doctors, fieldworkers and 
research participants.  From 2009 to 2014, a phase 3, double blinded, randomized 
control trial of RTS,S, was conducted across Africa to assess the efficacy of the 
vaccine to prevent malaria.  Eleven trial sites were chosen in seven African 
countries: Tanzania, Mozambique, Malawi, Kenya, Gabon, Ghana, and Burkina 
Faso.  The trial enrolled over 15,000 children in two age groups: a younger group 
aged 6 to 12 weeks and an older group of 5- to 17-month-old children (Cohen et al. 
2010; RTS,S Clinical Trials Partnership 2015).   
To get a better sense of this global technology and partnerships, I employed 
a methodology that many anthropologists use to explore multi-sited objects—a 
“follow” the thing, ideas, people and so on—approach (Marcus 1995).  Thus, I 
conducted ethnographic research in Africa and Europe, with additional interviews 
conducted via internet video calls.  I centred my ethnographic research on a RTS,S 
trial conducted in the town of Korogwe, Tanzania.  There, a building, the Korogwe 
Research Centre11, was designed by the Danish architect, Jakob Knudsen (Napier 
2017).   
The Research Centre held several offices, two laboratories, two conference 
rooms, a pharmacy, and data management and archival space.  It was situated 
across a parking lot from the Korogwe District Hospital, which was nicknamed 
Magunga for the sisal estate that used to be located there.  The Korogwe Research 
                                              
11 The full name of this building is the NIMR Korogwe Research Laboratory but in order to denote 
that this building is more than a laboratory, I refer to it as the Korogwe Research Centre 
throughout this thesis.   
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Centre served as the central site for the vaccine trial and my ethnographic research.  
Additionally, eight dispensaries were built and one government-run dispensary was 
refurbished in villages in rural parts of the Korogwe and Handeni Districts so that 
trial participants could be vaccinated close to their homes.  These dispensaries 
served the 34 villages involved in the RTS,S trial and were additional sites for my 
research.  
Fieldwork for my doctoral project began in November of 2012.  Previously, I 
conducted ethnographic research about the human papillomavirus, or HPV, vaccine.  
The entry of this new vaccine on the market had sparked my interest during my 
undergraduate studies and after writing a paper on the HPV vaccine for a medical 
anthropology class, I entered a Master’s degree program in social anthropology to 
study HPV vaccine uptake amongst university students in Canada.  I had planned to 
conduct ethnographic research about this vaccine as it was being provided to 
school-aged students in Tanzania.  However, I conducted pre-fieldwork research in 
Tanzania in April of 2012 and learned from a policy maker in the Tanzanian Ministry 
of Health that the program had insufficient funding and would likely only begin in 
2014.  This policy maker suggested I instead study the RTS,S malaria vaccine being 
tested in Korogwe and Bagamoyo, Tanzania.  I connected with the Principal 
Investigator (PI) of the RTS,S clinical trial in Korogwe and after meeting with him, he 
welcomed me to conduct ethnographic research at the vaccine trial site.  I took him 
up on his offer.  During that trip, I also had an opportunity to tour the Korogwe 
Research Centre and speak with Simon, the site coordinator at the Research 
Centre, and attend a medical research conference in Arusha to meet several RTS,S 
trial staff members.  This laid the ground work for my doctoral research.    
Before I returned to Tanzania to conduct research in late 2012, I applied to 
become an ancillary researcher of the RTS,S trial, a requirement for access to the 
clinical trial site in Korogwe.  I was obligated to sign a document that I submitted to 
the Ancillary Study Review Committee (ASRC), a committee formed by GSK, MVI 
and the clinical trial sites, which oversaw research conducted about the third phase 
of the RTS,S clinical trial.  At the time, I was troubled by the thought of signing this 
document because it required that I provide GSK and MVI access to my recordings 
and allowed these organization to review and comment on publications of my 
results.  I signed the document in order to carry out my research and to this day, I 
have not been asked to provide data to GSK or MVI.  As well, these organizations 
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have reviewed two manuscripts I have sent out for publication and have not had 
issues with them.      
In September of 2012, I passed an ethical review of my research proposal at 
the University of Edinburgh and applied for research clearance from the Tanzania 
Commission for Science and Technology (COSTECH).  By the time I arrived in 
Tanzania, I had received research clearance from COSTECH.  I then submitted my 
application to NIMR for medical research clearance.  I was reassured by staff at 
NIMR that this step would take a month or two.  After waiting for four months, my 
local supervisor, Dr. Peter E. Mangesho, visited the NIMR headquarters with me to 
inquire why it was taking so long for my application to be reviewed.  NIMR staff said 
they would make a speedier decision about my application and a month later my 
application was approved and I received clearance to conduct medical-related 
research.  Upon receiving this clearance, I applied for a Tanzanian research visa, 
which took almost three months to be issued.  In total, it took eight months to pass 
ethical review and receive a research visa.  
Waiting so many months to commence research was frustrating.  However, I 
used this time to study Swahili in Dar es Salaam and in Stone Town, Zanzibar.  I 
also spoke informally to people I met in my day-to-day life in Dar es Salaam and 
Zanzibar.  This included lay people (including Tanzanians and expatriates); doctors, 
nurses and an herbalist; researchers at NIMR and Muhimbili University of Health 
and Allied Sciences; and malaria policy makers and program managers at global 
health organizations (including the Clinton Health Access Initiative (CHAI), the 
Global Fund and US Centers for Disease Control (CDC)).  I attended an annual 
trade fair in Dar es Salaam during the holiday of Saba Saba.  There, a pavilion 
dedicated to malaria had been set up and I spoke to parasitologists and pharmacists 
who were providing information to lay people about how to protect themselves from 
malaria.  Additionally, I attended a medical research conference in Arusha in April 
2013 in order to meet researchers and learn about medical research conducted in 
the country.  All of these interactions helped me gain an understanding of how 
malaria was being prevented and treated in Tanzania, how lay people understood, 
experienced and treated malaria and how the health care system operated.  
Additionally, although I had learned quite a bit about malaria before starting 
fieldwork, there was still more for me to understand so to I read widely about malaria 
and control measures.  My reading included scientific articles and editorials, as well 
as archival material housed in the building where the National Malaria Control 
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Program (NMCP) was located in downtown Dar es Salaam, which held records 
about past control programs.  Throughout, I took copious fieldnotes about what I 
was learning, which helped me refine my research questions and interview 
protocols.  These activities also helped me build research contacts, which allowed 
me to hit the ground running as soon as I was able to conduct research.      
Also, this period allowed me time to immerse myself in the local context and 
become comfortable with living in Tanzania.  That process served me well as I 
interacted with informants after gaining research clearance because I could greet 
people in Swahili, had some knowledge about Tanzania, and was able to ask more 
informed questions.  Many people I came in contact with expressed surprise upon 
learning how long I had been living in the country because they regularly interacted 
with foreign researchers who visited the country for very short periods of time.  For 
some, my length of stay demonstrated that I was serious about understanding 
malaria in Tanzania and I believe this led to better interactions and interviews.  
Overall, this period, while unexpected, enriched my understanding of a range of 
topics, including malaria, health care provision and Tanzania.   
Once I received a research visa, I conducted nine months of ethnographic 
fieldwork in Tanzania from August 2013 to April 2014, with additional in-person and 
video call interviews carried out until June 2015.  Although not the direct focus of 
this thesis, I conducted semi-structured interviews with a range of people involved in 
malaria research and control.  These included donors at PMI, RBM and the Global 
Fund; policy makers at the NMCP, the WHO, the Ministry of Health and the CDC; 
researchers at Muhimbili University and NIMR; and partnering organizations that 
implemented malaria control programs in Tanzania, including RTI International, 
CHAI, Jhpiego, the U.S. President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), 
Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), John Snow, Inc. (JSI), 
Population Services International (PSI), Communication and Malaria Initiative in 
Tanzania (COMMIT), and PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC).  I also attended several 
meetings between PMI, the CDC, the NMCP, and implementing partners as they 
discussed funding priorities and results from PMI-funded control programs and 
research projects.  All of these activities provided valuable insights into the politics 
surrounding global health and malaria control on the global scale and how these 
politics played out on the ground in Tanzania.  Gaining these insights proved helpful 
for my research in Korogwe.   
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In November of 2013, I arrived in Korogwe, a town in north-eastern Tanzania 
where the third phase of the RTS,S clinical trial was being conducted.  The town of 
Korogwe is situated within Korogwe District, in the Tanga Region.  As of the 2012 
Tanzanian population and housing census, the town of Korogwe had a population of 
68,308 and Korogwe District had a population of 242,038.  Korogwe is a road 
junction that connects the cities of Dar es Salaam and Arusha and is located 280 
kilometres from Dar es Salaam, 340 kilometres from Arusha, and about 100 
kilometres inland from Tanga town on the Indian Ocean.   
 
 
Figure 1: Map of Tanzania and location of Korogwe (Coe 2006). 
 
 
Figure 2: A close up of the districts of Tanga Region with Korogwe District 





Korogwe District is in a tropical area and has two rainy seasons, one from 
October to December and another from March to May, although climatic changes in 
the last decade at times merge these two rainy seasons.  Malaria is most often 
transmitted during the rainy season(s).  Temperatures range from 18℃ to 30℃.  
Many people reside in rural settings and practice informal trade and subsistence 
farming, mainly growing rice, coconut, banana, cassava, maize and oranges 
(Mahende et al. 2014; Mmbando et al. 2010).  Sisal production has been ongoing in 
Tanga Region since being introduced in 1893 by the German East Africa Company.  
Many sisal plantations are still in operation, employing many people in the region 
(Giblin and Giblin 2005; Kimaro, Msanya and Takamura 1994).  In addition to the 
Korogwe District, the phase 3 RTS,S clinical trial was also conducted in villages in 
Handeni District, to the south of Korogwe District.  As of the 2012 National Census, 
Handeni District had a population of 276,646 (National Bureau of Statistics 2013; 
Mahende et al. 2014; Mmbando et al. 2010).  Most people engage in subsistence 
farming in Handeni District (Shabani et al. 2015).       
Korogwe District has one district-level hospital, two church-owned hospitals, 
four health centres and 47 government dispensaries.  Annually, the Korogwe District 
Hospital receives about 6000 children under five years of age, as of 2010 estimates 
(National Bureau of Statistics 2013; Mmbando et al. 2010; Mahende et al. 2014; 
Kahabuka et al. 2012).  Korogwe District is stratified into highland and lowland 
zones and altitudes range from 300 to 1,200 metres above sea level (Liheluka, 
Lusingu and Manongi 2013).  There has been ongoing research about falciparum 
malaria in Korogwe District and this research has detected that the rates of malaria 
in highland villages has decreased from 25% in 2003 to 3% in 2008, and in lowland 
villages it has decreased from 78% to 13% (Mmbando et al. 2010).   Despite this 
decrease, children under the age of five admitted to the Korogwe District Hospital 
are most commonly diagnosed with malaria, anaemia, pneumonia, diarrhoea, 
septicaemia and gastroenteritis (Mahende et al. 2014).  It is in this setting that the 
RTS,S vaccine trial was conducted.  
Once I received the official documents to conduct my research, I arrived six 
weeks before the end of the RTS,S clinical trial.  These documents were important 
to obtain because when I arrived at the Korogwe Research Centre, trial 
administrators asked for these documents and took photocopies of them to keep on 
file.  Only once they were satisfied that I had acquired correct documentation did 
they fully welcome me to conduct my research.   
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After these formalities, Simon, the site coordinator, gave me a tour of the 
Research Centre and introduced me to staff.  Simon explained to them that I was a 
PhD student from the University of Edinburgh, that I would be conducting research 
on trial activities and would want to interview people during my time in Korogwe.  
This introduction was helpful to inform staff of who I was and what I was doing there 
and most staff were very friendly and welcoming.  However, I felt uncomfortable 
having someone in a superior position tell staff that they should welcome me and 
consider being interviewed since I was concerned staff would feel they had little 
choice in being involved in my research.  To help counter this, at the time I clarified 
with staff that I would be interested in interviewing them but only if they wanted to be 
involved.  But I was still concerned about people’s inability to opt out of being 
studied since I was observing and interacting with them at their place of work.           
  
 
Figure 3: The Korogwe Research Centre. 
Due to these concerns, I was hesitant to observe staff as they worked when I 
first arrived in Korogwe.  Instead, for the first few days I conducted semi-structured 
interviews.  I asked staff in person if they were willing to be interviewed in their office 
or in one of the conference rooms at the Research Centre, which informally served 
as my office when it was unoccupied.  Many staff were willing to be interviewed and 
before each interview a consent form was provided in English and Swahili.  Each 
was asked their permission to be interviewed and recorded and all agreed.  All 
interviews were conducted in English and lasted from 30 to 70 minutes in length.  I 
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conducted a majority of my interviews with staff in the first week of my time at the 
Research Centre.  These interviews provided insight into trial activities and helped 
me to develop rapport with staff.  Many whom I interviewed invited me to observe 
them working and that is when I felt comfortable to conduct participant observation 
of trial activities.                 
In the last six weeks of the trial staff were carrying out activities to complete 
the trial.  This included visiting the homes of trial participants to collect health 
information; collecting biometric data, medical histories and blood samples from trial 
participants; and conducting preliminary analysis and preparation of blood samples 
and data to be sent abroad.  Joining in on these activities, I observing how staff 
carried them out and at times I helped with tasks, such as moving supplies or files.  
These times provided opportunities for casual conversations about their thoughts on 
the work and those they came in contact with over the course of their work days.  
This participant observation was conducted in the laboratories and data 
management offices at the Korogwe Research Centre and the trial dispensaries in 
villages in Handeni and Korogwe Districts.  In addition, observation was carried out 
in the pediatric ward of the Korogwe District Hospital, where health care was 
provided to children under the age of five, including RTS,S trial participants.  While 
in the hospital ward, activities were observed as children arrived with caregivers12 
and were given vaccines, diagnosed or had blood samples drawn, and treated for 
illness.  As this was ongoing, I spoke to nurses and doctors about how the hospital 
ward functioned and the role of the RTS,S trial in funding health care provision 
there.  I also met with nurses, clinic officers, doctors and laboratory technicians who 
worked for the Korogwe District Hospital and government dispensaries that were 
located near trial dispensaries.  I was given tours of these health care facilities and 
government staff discussed their jobs and the Tanzanian health care system with 
me.    
While in Korogwe, I stayed in a guesthouse funded by ENRECA, a University 
of Copenhagen longitudinal study about malaria rates in Korogwe District.  This 
guesthouse intermittently housed a couple of Tanzanian and international 
researchers and a few RTS,S trial staff who did not permanently live in Korogwe.  
                                              
12 I have chosen to use the word ‘caregiver’ in place of parent because, although a majority of the 
adults who cared for trial participants were biological parents, in some cases, grandparents, 
siblings, relatives and others provided care to trial participants.   
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Staying at this guesthouse allowed me to build rapport with researchers and staff 
and engage in informal conversations during non-working hours. 
 I left Korogwe in late December and returned to Dar es Salaam, where I 
maintained an apartment.  In early January, I returned to Korogwe to conduct two 
more weeks of research.  At this time, interviews were conducted with staff that had 
been missed during the previous visit and a second interview was carried out with a 
trial administrator.  Participant observation was also conducted at trial and 
government dispensaries, the pediatric ward of the Korogwe District Hospital, and 
the Korogwe Research Centre as staff wound down the trial. 
In addition to research amongst RTS,S trial staff, I also carried out semi-
structured interviews with a range of other people involved in the development of the 
vaccine, including vaccine scientists and trial funders/coordinators.  When I was in 
Dar es Salaam in early January 2014, I interviewed via internet video call a British 
malaria researcher and co-PI of a West African RTS,S trial who was in the UK at the 
time.  While in Dar es Salaam in February 2014, I jointly interviewed two RTS,S 
scientists from GSK in Belgium.  One day in March 2014, I visited the RTS,S clinical 
trial site in Bagamoyo, a town north of Dar es Salaam, to speak to the site 
coordinator and get a tour of the facilities.  This gave me a better understanding of 
how this branch of the trial operated, which served as a point of comparison to the 
Korogwe branch of the trial.  After returning to Edinburgh, I jointly interviewed two 
representatives of MVI in the US over internet video call.  These interviews ranged 
from 40 to 70 minutes in length.  Additionally, I interviewed the co-inventor of RTS,S 
twice; once via telephone in early January 2014 when I was in Dar es Salaam and 
he was in Belgium and the second time in person when I visited GSK Biologicals in 
Rixensart, Belgium in May 2015.  Meeting the co-inventor in person allowed for 
informal discussion before and after the interview as well as a chance to see where 
the RTS,S vaccine had been invented and manufactured.  
Although trial participants and caregivers are not the direct focus of this 
thesis, I interacted with them as trial activities were being conducted. One day I 
visited the homes of two trial participants after their mothers invited me.  This 
experience was enriching but limited.  The trial fieldworker I was with did not feel 
comfortable with the questions I had of caregivers and cited trial protocols for the 
reason I could not ask about their experiences of the vaccine trial.  Though 
approaching the RTS,S vaccine trial from the direction of the trial staff provided 
access to trial activities and staff, it made my access to other people who had been 
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impacted by the trial more difficult.  However, as Okwaro and Geissler (2015) argue, 
a large amount of anthropological research has been conducted amongst 
communities and research participants of medical research (see, for example, 
Geissler et al. 2006; Geissler 2005; Kelly et al. 2010; Fairhead et al. 2006; Leach et 
al. 2008; Leach and Fairhead 2011; Marcis 2015).  The world of science, including 
the views and experiences of African scientists, has received little attention.  This 
thesis builds on the work of anthropologists, such as Okwaro and Geissler (2015) 
and Crane (2013), by focusing on the people conducting medical research, including 
African scientists.             
 Although most people I came in contact with through the course of research 
were friendly, some were unwilling to be interviewed.  I respected those decisions 
and never pushed people to be involved in my research.  Some staff at the Korogwe 
Research Centre appeared suspicious, concerned or uncomfortable with my 
presence at first, especially those working in the data management office.  It was 
unclear to me why a couple of those staff members in particular responded to me in 
that manner.  However, they experienced regular auditing from Quintiles, a US-
based Contract Research Organization, which ensured adherence to ethical and 
regulatory guidelines.  I wondered if these staff felt I was there to evaluate their 
performance and therefore did not feel comfortable around me.  I gave these people 
space and found most staff I interacted with eventually grew comfortable with my 
presence, even if they remained unwilling to be interviewed.  I found something 
similar amongst policy makers in Dar es Salaam.  Some were unfriendly or 
suspicious at first but when I showed that I had gained ethical clearance and asked 
questions about topics they were interested in, they warmed to me and gave me 
generous amounts of their time.  Only one policy maker was uncomfortable with 
being voice recorded and requested that I only take hand written notes.  In some 
cases, language might have been an issue in people’s involvement in my research.  
Although I learned sufficient Swahili to converse with people in my day-to-day life, I 
did not gain sufficient proficiency to conduct interviews about science, malaria and 
vaccines.  Those staff less confident in their English skills may have felt 
uncomfortable to be interviewed in English.   
Additionally, my positionality, including my age, gender, level of education, 
and status as a mzungu (foreigner) shaped relationships with people I encountered 
over the course of fieldwork.  In some ways, my status and level of education 
endowed me with symbolic power that helped me gain access to people and places.  
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At the same time, my gender and age meant that some acted in a superior manner 
and wanted to teach me things.  Although this was frustrating at times, it was also 
helpful because those people seemed more than happy to share their knowledge, 
experiences and thoughts about malaria, the RTS,S trial and other topics with me.                     
While conducting research and writing this thesis, I have been concerned 
with respecting my informants’ rights to privacy and anonymity.  At times, I had 
issues with gaining fully informed consent, due largely to the dynamic nature of 
anthropological research conducted in many contexts with a range of people, and 
difficulties in communicating the meaning of my research.  However, I always 
explained who I was and my research when I met people in the course of fieldwork.  
And during formal interviews I provided consent forms, which included information 
about myself and my project, and required a signature indicating agreement to be 
interviewed.  Thus, to my knowledge, those included in this thesis were aware of 
their role in my research.   
Throughout the thesis, I have used pseudonyms for all informants except the 
co-inventor of the RTS,S vaccine.  He is a public figure and there was no easy way 
for me to share his very particular thoughts and experiences without identifying him.  
He consented to being identified in this thesis.  For all other informants, I use 
pseudonyms but this does not guarantee anonymity.  Those involved in malaria 
control in Tanzania or developing the RTS,S vaccine are part of small communities 
and often have distinct roles.  This situation may make it possible for those in these 
communities to discern who has been involved in my research.  For many 
informants, I have been vague in describing their position but in some cases I have 
been more specific in order to demonstrate their position within institutions.  Each of 
these people is aware of the nature of my research and have signed a consent form 
to have their interviews included in the thesis.  Below, I provide a summary of the 
chapters of the thesis.         
Chapter Summaries 
This thesis is divided into five chapters.  The first chapter is titled, 
“Productive Partnerships”.  This chapter provides a history of malaria vaccines and 
the RTS,S vaccine, as well as the various actors and organizations that have played 
roles in the development of RTS,S over time.  I argue that partnership and other 
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forms of social relationship have made vaccine development possible.  During the 
late stage clinical trials in Africa, these partnerships occurred in situations of stark 
inequality between actors and places.  Through recollection, several informants 
portrayed these partnerships as equal.  However, it was difficult for them to not 
reference inequalities between Northern and Southern actors.  In this chapter, I 
present an analysis of informants grappling with this contradiction.   
Chapter Two, entitled “Perceptions of Success”, charts informant’s 
reflections on the partnerships and RTS,S clinical trial as these were drawing to a 
close and after they had ended.  As informants thought about the beginning and end 
of the trial, they described several aspects of partnership and trial activity as 
successful.  This included the building of research capacity and human capacity, the 
provision of health care, mosquito nets and health education, and the fostering of 
relationships with communities.  I draw on Mosse’s (2005) theorization of projects to 
argue that informants perceived the partnerships and trial a success because they 
were drawn into an “interpretive community”, meaning their ambitions, goals and 
desires were being successfully addressed through the development of RTS,S.  At 
the same time, informants may have desired to affirm to themselves that they had 
been involved in a successful clinical trial.   
Chapter Three, “Building a Legacy?”, explores the materials and 
technologies that enabled the RTS,S partnerships and clinical trial, including 
research and health care infrastructure and buildings, laboratory equipment, and 
communication technology.  These material objects were symbolic of the 
transnational partnerships, were important parts of the exchange between Northern 
and Southern institutes and were perceived by informants as lasting impacts of the 
partnerships and trial on Tanzania.  Trial staff cared for these material objects 
throughout the trial and after the vaccine trial had ended.  This caring labour was a 
way to provide maintenance but staff also desired to care for gifts given to them by 
their Northern partners.  Yet, their Northern partners had no such sense of obligation 
once the partnership ended.  These objects experienced decay and trial staff 
expressed a sense of loss but staff continued to provide care to these objects 
because they held the potential for future partnership.          
The fourth chapter is titled “The Boundaries of Care”.  The RTS,S clinical trial 
provided health care in parallel to and from within the Tanzanian public health care 
system.  There were many exchanges of resources and information between the 
two health care providers.  Through these exchanges, the division between the 
 
60 
public and private health care system were reinforced and this division became even 
more obvious after the vaccine trial concluded.  I examine the spatial organization of 
the two services, informant’s perceptions of these two forms of health care, and the 
exchanges between the two.  I argue that the private provision of care shaped 
people’s ideas of how a public health care system should operate and led to feelings 
of loss and frustration at the inability of the vaccine trial to enact lasting change on 
the public health care system.  Thus, the long-term impacts of the vaccine trial were 
not only material but also ideational.              
Chapter Five, “Blood and Paper”, traces the collection, analysis and 
movement of evidence about the RTS,S vaccine, which materially came in the form 
of blood and paper.  Blood and information recorded on paper were collected from 
trial participants, moved to the Korogwe Research Centre, analyzed in a preliminary 
fashion, prepared for transportation, and moved out of Tanzania for further analysis.  
This was a process of abstraction but the actual labour that went into this process 
was anything but abstract.  Trial staff provided care to participants and sought to 
connect with participants in order to make evidence collection run smoothly.  The 
collection of evidence involved exchanges of bodily tissue, information, and time as 
the social relationships between trial staff and research participants were challenged 
and reaffirmed through affect, care and the provision of material resources.  
Although these components of the vaccine trial are not represented in the final 
analysis of the vaccine, I argue that these enabled the RTS,S vaccine to be 
developed.   
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Chapter 1: Producing Partnerships: An Account of RTS,S 
Malaria Vaccine Development and Partnerships 
Introduction 
With shifts in institutional organization, improvements in bio-technology and 
the establishment of partnerships, the RTS,S malaria vaccine was developed over a 
more than 30 year period.  In order to understand the development of RTS,S, I 
interviewed Dr. Joe Cohen, the co-inventor of the vaccine.  I first interviewed him via 
telephone in February 2014 when I was on fieldwork in Tanzania.  At the end of that 
interview, Dr. Cohen invited me to visit him at GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) Biologicals 
headquarters in Rixensart, Belgium, outside of Brussels.  I took him up on that offer 
and travelled to Rixensart in May 2015 to meet him in person for a follow-up 
interview and see GSK Biologicals first hand.   
GSK built its vaccine research facilities on expansive grounds in the small 
town of Rixensart.  It was there that the RTS,S vaccine was invented and 
subsequently manufactured before being sent to Tanzania for the phase 3 RTS,S 
clinical trial.  When I was in Korogwe, GSK Biologicals felt like a far away and 
mysterious place.  The data collected in Tanzania was sent there, as the Korogwe 
Research Centre received regular enquiries from researchers in Rixensart, which 
were answered by data managers in the basement of the Korogwe Research 
Centre.  But those exchanges were entirely mediated by computers, the internet and 
a satellite connection, creating a clear separation between Tanzania and Belgium.  
Visiting the place where the vaccine was created and data was sent helped me to 
conceptually connect the two places.   
Arriving in the tiny town of Rixensart in the afternoon after taking a train from 
Brussels, I walked to the outskirts of the town where GSK Biologicals was hidden 
behind trees in a quiet residential neighbourhood.  Passing through two security 
checks, I met Dr. Cohen in a large building that held the offices of vaccine 
developers.  Dr. Cohen had white hair and a grey beard and was dressed casually 
in slacks and a collared shirt.  Greeting me, he led me upstairs to a meeting room.  
Along the way, I caught sight of a large promotional banner that had Dr. Cohen’s 
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stern face on it and the quote: “Malaria is relentless.  But so is Joe Cohen” hanging 
from one of the suspended walkways above our heads.   
We spoke in an over-lit meeting room and Dr. Cohen shared the story of how 
RTS,S was developed, including the various partnerships, actors, institutions, 
technologies and research techniques that came together to enable its creation.  To 
better situate this story, I first provide background on the history of malaria vaccines.  
Second, I draw on my interviews with Dr. Cohen and secondary literature to trace 
the history of the RTS,S malaria vaccine from its birth in laboratories, to its clinical 
trials, and evaluation for use across Africa, examining how researchers built upon 
existing scientific understandings of vaccines and immunology to employed new 
tools and techniques.  Through the retelling of this history, I also uncover the various 
partnerships formed to support vaccine development and describe how resources 
and expertise were mobilized to confront health risks and create capital.  Third, I 
examine the partnerships and collaborative relationships established late in the 
development of RTS,S, during its phase 3 trials across Africa.  These partnerships 
were among diverse actors, with each bringing varying levels of resources and 
expertise to the table.  Despite claims of equality and mutually, informants could not 
avoid referencing hierarchal and unequal power relations between Northern and 
Southern actors.  I explore people’s narratives as they contend with that 
contradiction.  This discussion lays the groundwork for the rest of the thesis where I 
explore how these hierarchies and differences impacted people’s perception of the 
RTS,S trial and partnerships.  Below, I provide a summarized history of malaria 
vaccines. 
The History of Malaria Vaccine Development 
Malaria and the mosquitoes that carry it have often thwarted intervention 
(PATH-MVI 2016; Doolan, Dobaño and Baird 2009).  From the development of 
quinine, chloroquine, bed nets, DDT, artemisinin and other preventative and 
treatment methods, malaria and the mosquitoes that carry the parasite have found 
ways to adapt and overcome them.  Given the impact of malaria on millions of 
people and the decreasing efficacy of current control methods, the development of 
an effective malaria vaccine is high on the global health agenda (Shah 2010; 
Packard 2007; Sherman 2009).   
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For decades, researchers have attempted to develop a vaccine for malaria.  
Malaria researchers have observed for centuries that people native to malaria 
endemic regions have a level of immunity to the parasite.  Building on that 
knowledge, malaria vaccine researchers have made use of increasingly 
sophisticated scientific tools over time to create efficacious vaccines that target 
various stages of the malaria life cycle.  A vaccine functions by exposing the body to 
a weakened version of a virus, bacteria or parasite before the body becomes 
exposed to a fully functioning version.  This exposure can help the body develop 
immunity to these pathogens and decrease the severity of complications associated 
with infection.  Thus, the aim of developing a malaria vaccine is to help people build 
immunity to malaria without them having to suffer from the ill effects of the disease.  
An effective vaccine could lower the number of malaria infections amongst children 
and the general population, decreasing the number of people suffering and dying 
from the disease, and play a role in eventually eradicating malaria (NIH 2008; 
Packard 2007; Shah 2010; Desowitz 2002; Sherman 2009).   
However, although there have been many attempts to develop a malaria 
vaccine, few have been efficacious.  Malaria is unlike other diseases because 
becoming infected with malaria does not lead to full immunity to later infections.  
This means that if someone falls ill from malaria and recovers, they can be infected 
all over again.  There is a degree of acquired immunity: a person who has had 
malaria in the past can become infected again but likely experience less severe 
symptoms.  This partially acquired immunity only builds from repeated infections but 
can be lost if the person moves away from a malaria transmission area for a year, 
leaving them as vulnerable as someone who has never had malaria.  This situation 
makes the development of a vaccine more difficult since administering a vaccine 
may not lead to lasting protection over time.  Some researchers have cautioned that 
a vaccine may not be any better than naturally occurring immunity that develops 
after repeated infections with malaria (Sherman 2009).   
Despite the mechanism of illness for malaria being discovered in 1880, it has 
taken over a century to develop an efficacious vaccine (IAVI 2008; RTS,S Clinical 
Trials Partnership 2015).  Since the 1800s, researchers have worked towards 
understanding the life cycle of the Plasmodium parasite and the human immune 
responses to it.  During this time, researchers have also developed vaccines and 
drugs through field and laboratory research.  Ideally, research should have been 
conducted with the Plasmodium parasites that infect humans.  However, 
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researchers chose non-human animals for malaria studies due to the safety and 
ethical concerns of using human subjects, the limited availability of human subjects, 
and the difficulty of growing Plasmodium species in a laboratory or in other animals.  
These surrogates, which included rodents, monkeys and birds, were less than ideal 
because a different malaria species infects each of these animals and each animal 
has different biological mechanisms for immunity.  Thus, a successful vaccine for a 
rodent, monkey or bird is unlikely to offer protection for humans.  This meant that for 
decades, research in non-human animals was difficult to correlate into creating a 
vaccine for humans.  However, studies on non-human animals allowed researchers 
to understand broadly how malaria operated in the body of its host and theorize 
about various ways to target the different life cycle stages of the parasite (Sherman 
2009).   
At the height of the malaria eradication program in the 1950s and 1960s, the 
scientific community was not conducting malaria vaccine research.  At this time, 
control efforts focused on DDT and drug treatment and a malaria vaccine seemed 
unnecessary and extravagant (Desowitz 2002; Sherman 2009).  The World Health 
Organization (WHO) and United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID) declared that they would not pursue a malaria vaccine, stating that, “failure 
will continue to be the norm rather than the exception.” (Shah 2010: 167)  However, 
eradication efforts stalled and reversed as surveillance methods relaxed, some 
countries experienced turmoil, and resistance to drugs and chemical sprays grew.  A 
malaria vaccine became a possibility in 1961 when Sydney Cohen and Ian 
McGregor found that administering blood from immune Gambian adults to children 
infected with P. falciparum led to anti-parasitic effects.  This indicated that in theory, 
malaria vaccination was possible.  Blood from immune Gambian adults was also 
able to treat children with malaria in Tanzania.  This suggested that African strains 
of the parasite were similar and that a vaccine prepared against malaria in one 
region of Africa could be effective against malaria in another region (Sherman 
2009).      
Although countless amounts of blood have been collected from many 
thousands of people, it is still not entirely understood how the malaria parasite 
operates inside its human and mosquito hosts and why immunity in humans last 
such a short period.  However, many researchers have been able to devise 
vaccines that disrupt the three different stages of the malaria life cycle.  Using non-
human primates, different formulations of ‘antigens’ (a molecule able to induce an 
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immune response) and ‘adjuvants’ (a chemical that boosts the effect of a vaccine) 
have been devised.  The aim is to stimulate the body to produce ‘antibodies’, 
proteins that neutralize pathogens such as parasites or viruses.  Although not a 
perfect match to humans, these studies have still helped move malaria vaccine 
research forward.  Additionally, genetic-immunological technology has become 
increasingly sophisticated, helping scientists target the genes of the parasite and 
create better vaccines (Lee and Nguyen 2015; NIH 2008; Desowitz 2002; Sherman 
2009).   
Various malaria vaccines that target different life stages of the malaria 
parasite are currently being developed in laboratories around the world.  One kind of 
malaria vaccine targets the first stage of the malaria infection and is called a ‘pre-
erythrocytic’ vaccine.  At the first stage of malaria infection, mosquitoes inject 
‘sporozoites’ (the name for early-stage malaria parasites) into the human host, 
which then invade the liver, initiating the malaria infection (Vekemans et al. 2009).  
When sporozoites are injected into the host, the number of parasites is relatively 
small.  A pre-erythrocytic vaccine helps the body to develop antibodies to prevent 
the parasite from either entering the liver or multiplying in the liver.  Although most 
other vaccines of this kind of have not been successful, the RTS,S malaria vaccine 
is a pre-erythrocytic vaccine that is efficacious (Greenwood and Targett 2011; 
Sherman 2009; Girard et al. 2007).  I will provide a detailed history of how 
researchers developed this vaccine in the upcoming section of this chapter.  
Researchers have also created vaccines that target the malaria parasites 
after they leave the liver and are entering the red blood cells of the human host in 
order to multiply.  These are called ‘erythrocytic stage’ or ‘blood stage’ vaccines and 
build on what Sydney Cohen and Ian McGregor found in 1961 when they transferred 
blood from malaria immune Gambian adults to children who had malaria.  Vaccines 
that target this stage either attempt to induce an immune response that blocks 
invasion of the parasite into blood cells or inhibits their multiplication.  An example of 
blood stage vaccine was SPf66, which was developed in Colombia by Dr. Manuel 
Patarroyo.  In the early 1990s, SPf66 was tested in a phase 3 randomized control 
trial with children and infants.  While protection from malaria was found in 
experiments on non-human animals, clinical trials in Tanzania, Thailand and The 
Gambia were disappointing and researchers stopped the development of the 
vaccine.  Many alternate versions of blood stage vaccines are currently being 
developed (Greenwood and Targett 2011; Alonso et al. 1994; Girard et al. 2007).       
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‘Transmission blocking’ vaccines are another kind of malaria vaccine.  They 
do not protect the person vaccinated but works by stopping people who have 
malaria from transmitting it to others.  A transmission blocking vaccine works by 
having the human host generate antibodies against the malaria parasite.  These 
antibodies are then transmitted along with the malaria parasite into a female 
mosquito when that mosquito feeds on a vaccinated person.  When the malaria 
parasites begin to sexually reproduce in the mosquito midgut, the antibodies 
produced by the previous host attacks the parasite (Sherman 2009; Greenwood and 
Targett 2011; Girard et al. 2007).  Since mosquitoes only fly less than 1 kilometre, 
people administered with this vaccine would be helping prevent malaria in their 
families and communities.  That is why some call this an altruistic vaccine.  The 
scientist Richard Carter devised the idea of this vaccine in 1974 when he realized 
that other kinds of vaccines would not be 100% effective, allowing malaria to 
continue its transmission.  Studies on a transmission-blocking vaccine in mice have 
demonstrated a high efficacious rate, decreasing the number of malaria parasites by 
97% and the number of malaria infected mosquitoes by 75% (Sherman 2009).  Early 
stage clinical trials of this vaccine indicate it is over 90% efficacious in preventing 
malaria in humans and larger-scale trials are currently ongoing in Africa, Europe and 
the US.  However, in order to manufacture this vaccine, the salivary glands of 
mosquitoes must be dissected to obtain living malaria parasites.  This labour-
intensive form of manufacturing may impede development of this vaccine (Seder et 
al. 2013; Richie et al. 2015; Hoffman et al. 2015) 
There are other kind vaccines that have been theorized and tested on non-
human animals but the three kinds of vaccines described above are the most 
advanced.  Much research has involved both humans and non-human animals, and 
countless numbers of mosquitoes, malaria parasites, and human blood samples 
have been studied in the pursuit of a vaccine.  A few vaccines appear promising and 
some people have prophesized that a malaria vaccine will arrive quickly.  As Sydney 
Cohen and Ian McGregor proclaimed when devising their blood stage vaccine in 
1961, “An experimental vaccine … may be only a decade away … and if it is very 
effective malaria will be eradicated like smallpox” (Sherman 2009: 319).  However, a 
fully effective malaria vaccine still remains elusive, decades later.  Even with the 
RTS,S vaccine, existing malaria control measures will need to be employed in order 
to effectively prevent malaria (RTS,S Clinical Trials Partnership 2015).  Malaria is a 
highly complex organism with 5,300 genes that code for P. falciparum strains, half of 
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which have no known function or counterpart in other living creatures.  As well, 
malaria has a complex life cycle that involves both a vector and a host (Sherman 
2009).  Research teams are attempting to combine different kinds of vaccines to 
create one vaccine that targets different stages of the malaria life cycle but it may be 
many years until a highly efficacious malaria vaccine is available (Sherman 2009; 
Girard et al. 2007).   
RTS,S Vaccine Development in Laboratories  
Although the previous section provided an overview of malaria vaccine 
development, I now focus on the development of the RTS,S malaria vaccine.  This 
new technology was created with the use of new scientific knowledge and ideas of 
immunology and prevention, as well as new business models and transnational 
partnerships.  Describing the invention and development of RTS,S over time, I 
elucidate the shifts in scientific knowledge and global partnerships that have made 
this vaccine possible, drawing on my interviews with the vaccine co-inventor Dr. Joe 
Cohen and secondary literature.  
When I interviewed Dr. Joe Cohen in a meeting room at GSK in Rixensart, 
Belgium in 2015, he spoke about the development of RTS,S and its potential future 
impacts in sub-Saharan Africa.  By that time, RTS,S had been tested in third phase 
clinical trials and found to be safe and efficacious.  Since Dr. Cohen had overcome 
many scientific hurdles to create the first efficacious malaria vaccine, he could look 
back on the history of the vaccine and give a teleological narrative of success and 
completion.  Thus, his narrative was fairly smooth, with few detours in the story to 
discuss the contingencies, missteps and dead ends that are normal parts of 
scientific discovery, making the development of RTS,S appear like an inevitable 
process. 
I began by asking Dr. Cohen about his desire to work on RTS,S and he 
explained that his upbringing played a role in his work on a malaria vaccine: 
I was born in … Egypt and I grew up there.… I have 
experienced first-hand a life in a developing country.  I was 
part of a privileged class of people but I grew up seeing with 
my own eyes what it is to live in a very poor country.  I think 
that has had some impact on my desire to do science…. and 
when it came to choose a job, working on something that 
 
68 
could have a benefit for people living in very poor countries 
[was important].   
Dr. Cohen continued, entwining the story of RTS,S with his own life story.  In 
the early 1980s, he obtained his PhD in molecular biology at New York University 
(NYU).  In 1984, Dr. Cohen joined the pharmaceutical company SmithKline and 
French13.  He was hired to work on a variety of vaccines as a microbiologist but in 
April 1987 he was asked to head the Malaria Vaccine Project team.  Dr. Cohen 
accepted this offer and began work on what would later be called the RTS,S malaria 
vaccine.  
Dr. Cohen explained that the building blocks of the RTS,S vaccine began 
with the identification of the ‘circumsporozoite protein’, or CSP, in the laboratory of 
Drs. Ruth and Victor Nussenzweig at NYU.  Funding for this study stemmed from 
the US Department of Defense.  Speaking about this discovery, Dr. Cohen said that 
the Nussenzweigs had “discovered, identified, this antigen [CSP] in the late 50’s, 
early 60’s.  They studied it and made the hypothesis that that was a potential 
component for a vaccine.”  In 1967, Dr. Ruth Nussenzweigs et al. reported success 
in immunizing mice against malaria using weakened sporozoites that had been 
altered so they became less virulent but were still alive (Badgett et al. 2002; 
Hoffman et al. 2002; Franke-Fayard et al. 2010; Sherman 2009).  This finding was 
the impetus for similar studies in humans.  During the 1970s, several studies 
demonstrated that humans could be immunized against malaria if infected with P. 
falciparum from the bites of irradiated mosquitoes—mosquitoes that had been 
exposed to X-rays and been weakened.  This demonstrated that it was possible to 
vaccinate people and provide protection against malaria invading the liver (Hoffman 
et al. 2002; Vekemans et al. 2009).   
From 1989 to 1999, researchers explored this process, finding through 
human studies that exposure to malaria from irradiated mosquitoes led to an 
immune response (Hoffman et al. 2002).  These studies gave scientists an idea for 
formulating vaccines that targeted the ‘pre-erythrocytic stage’, which as described 
above is the phase of malaria infection that takes place before and after the malaria 
parasite enters the liver and before malaria infection leads to symptoms (Cohen et 
                                              
13 Over the years there have been many mergers to create GSK and the name has changed 
several times. When discussing GSK before 1999, one is referring to the legacy companies of 
GSK (J. Cohen, personal communication).  
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al. 2010; Girard et al. 2007; Casares, Brumeanu and Richie 2010; Hoffman et al. 
2002).   
It was impractical to immunize large numbers of people with an irradiated 
sporozoite vaccine because the sporozoites would need to be delivered via a 
mosquito or an intravenous injection.  Instead, researchers focused on 
understanding the underlying reasons for this protective immunity (Hoffman et al. 
2002).  The US National Institutes of Health (NIH), USAID and the WHO provided 
funding for this next stage of research.  Scientists found that rodents vaccinated with 
irradiated sporozoites developed antibodies that neutralized malaria infection.  The 
immune system was able to identify and abolish the sporozoites infecting the body 
by identifying a protein on the surface of the sporozoite.  This protein was later 
identified as the ‘circumsporozoite protein’, or CSP, a protein that covers the surface 
of the malaria parasite sporozoites and is responsible for latching onto humans 
when infecting them.  Once the body had identified this protein from sterile 
parasites, it could mount a defence and later protect the body from fully pathological 
malaria parasites (Cohen et al. 2010).  With this understanding of infection and 
immunity, there were hopes that a vaccine would be found very quickly (Sherman 
2009).   
Once the CSP had been discovered, researchers at NYU applied for a 
patent to clone the CSP in 1981.  Although NYU sought to sell the patent rights to a 
genetic engineering company to produce CSP, public funders of the research 
blocked this.  The WHO objected to this sale because they wanted to maintain 
“public access” (Sherman 2009: 254) and USAID technically held the patent for the 
research it supported at NYU.  By 1983, researchers at NYU were able to produce 
CSP through cloning themselves.  However, despite previous attempts to block its 
sale, in 1989 NYU licenced the patent for the CSP to GSK in a non-exclusive and 
royalty free deal (Sherman 2009).   
At the same time, researchers at The Walter Reed Army Institute of 
Research (WRAIR) were experimenting with the CSP.  In 1984, WRAIR genetically 
sequenced and cloned the CSP, allowing for the development of a malaria vaccine 
(Sherman 2009).  Administered by the US Department of Defense, WRAIR is the 
largest biomedical research facility in the US and is situated in Silver Springs, 
Maryland.  WRAIR conducts biomedical research that responds to the needs of the 
US Department of Defense and the US Army, including studies on infectious 
diseases and the development of drugs and vaccines for malaria, dengue and 
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HIV/AIDS (WRAIR 2017).  Early in 1984, WRAIR and GSK entered into a 
collaborative research and development agreement to create a malaria vaccine.  As 
Dr. Cohen said, “the idea was to develop a vaccine that could serve … where 
malaria was endemic, but possibly a vaccine for travellers.  Included in the definition 
of travellers is, of course, military; they tend to travel.”   
The WRAIR had investigated malaria for many years, contributing 
significantly to the foundational research that underlies RTS,S, and by the late 
1980s, GSK held the patent for the CSP and the technology to produce CSP in large 
quantities (Sherman 2009; WRAIR 2011).  Together, scientists at both institutes 
developed nearly a dozen different vaccines that were tested pre-clinically and 
produced six different vaccines that were tested in laboratories at WRAIR in the US 
and in malaria endemic regions in Africa.  At the same time, a team led by scientists 
at NYU were developing and testing a malaria vaccine variation (Cohen et al. 2010; 
WRAIR 2011).  Each of the vaccines were tested in ‘challenge models’ in 
laboratories in the US.  Dr. Cohen provided an explanation of a human challenge 
model:  
[T]he volunteers in a study are immunized with the vaccine 
and then, in the confines of the laboratory, with proper follow 
up, you challenge the volunteers by having them bit with 
infectious mosquitoes in a container.  Follow up is done to 
find out if the vaccinated volunteers have contracted malaria 
and if the vaccine works.  The volunteers who were not 
protected by the vaccine were treated for malaria as soon as 
parasites were found.  The challenge model is useful to allow 
people to find if a vaccine works or not. 
However, a majority of the vaccine candidates performed poorly and were not 
developed further.  
One vaccine candidate was field tested in a phase 2b trial amongst Thai and 
Kenyan volunteers at overseas laboratories owned by the WRAIR.  However, this 
vaccine candidate was found inefficacious (Cohen et al. 2010; Regules, Cummings 
and Ockenhouse 2011; Kester et al. 2000; WRAIR 2011).  Where once there was 
great optimism that a vaccine would be found, by the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
there was widespread disappointment and skepticism that a malaria vaccine would 
be developed (Cohen et al. 2010).   
In 1987, the results from testing vaccine candidates were not encouraging.  
The research by Hoffman et al. (2002), demonstrated that humans could be 
protected against malaria infection with CSP-based vaccines but it was unclear how 
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to employ this finding to create a vaccine.  The malaria vaccine program at GSK had 
moved its laboratories in Philadelphia to Rixensart, Belgium.  It was then that Dr. 
Cohen was asked to take charge of the Malaria Vaccine Team at GSK and see if he 
could devise some new ideas for developing and improving the vaccine (Sherman 
2009).   
GSK had been in the process of completing a hepatitis B vaccine in 1984 
when Dr. Cohen began working at GSK and the first genetically engineered vaccine 
against hepatitis B was registered in Europe in 1986, named Engerix-B™ (Cohen et 
al. 2011).  Dr. Cohen said, “I was very much impressed with the … kind of molecular 
biology, that these scientists in industry were doing.”  As he headed the Malaria 
Vaccine Team, his team of scientists devised a new molecule to help increase the 
performance of the vaccine, employing similar genetic engineering techniques as 
used to develop the hepatitis B vaccine.  This newly formulated malaria vaccine was 
created by partitioning one gene from the hepatitis B virus and combining that with 
the CSP discovered by the Nussenzweigs at NYU.  The combination of virus and 
parasite genes assembled into virus-like particles and were transferred to yeast cells 
using molecular biology techniques.  These genetically modifying yeast cells then 
produced large quantities of these virus-like particles.  Dr. Cohen described this 
process: “These proteins inside the yeast cells were assembled together into a little 
ball of sorts, a few nano meters in diameter, that looked like the virus but with no 
pathological material … in it whatsoever… that would be a protection against … 
malaria,”.  “This hybrid formed particles looked like virus particles….  The immune 
system thinks it’s a virus and responds better.”   
This was not enough for an efficacious malaria vaccine and in 1989, 
scientists began developing an adjuvant system to boost the immune response to 
RTS,S (Casares et al. 2010; Cohen et al. 2010).  As discussed above, an adjuvant 
is a substance added to vaccines and other medicines to boost the immune 
response (NIH 2008; Brownstein 2009).  Adjuvant systems (AS) were developed, 
derived from the bark of a plant and two were found to be efficacious: AS01 and 
AS02 (Casares et al. 2010; Cohen et al. 2010).  Dr. Cohen explained this 
development:  
While the trials were running, we were working on improving 
adjuvants and we were doing trials … on mice and … rhesus 
monkeys.  But we also were doing trials on humans … to 
see if any new adjuvants that we were developing would be 
better.  Indeed, one adjuvant…called AS01, was … better 
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than AS02…. [W]e switched to AS01 and that’s the one we 
did the phase 3 [trial] with and … that’s the one that will go 
into the final vaccine. 
Dr. Cohen summed up the development of RTS,S vaccine and the adjuvant, 
AS01: “We took this protein that people had been working with for many, many 
years, the CSP, and failing.  We hooked [the CSP] up to the hepatitis B protein to 
produce particles.  We formulated [the vaccine] with adjuvants and that form of the 
RTS,S vaccine finally gave us some positive results.”  This new and improved 
vaccine took nine years to develop.   
The vaccine needed to be tested to see if it was an improvement on the last 
formula and in 1996, GSK with the WRAIR worked together to test the vaccine on 
human volunteers at WRAIR in the US (Cohen et al. 2010; PATH-MVI 2016).  The 
outcome was very positive, as Dr. Cohen explained:  
We were fortunate that the vaccine actually worked and 
worked in the first study very well.  Out of the study 
volunteers that had been immunized with the malaria 
vaccine and challenged with the bite of infected mosquitoes, 
six out of seven were completely protected.  After that we 
tested in many different applications … [through] the 
challenge model and the efficacy was more in the range of 
50%.   
These studies were carried out on a very small adult population, volunteers who had 
never experienced malaria or been to malaria endemic regions.  That was the first 
strong indication that the candidate vaccine could protect against malaria.   
The outcomes of the challenge model tests were encouraging but the 
efficacy rates called into question the ability for RTS,S to protect travellers and 
military personnel.  I spoke about this issue with Michael, a representative of the 
Malaria Vaccine Initiative (MVI), via internet video call in 2015.  He stated, 
[RTS,S] had been worked on by GSK and Walter Reed back 
in the ‘80s [and] it showed some promise but not promise for 
the clientele they were looking for….  Given that Walter 
Reed was involved, I’m not going out on a limb to say that 
they were looking for a malaria vaccine for the military.  But 
the efficacy they were getting really wasn’t showing that it 
was going to be what the military would need…. And as you 
know, children in Africa with falciparum malaria, that’s the 
biggest killer and that’s the ones most affected by the 




However, developing a vaccine for African children was not always the main 
goal of GSK and WRAIR.  With efficacy levels of RTS,S lower than hoped, the 
vaccine became targeted towards young children only after disappointing results.  
Dr. Cohen explained the need to develop a more efficacious malaria vaccine for 
travellers and military personnel: 
[People] are working on vaccines that can be used by … 
military personnel, or by travelers, various groups of 
travelers.  That is a completely different project that requires 
that a vaccine be extremely highly efficacious to compete 
with what travelers or military personnel can do today to 
protect themselves against malaria, which is to take 
preventative drugs, pills….  [T]hese are efficacious at near to 
a 100%.  Making a vaccine that can reach very high efficacy, 
and even a vaccine that can be easily taken by a traveler—
which means that it requires one, or maybe a maximum of 
two injections—we are really very far from anything like this 
today.   
Although less efficacious than hoped, the RTS,S malaria vaccine protects 
against the species, Plasmodium falciparum by triggering the immune system when 
the sporozoites of the P. falciparum malaria parasite enter the bloodstream after the 
bite from an infected mosquito and/or when the parasite infects the liver.  The 
vaccine prevents the parasite from infecting, coming to maturity and multiplying in 
the liver and from later re-entering the bloodstream and infecting red blood cells, the 
point at which the affected person would begin showing symptoms of malaria 
infection.  Dr. Ripley Ballou at the WRAIR and Dr. Joe Cohen at GSK were named 
co-inventors of the vaccine.  As the history of the RTS,S malaria vaccine 
demonstrates, the science behind the vaccine was informed by previous 
technological and scientific breakthroughs and a growing understanding of the 
malaria parasite and human immunology.  Also, at each stage of development of 
RTS,S, the body of knowledge about biology grew, as did the tools available to 
researchers, allowing for refinements of the vaccine (Cohen et al. 2010; Vekemans 
et al. 2009; Sherman 2009; PATH-MVI 2016).  Additionally, institutional 
arrangements shifted that saw the sale of publicly funded research to a private 
company and the formation of a partnership between the WRAIR and GSK to fund 
and support research activities.         
Once the formulation of the vaccine was tested and confirmed to be 
efficacious in small-scale studies in laboratories, researchers wanted to see if 
RTS,S prevented malaria under more realistic conditions in the field, in the places 
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where the vaccine would potentially be used.  Below, I discuss the vaccine clinical 
trials that were carried out between 1998 and 2014 and how they were increasingly 
scaled up from small trials involving a few adults to involve thousands of young 
children (PATH-MVI 2016). 
Testing RTS,S: Phase 1 and 2 RTS,S Vaccine Clinical Trials  
In 1998, GSK and WRAIR began collaboration with the UK Medical 
Research Council (MRC) and a program was set up to test the vaccine in the MRC 
field station in The Gambia in a phase 1 trial.  Adult men were vaccinated and the 
safety and immune response to the vaccine was demonstrated under natural 
exposure to the malaria parasite.  Subsequent trials—phase 2a and 2b—were 
carried out in Gambian adult men, providing proof that RTS,S was efficacious under 
natural malaria exposure (Cohen et al. 2010).  “Lo and behold, the vaccine was 
indeed offering partial efficacy against naturally challenged malaria in the field on 
African challenged volunteers,” Dr. Cohen explained.  At the conclusion of the trial, 
there was 47% efficacy rate (Cohen et al. 2011; Girard et al. 2006).  Over the next 
five years, this population was monitored to determine long-term safety and efficacy 
of the vaccine (Cohen et al. 2010).  
The outcome of the vaccine trial at the MRC research centre in The Gambia 
encouraged GSK to continue with the testing of RTS,S amongst a younger 
population in Africa.  Dr. Cohen said, “In order to test the vaccine targeting infants in 
Africa, there was no other way of testing it other than actually in the target 
population, and in the geographic region where that target population resided.  So, 
just in terms of regulatory issues, if we expect to have the vaccine licensed and 
registered and implemented, we had to do this testing in Africa.”  However, this 
undertaking was anticipated to be quite costly.  Although GSK and the WRAIR were 
able to fund vaccine development up until this point, they were unable to provide 
funding for further phase 2 trials and a large-scale phase 3 trial.  Many vaccines that 
are unlikely to be money-makers tend to have trouble passing from development 
and testing in laboratories to being tested in the field.  This is often due to a lack of 
funds and support from pharmaceutical companies that anticipate little return on 
their investment into vaccines for diseases that predominantly afflict the poor 
(Widdus 2005).  Thus, to overcome this challenge, GSK sought outside funding.   
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Reflecting on this period of time, Dr. Cohen said, 
We developers were aware that this would be a 
tremendously large endeavour, from a scientific point of view 
and from an organization point of view, and from a cost point 
of view.  We knew how much it cost, on average, to develop 
a vaccine and this was a rather particular vaccine targeting a 
rather vulnerable population.  Not only vulnerable because 
they carried the burden of malaria but vulnerable in a more 
general sense.  These were infants, children, in very poor 
countries.  That added another aspect to their vulnerability 
that needed to be taken into consideration.  So, at the end of 
the 90s and beginning of the 2000s …we knew it was going 
to be a complicated and costly project.  Because the vaccine 
was targeting a very poor population, there would be a very 
low return.  And so, we had to develop a new business 
model to try to address the specific difficulties or hurdles for 
the development of the vaccine.  At the same time, the 
Gates Foundation was created [in] 1998.  And by 1999, the 
Gates Foundation had itself founded and funded a new 
organization, the Malaria Vaccine Initiative [MVI]....  Its 
primary goal was to accelerate development of vaccines 
against malaria….  Very quickly we went to see them with 
the data we had [from] small trials in African adults in ’97, 
’98.  We went to see them to discuss the potential for an 
agreement.  Perhaps at that time these things were not quite 
known as public-private partnerships but essentially that was 
what it was….  We had discussions with the Malaria Vaccine 
Initiative and the Gates Foundation and in January 2001, we 
entered into a partnership agreement …whereby GSK and 
MVI would partner and share the risks and the costs of 
developing this malaria vaccine.  This partnership has been 
there over the years as the project progressed and is still 
honoured today. 
Acknowledging that a malaria vaccine for African children would not likely 
lead to great profits for GSK and knowing that a large-scale clinical trial of RTS,S 
would be a great undertaking, partnering with a non-profit organization was key for 
RTS,S to progress in its development.  GSK teamed up with the Malaria Vaccine 
Initiative (MVI), which was created as a branch of the US-based non-profit 
organization, Program for Appropriate Technology in Health (PATH), based in 
Seattle.  PATH and MVI share financial and administrative systems.  MVI was set up 
in Bethesda, Maryland in 1999 and with a large grant from the Gates Foundation for 
US$50 million, helped carry out the phase 2 and 3 clinical trials for RTS,S (MVI 
representative, personal communication; Sherman 2009; Chataway et al. 2010).  
Michael explained the involvement of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and 
their large financial investment: “They saw the value of a malaria vaccine; they see 
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the value in vaccines generally.  The Foundation is very hot on this.  Melinda Gates 
is very hot on malaria; she’s doing something about it because it’s such a killer.”   
MVI’s mission is “to accelerate the development of malaria vaccines and 
ensure their availability and accessibility in the developing world.” (Chataway et al. 
2010: 1285)  There are three aspects to their mission: 1) product development; (2) 
access to products; and (3) working with countries where malaria is endemic in 
order to ensure that those countries have leadership and ownership of vaccine use.  
Chataway et al. (2010) describe MVI is an integrator, bringing together a mix of 
stakeholders and organizations in order to ensure that the vaccine candidate was 
successfully taken from ‘bench to bedside’ (Chataway et al. 2010: 1285).  MVI has a 
portfolio of around 20 malaria vaccines, each at different stages of development 
(Sherman 2009; WHO 2016a).    
Michael remarked about the partnership between GSK and MVI: 
There was probably too much risk for GSK to undertake 
these trials all on their own.  A lot of money, a lot of capacity 
building required for these large-scale trials in Africa so they 
needed a partner that was willing to off-set some of that risk 
if things didn’t work out.   
The contract between GSK and MVI took a year to negotiate and clearly stipulated 
in a charter under the partnership agreement what the roles, responsibilities and key 
deliverables were for each party.  GSK served as the regulatory sponsors of the 
trials and MVI coordinated trial activities and funded operating expenses, including 
resources, equipment and staff training for the clinical trials.  Dr. Cohen reflected on 
the partnership between GSK and MVI.  “[I]it’s a complex partnership….  [T]here is 
an agreement that isn’t just one page that says, “We’ll work together” and that’s it.  
What are the deliverables, with who will do what, with a charter under the 
agreement.”   
With this partnership in place, RTS,S vaccine clinical trials were conducted 
across Africa.  As Dr. Cohen explained, “We began progressing very carefully to the 
younger populations and ultimately to the infants.”  A pediatric version of RTS,S was 
developed and around 3,000 children ranging in age from 6 weeks to 11 years old 
were vaccinated from 2004 to 2009 in The Gambia and Mozambique.  Through 
these trials, the vaccine was demonstrated to be safe for children.  In 2004, a trial 
was carried out in Mozambique to demonstrate the efficacy of RTS,S in the pediatric 
population in a large, double-blinded study amongst 2,022 children aged one to four 
years old.  The efficacy was around 35% against first clinical episode of malaria and 
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49% efficacious against severe malaria over an 18-month period.  The benefits 
lasted over 45 months and the vaccine was found to be safe (Cohen et al. 2010). 
Beginning in 2007, the next phase of testing was conducted in Mozambique 
amongst younger children who were receiving vaccines as part of the Extended 
Program of Immunization (EPI).  This trial assessed the efficacy of RTS,S in children 
aged 8, 12 and 16 weeks when administered with EPI vaccines, including the 
tetanus, diphtheria and pertussis vaccines (Cohen et al. 2010).  Many children 
around the world receive their childhood vaccines through this program and being 
able to administer RTS,S through the same program would lower administration 
costs (WHO 2017a; RTS,S Vaccine Trial Administrator 2013, personal 
communication).  As Dr. Cohen explained, RTS,S “is meant to be implemented from 
existing channels of implementation of vaccinations for kids in Africa.  This is the so 
called Extended Program of Immunization … through which kids in Africa receive 
their standard courses of vaccinations today with existing registered and 
recommended vaccines.  This is an existing system that works extremely well [and] 
covers … about 75% of the kids in Africa.”  During this trial, RTS,S was found to be 
66% efficacious.   
From 2006 and 2008, a subsequent trial was carried out in Korogwe, 
Tanzania14,15 and Kilifi, Kenya.  In Korogwe District, children from 17 villages were 
enrolled in the trial, which operated out of the pediatric ward of Korogwe District 
Hospital, with three trial dispensaries16 used as vaccination sites.  The vaccine was 
similarly efficacious as in previous trials (Cohen et al. 2010; Olotu et al. 2011; 
Liheluka et al. 2013).  Speaking to Sharon, a representative of MVI, via internet 
video call in 2015, she explained, the phase 2 trial in Mozambique was a 
“preparatory study,… kind of like a shake down.”  It was a chance to enhance 
referral systems and pediatric care services in the area in order to ensure that when 
                                              
14 In 2005, in preparation for the phase 2 RTS,S vaccine trial, a demographic surveillance system 
was set up in 14 villages in Korogwe District (Nyika et al. 2010). 
15 Before the RTS,S trial began, ethical clearance was obtained from the relevant medical 
research organizations both internationally and in Tanzania.  MVI employed people who had 
decades of experience conducting clinical trials in Africa and had expertise in navigating this part 
of the research.  Once a site at the Korogwe District Hospital was identified to support the trial, 
meetings were held with administrators at the Korogwe District Hospital and district medical 
officers who oversaw the health care system in the area.  Once these people approved of the 
RTS,S trial, trial staff could begin their work of community engagement and recruiting research 
participants (MVI Representative 2015, personal communication). 
16 Informants referred to health care dispensaries built for the RTS,S trial as “satellite 
dispensaries” because they were located in villages around the Korogwe Research Centre.  
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participants fell ill, the necessary steps would be taken for them to receive care and 
have samples collected for analysis.  These positive outcomes and improvements in 
care led researchers to progress to a large-scale phase 3 study for infants and 
young children. 
Phase 3 RTS,S Vaccine Clinical Trial 
From 2009 to 2014, a phase 3, randomized control trial of RTS,S, was 
carried out in seven African countries.  The trial involved over 15,000 children in two 
age groups.  The trial participants were divided into three groups: one group was 
administered the vaccine in three doses, along with an alternate vaccine as a 
booster shot; a second group receiving four shots of RTS,S (which included an 
active booster shot); and a third group received four shots of an alternate vaccine (a 
rabies vaccine was given to the older group of trial participants and a meningococcal 
vaccine for the younger group).  There were three vaccines provided to each 
participant, once a month for three months, with a fourth shot provided to a third of 
participants after a year as a booster.  Researchers wanted to know if RTS,S could 
prevent malaria and if an additional dose a year after the first RTS,S dose boosted 
the performance of the vaccine.  Participants were randomly assigned to one of the 
three groups and since the trial was double blinded, neither the researchers or 
participants knew which participant received RTS,S or an alternate vaccine.  MVI 
provided funding for the trial, which stemmed from the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation, with a bit of funding from USAID and ExxonMobil for communication 
training for trial staff and the conduct of ancillary studies on malaria transmission 
(RTS,S Clinical Trials Partnership 2015; MVI Representative 2015, personal 
communication).   
GSK and MVI remained partners while entering into multiple collaborations 
with the African research institutions conducting the RTS,S clinical trial.  For each of 
the 11 trials sites across Africa, a publicly or privately funded African research 
institute conducting the trial and many of the trial sites formed affiliations with an 
academic institution in Europe or the United States.  Dr. Cohen described the 
collaborations: “In total there are more than two dozen collaborations between … 
                                                                                                                                
However, in order to simplify terminology, I have used the term “trial dispensary” to refer to these 
dispensaries throughout the thesis.   
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African and European or American institutes.”  Speaking to Tom, a British malaria 
research and co-Principal Investigator (PI) of a West African RTS,S trial site, he 
explained the role of northern academic institutions in the trial:  
Many of the sites have Northern partners that they’ve worked 
with and … some small amounts of money came from 
[them].  [Northern partners] helped, especially in the 
beginning when [people were] getting the trial off the 
ground.…  They are really good, giving help in that way.  In 
the beginning, [trial sites] really needed help with how to 
actually run a vaccine trial and [Northern partners] are there 
to offer support. 
In Korogwe, Tanzania, the RTS,S trial was supported by the publicly funded 
Tanzanian National Institutes for Medical Research (NIMR), but was solely funded 
by MVI and had no affiliation to a Northern academic centre.  Other trial sites had 
different arrangements.  For example, the other vaccine trial in Tanzania was 
conducted in Bagamoyo, just north of Dar es Salaam.  There, the trial was carried 
out by the Ifakara Health Institute, a non-profit research organization largely funded 
through grants from world governments, with an affiliation with the Swiss Tropical 
and Public Health Institute (IHI 2016; Tanner 2017).   
Although most African trial sites developed partnerships with Northern 
institutions, the partnership between GSK and MVI required new governance 
structures as the roles of each organization centred on the phase 3 trial.  Sharon 
spoke about this shift: 
MVI played a role … in partnership with GSK because they 
are … the regulatory sponsors.  So, one of the roles that MVI 
had was that we funded all the [trial] sites.  In other words, 
we paid for their operating expenses, for their budget.  So 
MVI staff were intricately involved in working with the sites 
for resources, budgets, equipment, training.  Then, on an 
ongoing basis, MVI staff were the ones that coordinated 
what is called the CTPC, the Clinical Trials Partnership 
Committee.  That was the next tier of the governance 
structure of a network-wide way to communicate and 
coordinate among all of the sites, creating that harmonized 
11-centred network.   
Speaking to Dr. Cohen about how the partnership operated, he said,   
We have a steering committee that represents GSK and the 
Malaria Vaccine Initiative that actually steers … the overall 
strategy of the project and manages the overall project.  With 
the steering committee, [it] has 14 members for GSK and 
MVI but also has … an observer from the Gates Foundation 
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and there are observers from the African collaborators.  And 
in addition to this particular steering committee between MVI 
and GSK, there is a committee that brings together all of the 
… collaborating institute in Africa, in the US and Europe and 
it’s called the CTPC, Clinical Trial Partnership Committee.  
This has representatives of each of the collaborating sites 
and each of the collaborating institutions come together in 
this committee.  They actually deal specifically [with] work on 
the clinical trials,… they have the final say on the way the 
results of the trial are … drafted and published, et cetera. 
I spoke to Isabelle, a RTS,S vaccine scientist at GSK via telephone in early 2014.  
She described the need for a partnership. 
This is clearly something that the company would not have 
been able to develop on its own.  On the other hand, the 
other partners would have not been able to do it on their own 
because we have the clinical infrastructure [and] know-how 
to use the existing infrastructure in Africa.  We have the 
capacity to manufacture, et cetera.  But on the other hand, 
we need the support, not only in term of risk-sharing and 
cost-sharing, but also in terms of expertise.  We really need 
the expertise and the views of the people, like the Gates 
Foundation, like PATH-MVI.  But more importantly from the 
people on the ground [in Africa].  It is really critical that each 
of us brings in expertise.…  It’s really trying to put … all the 
minds together and … [have] each other’s expertise and 
knowledge. 
Sharon reflected on the social relationships formed through the RTS,S 
vaccine trial: “when the trial was going on, at any given point there were 1000 
people dedicated to the trial.  It’s an incredible effort….  We had a lot of dedicated 
people making this happen.”  Dr. Cohen also spoke about how activities were 
coordinated between the many people and organizations involved: 
It’s not a simple matter, and it is done by … committees and 
… a lot of emphasis on transparency and making sure that 
everyone is involved and aware of what is happening.  Many 
face-to-face meetings.  That’s how hundreds of people have 
been working on that….  It was done successfully I think, 
very much so.  
At the end of the trial, researchers found that the efficacy of RTS,S waned 
over time.  Three shots of RTS,S led to a 28% efficacy rate but three shots of the 
vaccine along with a booster shot 20 months after initial vaccination led to a 36% 
efficacy rate for the older group and 26% for the younger group after four years of 
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follow up.  After seven years, that efficacy of four shots waned to 4.4% (Olotu et al. 
2016; RTS,S Clinical Trials Partnership 2015; Moorthy and Okwo-Bele 2015). 
Researchers now know why results of the vaccine trial are lower than 
expected.  As discussed, vaccine researchers used a protein found on the surface 
of malaria parasite, the CSP, to manufacture RTS,S.  However, different malaria 
parasites have slight variations in their proteins, something that researchers 30 
years ago were unable to detect with the tools available at the time.  Using new 
DNA sequencing tools, researchers analyzed the parasites that infected 5,000 of the 
children involved in the phase 3 trials.  Fewer than 10% of the parasites found in 
these participants had a matching protein to the one used in the RTS,S vaccine.  
RTS,S was partially efficacious to malaria parasites with mismatching proteins but 
worked best when the proteins were an exact copy.  Researchers are now looking 
into including a variety of proteins in newer malaria vaccines (Neafsy et al. 2015; 
Maxmen 2015).              
Although these outcomes might be considered disappointing, Dr. Cohen did 
not feel this way.  Reflecting on the phase 3 RTS,S vaccine trials, he said, 
[The trials] are recognized as high quality trials, so that is 
fantastic given where we started.  Not easy.  And as far as 
the results, we are very happy….  The efficacy … is partial 
… but that was something we knew almost from day one.  
So, the trials we performed at Walter Reed suggested an 
efficacy of about 50% overall.  When we went into the field 
that is what we saw.…  But for us … it is still an excellent 
result because … the public health impact of that level of 
efficacy, and the human impact of that level of efficacy, is 
enormous.  Because the disease has such a high burden….  
It sends … millions to the hospital each year….  If you can 
have an impact of 50 or even 30% on these numbers, you 
have a tremendous public health impact, of course.  So, we 
are very happy with the results. 
Several informants emphasized that RTS,S is no magic bullet and if 
deployed it will be added to existing prevention methods, such as insecticide-treated 
bed nets.  As Dr. Cohen said:  
The malaria vaccine is an additional tool, completely different 
in its mode of action, completely different in its 
implementation….  We are simply saying this is an additional 
weapon in the arsenal to fight malaria and it has its role and 
its place because it is actually very different from the other 
preventative measures….  [T]his is not the silver bullet that 
will resolve … the malaria problem, it’s not going to eradicate 
or eliminate malaria in Africa.  But it will save lives.  It will 
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prevent children from being sick and having to go to hospital 
and having … severe malaria.  It will prevent millions of … 
uncomplicated cases of malaria.  It has an important role to 
play from that point of view. 
Joseph, a RTS,S trial administrator in Korogwe, echoed this: “in my view and the 
view of other scientists that I know, [RTS,S is] to be used in combination with other 
existing malaria interventions.”  This may put strain on already underfunded malaria 
control efforts in Tanzania but some people I spoke to viewed RTS,S as a stepping 
stone towards more effective malaria vaccines.  As Tom said,  
The next step is to come up with a better vaccine.  There are 
20 other vaccines at various stages….  [T]he malaria vaccine 
will be licensed and used in some places but that will 
encourage the development of better vaccines….  I don’t 
think we’ll get a vaccine that will get 100% protection.… It 
will be a gradual process.  You will probably get 
combinations of vaccine that get up to 60% or they will 
develop something else that gets it better than that but it will 
be a gradual process.   
With the data collected from the large-scale clinical trial, researchers and 
policy makers could see that RTS,S was able to prevent malaria in about a third of 
cases.  This could pave the way for RTS,S to be eventually provided to children in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, as well as the development of other malaria vaccines.  I now 
turn to a discussion about the steps towards widespread provision of RTS,S.  
Steps Toward Future Provision of RTS,S 
In July 2014, GSK submitted the results of the phase 3 trial to the European 
Medicines Agency (EMA) under article 58.  Article 58, which devised by the EMA 
and the WHO, states that the EMA will review and offer an opinion on new drugs 
that are developed in Europe but are not destined for the European market.  This 
process did not lead to drug licensure but the EMA gave a scientific opinion on the 
safety and use of RTS,S.  In July 2015, the EMA determined that RTS,S was 
efficacious and safe for use amongst the younger and older age groups of children 
included in the third phase of the trial (J. Cohen 2013, personal communication; 
PATH-MVI 2016; Greenwood and Doumbo 2016).   
After this recommendation, two WHO advisory groups—the Malaria Policy 
Advisory Committee and the Strategic Advisory Group of Experts on Immunization—
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reviewed the file on RTS,S.  These committees provided a recommendation about 
how the vaccine should be used in Africa and developed guidelines for its provision.  
In the phase 3 trial, vaccine efficacy was low among the younger group of children 
aged 6 to 12 weeks.  Due to this outcome, the WHO recommended that RTS,S only 
be used amongst the older age group, the 5- to 17-month old children (Greenwood 
and Doumbo 2016; WHO 2016; Moorthy and Okwo-Bele 2015).   
The WHO advisory groups also recommended large-scale pilot studies be 
undertaken before widespread use of RTS,S.  Three pilot studies will commence in 
three different African countries, beginning in 2018.  The pilot studies will assess 
whether existing immunization programs are able to deliver four doses of RTS,S, 
whether the vaccine is as safe as demonstrated in the phase 3 trial, and whether the 
vaccine is effective in preventing death in real-life settings.  The WHO is yet to 
decide which countries will undertake the pilot studies but priority will be given to 
countries that have participated in the phase 3 trial.  Additionally, each setting for the 
pilot studies will have a high burden of malaria and functioning immunization and 
malaria programs.  The pilot studies will be amongst 5- to 9-month-old children.  
Funding for these pilot studies will come from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria, GAVI—the Global Alliance for Vaccines, and UNITAID17.  
So far, US$49.2 million has been pledged for a three-year pilot program (PATH-MVI 
2016; Greenwood and Doumbo 2016; WHO 2016b; WHO 2017b).       
After the pilot studies, policy makers in individual countries will decide about 
providing RTS,S and the extent of that provision.  Since countries where RTS,S will 
be deployed tend to be impoverished, they will have to seek out donor funding for 
the vaccines to be purchased and deployed.  As Dr. Cohen explained, “the people 
that are the final target of the vaccine clearly are not able to pay for the vaccine and 
will not pay for the vaccine….  These vaccines are being funded by donors.  In some 
cases, the countries contribute a certain amount, usually a small amount, and in 
many cases, the purchasers of the vaccine are in fact run through [GAVI].”  As for 
the cost of RTS,S, Dr. Cohen explained that GSK will not make a profit from the sale 
of RTS,S.  GSK aims to set the price at US$5 per shot, the same price as an 
insecticide-treated bed net.  This cost will cover vaccine manufacturing costs along 
                                              
17 UNITAID was founded in 2006 by the WHO to fund the last stages of development and 
research for new drugs, including the production of data to support guidelines for use.  Located in 
Geneva, Switzerland, UNITAID is funded by France, Norway, Chile, the Bill and Melinda Gates 
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with an additional 5% that GSK will invest in research about malaria and neglected 
tropical diseases (MVI-GSK 2015).     
Penny et al. (2016) conducted a cost-effectiveness analysis of RTS,S 
vaccinations in a range of different settings in Africa.  With a 75% coverage rate with 
four doses of the vaccine, RTS,S would be cost-effective in a variety of places, as 
long as the vaccine cost between US$2 and $10 a dose.  The researchers predicted 
that the introduction of the vaccine could make a substantial and positive impact on 
public health in many places in Africa.  Providing four doses of the vaccine could 
avert “484 … deaths … per 100,000 vaccinated children ... This finding translates to 
roughly one malaria death prevented for every 200 children fully vaccinated” (373).  
This modelling will help shape policy recommendations for where and how RTS,S 
will be provided in Africa, as well as donor funding for the vaccine (Penny et al. 
2016; Greenwood and Doumbo 2016).  I now turn to a discussion about the 
partnerships established during the phase 3 RTS,S vaccine trials in Africa.     
The RTS,S Vaccine Partnerships  
Throughout the development of the RTS,S vaccine, a combination of new 
scientific tools, funding mechanisms and global health partnerships made the 
vaccine possible.  RTS,S started as a molecule in a university laboratory and then 
became the patented property of GSK.  Different institutions and organizations were 
involved in laboratory research or clinical trials as the vaccine progressed and went 
from potentially having military applications to being formulated for pediatric 
populations in Africa.  The earlier partnerships were formed between Northern 
companies and institutions; each had ample resources, making relations more 
equal.  As well, these actors were engaged in partnership over years and decades, 
allowing people time to build relationships.  Later in the development of RTS,S, 
partnerships were forged between GSK, MVI and African research institutions.  
These African research institutions in turn established partnerships with Northern 
research institutions.  These later-stage partnerships involved larger differences in 
wealth and resources and operated for only a few years, which likely made it difficult 
                                                                                                                                




for people to develop strong relationships of trust and mutuality.  Below, I explore 
people’s thoughts on these later partnerships.  
Reflected on the establishment of partnerships between dozens of 
organizations in Africa, Europe and the US, several informants portrayed the 
partnerships positively, describing them as successful.  Dr. Cohen, discussing the 
partnership between GSK and MVI, said: “It’s a partnership that … we have been 
completely transparent …, visa-vis, the partners with each other … and that has 
been really critical in our capacity to get this vaccine to a stage where it is today.”  
Michael said, “if you see in the latest publication in The Lancet, the sites and 
partnerships succeeded.”  From Michael’s perspective, the RTS,S trial also fostered 
relationships between trial sites in Africa:  
The things that proved to be essential is that in some of the 
countries there was more than one trial site….  [S]ome of the 
countries it was the RTS,S vaccine partnership that got 
those research centres talking to each other.  Even though 
they were in the same countries, they were kind of in their 
own silos in some cases and this trial … actually got these 
guys talking together, to their mutual benefit, outside of 
RTS,S. 
Sharon also spoke highly of the partnerships: “We would set goals and a lot of time 
we would make them and if we didn’t and … there was some unanticipated 
roadblock or challenge or something we didn’t think of, the teams worked together to 
solve them….  I do believe that ultimately … [the] PIs felt respected and that they 
had a place at the table.  That they were part of the decision-making and it wasn’t 
just top-down.”   
For the most part, representatives of GSK and MVI spoke about the positive 
aspects of partnership.  At the time of the interviews, the RTS,S partnerships had 
come to an end.  Informants were confident that through the partnerships, they had 
been successful in developing a malaria vaccine, publishing multiple articles in 
reputable academic journals, building African capacity to conduct biomedical 
research, and encouraging African research institutions to collaborate.  Thus, from 
their perspectives, these partnerships had been positive and mutually beneficial.   
Nevertheless, some informants revealed some of the difficulties that arose 
during the course of the partnerships.  Tom said, “obviously, everyone wants to 
know whether the vaccine works, that is the primary purpose of the whole thing.  But 
there are lessons to be learned about how partnerships can come together.  And not 
everything has gone perfectly and I think those are important lessons as well.”  The 
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two representatives of MVI, Sharon and Michael, spoke frankly about some of the 
difficulties encountered while testing RTS,S.  They had first-hand experience of 
these difficulties since they coordinated the various people and organizations 
involved in the trial.  Sharon recalled technical difficulties, saying, “You should try to 
organize and convene a teleconference with numerous African sites….  It’s actually 
impossible!”  She spoke of generators going down and the internet operating 
inconsistently, making communication difficult.  To help with this situation, MVI had 
regular visits to trial sites to deal with issues on the ground and there were many 
face-to-face meetings between partners and trial site representatives.  Sharon said, 
“It took a lot of strategic planning and … there are a lot of uncertainties.  We had this 
mantra: ‘We are going to plan for success’.  Yet, when a challenge came up, we 
really then had to go into problem solving mode….  Getting the vaccine to the sites 
and the cold chain, recruiting key personnel….  So many people and so much work 
went into this.”  With this, Sharon high-lighted that people cared about making the 
trial a success and put a lot of labour into establishing and maintaining social 
relationships, communication channels, and technological systems.   
A key component that enabled the trial to operate was coordination, 
something Michael spoke to:  
MVI’s role is that we’re kind of the honest broker in the 
partnership.  We have the trust and the confidence of the 
trial sites.  We are a not-for-profit and we play a different role 
than a for-profit company.  We are still, to some extent, the 
backbone of the partnership in terms of having the different 
parties working together.   
From Michael’s perspective, MVI was central to the partnership and served as the 
mediator between GSK and the trial sites in Africa.  Michael thought that staff at trial 
sites placed more trust in the non-profit organization because it was viewed as an 
altruistic and “honest” enterprise, focused on the alleviation of suffering, and GSK 
was perceived as being largely motivated by the generation of profit, despite the 
company demonstrating corporate social responsibility by creating the RTS,S 
vaccine.  This dichotomy between the two organizations meant that each served a 
different role in the partnership and related differently to staff in Africa.              
Sharon spoke to this dichotomy between MVI and GSK when she described 
the different strategies employed to coordinate and motivate trial staff:  
[S]ometimes [the] strategy was very consciously good cop, 
bad cop (laugh).  MVI was usually the good cop.  The sites 
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could come to us and bitch about GSK and we would feel 
their pain and we would say, ‘Yes, they’re the big, bad drug 
company’….  These are not the things that you write in a 
scientific paper but these are the human aspects of it and the 
management aspects.  You are managing personalities.  
You know, [the Tanzanian PI in Korogwe] is a personality to 
manage, and times that by 11.  You need to take different 
approaches to motivate people and to keep them motivated 
and for them to trust you….  We knew that [trial staff] were 
padding certain things, like laptops here and there and this 
and that, but we weren’t being draconian with things.  We 
would cut budgets but we understood that they were trying to 
slide things in….  We are viewed as reasonable people that 
really knew and understood their challenges and we weren’t 
going to nickel and dime them for stuff.  On the other hand, 
we kind of kept them in line.  
Sharon described the role of GSK as being the “bad cop”, the organization that was 
aimed at motivating people to stick to research protocols and be cost efficient.  MVI 
acted as the “good cop”, building the trust of trial staff by allowing trial staff to vent to 
them when frustrations with GSK arose.  More than that, MVI was relaxed when 
funding equipment, allowing trial site staff to add things to budgets and keep 
laptops, which was a strategy of providing material rewards to motivate trial staff.  
Yet, MVI also “kept them in line”, as Sharon said.  This expression demonstrates 
that she viewed African trial staff in paternalistic ways, assuming that they would be 
corrupt, steal and misbehave if not monitored.  Although representatives of MVI and 
GSK spoke about the successes of the partnerships, Sharon alluded to the unequal 
power dynamics and hierarchy at work in the RTS,S partnerships.                   
Sharon and Michael were frank about issues and challenges that the 
partnerships and collaborations faced.  What Michael and Sharon both expressed 
also demonstrated the importance of social relationships and the building of trust 
between actors to carry off a large-scale clinical trial.  Mosse (2005), having been 
involved in carrying out a development project in India, found something similar:       
… development projects generally are never simply 
‘implemented’ by single-sized actors through formal 
structures of responsibility; they not only require (and bring 
into existence) a range of unscripted inter-institutional broker 
roles, but also need extensive informal networks of support, 
built personally through relations of trust and maintained 
through an out-of-sight ‘economy of favours and obligations’ 
… Ultimately, it is not policy consensus, rational planning or 
bureaucratic procedures that make projects … run.  It is 
personalities, brokering skills and the channels of influence 
of individual mediators, buffers and filters. (125) 
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Projects in either development or global health often operate over vast 
distances and involve many people who speak different languages and have 
different aims and expectations.  People’s personalities, the building of trust, 
brokering of relationships and the influencing of actors play key roles in the success 
of such projects.  For the RTS,S vaccine partnerships, there were also procedures 
to solve issues that arose over the course of the trial, which included the use of 
committees and face-to-face meetings.  The committees and other governance 
structures imposed a hierarchical structure on relationships, making it clear how the 
different actors and institutions related to each other, as well as clearly outlining 
expectations for each party.  These structures also opened lines of communication, 
allowing people’s issues to be heard and discussed.  So, although hierarchy led to 
clear power differences between people and places, it also organized diverse 
people and enabled the conduct of a large-scale, multi-sited clinical trial.   
The hierarchies and inequalities between Northern and Southern partners 
were issues that informants reflected on a great deal.  Tom downplayed the 
existence of inequalities, saying,  
Twenty years ago, North-South partnerships were very much 
dominated by people in the North who wrote the grants, got 
the money, made the big decisions.  They got their African 
colleagues to sign up and they were very much the junior 
partner.  That of course still happens from time to time but I 
think that things have changed.  For example, with the 
RTS,S trial,… Ghana gives the money to the London School 
[of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, it’s Northern partner].  
They have the grant so they have control over the money 
and if they think the London School can offer them 
something, they bite at it.  That is a big change.  Now the 
stronger partner is the African partner….  It hasn’t happened 
in all projects but there is an increasing move [to] giving the 
money to the African partner.  Then that makes them the 
stronger partner because money has the most influence….  
GSK and [MVI] are, to their credit, [allowing] the investigators 
to make a lot of the decisions. 
Simon was the site coordinator and his job involved coordinating the data 
management, laboratory, clinical and administrative departments at the Korogwe 
Research Centre.  We spoke at length in his dark office one hot afternoon as the air 
conditioner hummed in the background.  Like Tom, Simon understated the 
inequalities between partners.   
Of course, the sites are [very] dependent on the donors and 
sponsors but … I can say that the partnership is almost 50-
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50 because the site is contributing in getting study 
participants.  You cannot find malaria in Europe so they are 
dependent on countries that have malaria.  They provide 
funds but the site provides participants.  If you have 
participants but no funds, you can’t do a clinical trial and vice 
versa.  You can say that it is almost 50-50, we are 
depending on each other.   
Simon spoke of the dependency that the partners had on each other with the trial 
sites providing bodies for experimentation and the Northern partners holding the 
purse strings.  However, by describing the partnerships as “almost” equal indicates 
that Simon thought the balance of power tipped more towards GSK and MVI.   
 Although Tom and Simon minimized the role of inequality in the relationships 
between actors and organizations, it was difficult to avoid discussion of this issue.  
Later in the interview, Simon was more explicit about the differences in wealth 
between partners:   
[T]hose partnerships, first of all, built capacity for our local 
people but they also provided funds, they also provided 
expertise.  Without these partnerships … it was not possible 
to have conducted a clinical trial here.  So, it is very 
important and we still encourage that kind of partnership….  
We have some expertise but we think we need some more 
time working with them, making sure we are fully 
independent and can run our own things in our own country.  
We are still developing, we are still very young.  We need to 
be guided, we need to be shown the way.   
This perspective, that Tanzanians are young, in need of guidance and 
scientific and technological development, is significant.  Simon demonstrates that he 
has internalized feelings of inferiority in relation to those from more ‘developed’ 
places, a holdover from colonial times.  He employs the notion of immaturity to 
explain that he views Tanzanians as inferior and in need of help from people from 
wealthier parts of the world to advance economically and socially and catch up with 
the ‘modern’ world.  One important way that this advancement can happen, in his 
viewpoint, is through partnerships with organizations and companies from wealthier 
and more ‘developed’ countries.  Simon’s expression also is strategic and 
aspirational.  While on one hand he is expressing that the RTS,S vaccine 
partnership facilitated development through the training of locals, he is at the same 
time downplaying these improvements and expressing the need for continued 
investment and partnership with organizations from wealthy countries.   
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Like Simon, other clinical trial staff spoke directly to the issue of inequality.  
Interviewing Emmanuel, a trial doctor, at the Korogwe Research Centre conference 
room one afternoon, he said, “We need partnership from outside, we cannot develop 
that on our own because we have the capacity, we have the knowledge about how 
to conduct the trials but the problem is the funding, funding for such a big trial.  We 
don’t have the money.”  With this, Emmanuel contradicted what Tom said above and 
high-lighted that African partners are often at a disadvantage in terms of research 
funding and thus reliant on outside funders.   
 Hassan was a fieldworker who had been working for the RTS,S clinical trial 
since the second phase commenced in 2006.  He spoke to the issue of inequality 
when reflecting on the future of the RTS,S vaccine: “When they administer this 
vaccine, it will be GSK that benefits the most”.  Later, I asked Hassan why GSK 
would be interested in developing a vaccine for a disease that does not affect 
Europeans and he said, “Because they want to get profits.  I know that once this 
vaccine is authorized to be administered, they will produce more and more 
vaccines.…  [O]ur government might have to buy that vaccine so GlaxoSmithKline 
will benefit because it will get a lot of money for their vaccine.”  Quickly, Hassan 
followed this critique by saying, “We might know this but still this vaccine will help 
us.”  Later in the interview, Hassan said: “One day I will be happy I worked on this 
vaccine.”   
Hassan openly criticized the motives of GSK, highlighting the potential for 
GSK to make large profits from RTS,S.  He undermined the idea that GSK was 
acting out of altruism when developing the vaccine, something that most informants 
avoided discussing.  But then he softened his criticism by saying that the RTS,S 
vaccine would be beneficial to Tanzanians.  As well, Hassan thought of his own 
future, expressing the belief that he would be very happy about his involvement in 
the vaccine clinical trial.  Hassan was clearly grappling with the inequalities and 
injustices of the RTS,S partnerships and clinical trial.  Although he articulated that 
the vaccine could potentially enrich a wealthy pharmaceutical company, Hassan 
was expressing that he personally derived meaning from the labour he put into the 
clinical trial, which fulfilled his desire to save lives.  Hassan’s involvement in the 
vaccine trial was his chance to give back, which was a non-commodified form of 
payment for his labour.  For him, this made the inequality less problematic since he 
felt he was benefiting in non-monetary ways. 
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Although Hassan and Emmanuel addressed hierarchy and inequality, a few 
sought to dispel the idea that there was inequality between partners.  As Tom said, 
the money that the African research centres received from MVI and Northern 
academic institutions helped the research centres assume a level of power in 
relation to their Northern partners.  And Simon described the partnerships as 
“almost” equal because each partner brought something to the partnership.  
Nevertheless, the money provided to African research centres was not sufficient to 
put them on equal footing with GSK and MVI.  GSK had immense capital as one of 
the largest pharmaceutical companies in the world.  As well, this company held the 
patent for RTS,S, and determined how the trial would be conducted.  MVI had its 
own sizeable funding that it channelled to collaborating African institutions, making 
African collaborators recipients of funding.  This position did not confer equality.  
Nonetheless, some informants sought to undermine the idea that there were 
inequalities between institutions.   
People’s level of openness about inequality may relate to their position in the 
hierarchy of the partnerships.  Okwaro and Geissler (2015) reflect on this issue after 
interviewing African scientists in an East African university.  These anthropologists 
uncovered various opinions about their experiences of collaborative research 
relationships with Northern institutions.  Some scientists downplayed inequality, 
insisting that partnerships worked well and operated in a smooth manner.  Others 
acknowledged the asymmetrical power dynamics with partnering Northern institutes 
and described conflicts and frustrations.  However, it was difficult for those who 
insisted that the partnerships worked well to not reference power differences.  
Okwaro and Geissler thought that the difference in portrayal could relate to the 
hierarchy between scientists.  Senior scientists may have felt the need to pay lip 
service to partnership and equality since they had to maintain these relationships 
over time.  This portrayal may have also helped these scientists maintain personal 
integrity and dignity.  As well, senior scientists benefited from partnerships through 
better pay, co-authored publications and presentations at conferences, making them 
more likely to experience a sense of equality with their Northern partners.  But 
scientists of a lower rank worked as short-term contract employees and did not 
benefit in the same ways as senior scientists.  Thus, they did not have a 
responsibility or appear to have a desire to portray the research partnerships as 
frictionless or balanced.   
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This resonates with my findings.  Simon could not help but reference 
difference in power between partners.  But he sought to minimize the hierarchies 
and this may have been because he was in a management position with long-term 
employment at the Korogwe Research Centre.  Emmanuel and Hassan, on the 
other hand, were contract employees and had little responsibility in representing the 
partnerships as equal.  Furthermore, they did not benefit from the partnerships over 
the long-term since their employment ended when the phase 3 clinical trial ended.  
Thus, their position in the hierarchy may have shaped their reflections on the 
partnerships and their willingness to take a critical viewpoint.   
As for informants at GSK and MVI, they were looking back at the 
partnerships after they had ended.  These people could reflect on the partnerships 
and expressed feeling good about RTS,S development and building capacity in 
Africa, which may have made the frictions between people more acceptable.  As 
well, these informants did not have to confront the inequality in the same way as trial 
staff because they were in a position of power in relation to their Southern partners.  
It was trial staff who were in a lower position relative to their Northern partners and 




In this chapter, I laid foundation for subsequent chapters by providing 
background on the history of malaria vaccines and the RTS,S malaria vaccine 
development, from its creation in laboratories, to field testing in several vaccine 
clinical trials in Africa, and evaluation for future use.  This history was informed by 
interviews with Dr. Cohen, who provided a narrative from the perspective of 
someone who has successfully reached the end of a long research journey.  I also 
explored the social relationships established between different actors and 
organizations over time, describing how the formation of various partnerships have 
been integral to the development of RTS,S.  Although many of the partnerships 
throughout the history of RTS,S were established between GSK and wealthy 
organizations in the North, in later stages of the vaccine development, partnerships 
were forged with Southern research institutions.  Informants at GSK and MVI 
reflected on these partnerships after the vaccine trial ended and described them as 
successful.  These people could look back on these arrangements and perceive 
them as beneficial for everyone involved because the partnerships built capacity in 
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Africa to conduct medical research and led to the successful development of RTS,S.  
However, few informants could discuss these partnerships without alluding to 
hierarchy and inequality.  For representatives of MVI, they spoke openly about the 
ways they managed people and motivated trial staff to work.  For them, the 
hierarchical nature of the partnerships may have led to some frictions between 
people but these issues were overcome.  However, for clinical trial staff in Tanzania, 
some spoke about how hierarchy and inequality meant they were at a disadvantage, 
lacking the autonomy to build their own capacity for research or benefit from future 
earnings of the sale of RTS,S.  Thus, informants had different perspectives on the 
partnerships depending on their position within them.     
Overall, this chapter illustrates some of the frictions that operate in global 
health.  For the RTS,S vaccine partnerships these frictions related, in part, to 
hierarchical difference between partners.  For Simon, he was in a management 
position, which may have shaped his perceptions.  As well, he appeared to deal with 
this unequal arrangement by discussing the building of capacity as a positive 
outcome of the partnership.  And for Hassan, he attempted to make peace with the 
unequal arrangement between partners by thinking of the future.  He expressed that 
although the situation was unequal, he received more than a wage in exchange for 
his labour; he obtained a chance to be involved in creating a vaccine that had the 
potential to save many lives, an involvement he felt he would be proud of in the 
future.  Thus, Hassan found meaning in his work for the vaccine trial, making the 
inequality less problematic for him.  In the following chapter, I will build on this 
finding to discuss people’s reflections on the value of the RTS,S vaccine 





Chapter 2: Perceptions of Success: Examining 
Reflections on the RTS,S Vaccine Partnership and 
Clinical Trial  
Introduction 
I spoke to Michael, a representative of the Malaria Vaccine Initiative (MVI), 
via internet video call in June 2015.  Michael compared how medical research had 
been carried out in Africa in the past with the RTS,S malaria vaccine trial:  
I have been doing clinical research for almost 30 years.…  
Back in the day, we used to call it ‘safari research,’ where 
teams would fly in [with] their helicopters.  They would do the 
research, take over the whole place and then blow out of 
there.  They didn’t want to leave anything for the physicians 
and the nurses and the lab people on the ground.  We took 
at the beginning a very different philosophy.  We wanted to 
make sure that we … were going to leave something there 
that could be built upon to solve problems.  Once after this 
study was done, [people] needed to be able to sustain that.   
Michael emphasized the desire of clinical trial funders to build something that 
would remain and be sustained after a malaria vaccine clinical trial ended, breaking 
with the history of extractive medical research in Africa.  Michael was not alone in 
expressing this desire.  Although it was acknowledged that RTS,S malaria vaccine 
had the potential to improve health outcomes amongst African children, the clinical 
trial staff in Tanzania, malaria vaccine scientists at GlaxoSmithKline (GSK), and 
clinical trial coordinators/funders at MVI, that I spoke to often asserted that the value 
of the malaria vaccine partnerships was more than the development of a new 
vaccine.  Many I encountered described the RTS,S vaccine partnership as 
successful in its ability to “build capacity” in Tanzania, improve the health and 
education of community members, and create partnerships with communities.  For 
many informants, the aim was that once the vaccine trial ended, these capacities 
and partnerships could be drawn on in the future to “solve problems”, as Michael 
described it.   
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As the RTS,S clinical trial and partnerships drew to a close and ended, 
informants reflected on how activities started and progressed, and what the future 
held.  Informants largely described trial activities, such as capacity building and 
community engagement, as successful and positive.  They may have desired to find 
meaning in their involvement and wished to affirm that for themselves.  At the same 
time, informants wished to portray the trial and partnerships in a particular way to 
me during discussions and interviews.  Mosse’s (2005) writing about a UK 
Department for International Development (DfID) funded development project in 
India is helpful for understanding this.  Like clinical trials, development projects are 
intentional activities that have an end.  Mosse found that as projects end, people 
declare whether they were successful or not.  But no development project is a 
success or failure in itself; projects are deemed a success or failure by people who 
interpret its outcomes and impacts.  Policy and program outcomes are often 
ambiguous and vague, with stated aims such as ‘partnership’ or ‘participation’, 
which are outcomes that are difficult or impossible to assess or quantify.  This allows 
policies and programs to be translated into the goals, ambitions and intentions of the 
many institutions and people that the project brings together.  These people are part 
of an “interpretive community” (Mosse 2005: 18).  An interpretive community is 
made up of those who judge a project and these people construct stories to assert 
that a project has achieved a desired impact.  Policy need not be implemented and 
outcomes need not meet expectations.  What is needed is enough people who are 
willing to believe outcomes have met expectations.  Thus, the success of project is 
“not objectively verifiable but socially produced.” (Mosse 2005: 172).  Drawing on 
this book, I argue that my informants described the impacts of the research 
partnership and clinical trial as successful because they were part of an interpretive 
community. 
In this chapter, I explore the ways informants deemed the vaccine 
partnership and trial successful and beneficial.  I focus on several outcomes of the 
trial high-lighted as successful by informants, including the construction of buildings, 
infrastructure and assembly of technology to support trial activities, the training of 
African trial staff, the provision of health care, malaria control and health education 
to communities, and community engagement.  I elucidate the connections that 
informants made between research and partnership, untangling the entwining of 
these projects: one to test a new vaccine and the other to build capacity and foster 
partnership between North and South, and between researchers and communities.  
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I then analyze why informants portrayed the partnerships and trial as successful and 
beneficial to people and places in Tanzania.                            
The Value of Medical Research 
As Michael alluded to above, during the colonial and post-independence 
periods in Africa, Northern scientists tended to collect data from resource poor 
places and leave, which has since been termed “parachute” or “safari” research.  
This way of conducting research is now perceived disapprovingly in global health 
circles and Crane (2013) argues that global health researchers tend to be acutely 
aware that earlier international medical research was conducted under dubious 
ethical conditions.  Instead, global health organizations and researchers now 
advocate for partnerships with institutes, researchers and communities in resource 
poor countries.  This is perceived as a more equitable approach to international 
research.  With this shift towards partnership, there is an emphasis on and 
commitment to building capacity and forming collaborative relationships with local 
researchers and communities (Crane 2013; Kelly and Geissler 2011).  Thus, 
medical research partnerships have increasingly aligned their agendas with 
philanthropic organizations and global institutions which have recently come to 
prominence after public health care systems collapsed in many developing 
countries.  International science now often explicitly claims to contribute to the public 
health and research capabilities of resource-poor countries (Street 2014; Crane 
2013).   
Framed as “capacity building”, these activities can include material 
outcomes, such as infrastructure, health care provision, career training and 
employment (Simpson and Sariola 2012; Geissler 2015b; Kelly and Geissler 2011).  
These often form standard features of medical research in low-income settings.  
Such activities enable the conduct of medical research in the places where the 
resulting medical knowledge will be employed but they can also serve as way to add 
value to research activities and build partnership with local researchers.  The 
building of capacity demonstrates corporate social responsibility and aims to extend 
the benefits of research past pharmaceutical companies or research partnerships to 
the resource poor places where research is carried out (Kelly and Geissler 2011; 
Street 2014; Geissler 2015b; Leach and Fairhead 2011).   
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In addition to capacity building, international medical research partnerships 
and pharmaceutical companies aim to establish partnerships with communities 
impacted by research through activities called “community engagement”.  When 
research is conducted with vulnerable groups, important ethical considerations are 
raised.  This includes questions about participants’ understanding of the research, 
the level of voluntariness or coercion in people’s decisions to participate in research, 
the potential to exploit research participants, the social value of the research, and 
the sharing of research benefits (Emanuel et al. 2004; Chantler 2012).  Community 
engagement is the process of enacting two-way communication between research 
communities and researchers.  Various international guidelines emphasize the need 
for community engagement in resource poor setting because these activities can 
ensure that communities understand the procedures and purpose of research, and it 
can enhance trust (Nyika et al. 2010).  Community engagement and partnership can 
also allow lay citizens to shape the management, orientation, and evaluation of 
research (Kelly and Geissler 2011).  If partnerships with communities are not 
established, the fear is that  
[e]xclusion of ordinary members of communities from which 
participants are drawn, over and above local beliefs and 
cultural practices, could create conditions that are conducive 
to the generation of misconceptions, rumours and suspicions 
about particular research projects, which could deter 
potential participants from taking part in the research or 
could hinder the progress of the research (Nyika et al. 2010: 
86). 
Community engagement between communities and researchers is proposed as a 
standard for ethical research, as well as a tool to address ethical concerns (Chantler 
2012; Emanuel et al. 2004).  Community engagement and establishment of 
partnerships represents a shift in ethical doctrine towards the consideration of 
community perspectives and social practices and entangles medical research in the 
local context (Kelly and Geissler 2011). 
Like capacity building, establishing community partnership through 
engagement is conceptualized as way to add value to medical research (Kelly and 
Geissler 2011).  Petryna (2009) has noted that recruiting and maintaining research 
participants is expensive and time-consuming but is equally important to 
establishing and maintaining technical facilities.  Collaborators and funders 
increasingly demand documentation that a research centre can recruit participants 
(Okwaro and Geissler 2015).  Research centres with strong partnerships with 
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communities can attract researchers and pharmaceutical companies to the area for 
future medical research.  This in turn is thought to benefit communities through 
further provisions of health care and capacity building through successive research 
studies.   
Informants reflected on capacity building, benefits sharing, and community 
engagement when discussing the RTS,S vaccine trial.  These activities were central 
to how people understood the trial and its value.  Below I explore informant’s 
narratives about these activities.     
Buildings, Infrastructure and Technology 
In order to conduct the RTS,S vaccine clinical trial, investments were made 
into the building of capacity in Korogwe.  For many I spoke to, the construction of 
infrastructure and buildings, along with the provision of technology, were important 
forms of capacity building.  Dr. Joe Cohen, the co-inventor of RTS,S, discussed 
capacity building when I spoke to him on the telephone in 2014, when he was in 
Belgium and I was in Dar es Salaam.  He said, “I think a lot of health infrastructure in 
and around the villages have benefited from the trial.  We hope that will remain and 
has had a positive impact on the community around the trial site.”  He also said: 
There was a lot of … so called ‘capacity building’, in terms of 
training of … research and medical personnel.… At all these 
sites, quite a bit of training of their staff was done.  Quite a 
bit of new equipment was being brought to the sites so they 
could do the kind of testing that was required.  A lot of 
capacity building in terms of building laboratories.  And these 
are not just laboratories, four walls and that’s it.  These are 
really … in all the cases, are high standard science 
laboratories.…  In the local hospital, a special ward was built 
to house kids that participated in the trial.  In all of these 
places, X-ray machines were provided and the training that 
goes with it.… All is not rosy of course … but … in general 
[the vaccine trial employees] recognize the enormous 
capacity building … and how positive that has been for them 
and the community around them. 
Thus, Dr. Cohen viewed the building of infrastructure and capacity as a largely good 
thing and assumed many others did as well.   
Sharon, a representative of MVI, had been involved in the phase 3 RTS,S 
vaccine trial from its inception and spoke about the building of capacity for the 
vaccine trial when I interviewed her via internet video call in 2015.  She said, “We 
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sponsored a lot of ways for the capacity building, the education, the training”.  
Sharon explained that the Korogwe trial site received the most amount of investment 
out of all the 11 RTS,S vaccine trial sites in Africa.  There had been very little at the 
site prior to the phase 3 trial because the phase 2 RTS,S vaccine trial had been 
conducted out of the Korogwe District Hospital.  When the contract was received to 
continue with a much larger phase 3 trial, the Tanzanian investigators knew they 
would need more space.   
Joseph, a trial administrator and medical doctor, explained how infrastructure 
was built in preparation for the phase 3 trial: 
[W]e had more than 1,500 kids involved and we did not want 
to have to disturb their routine health care provision system.  
Because if we could use the same buildings or ask for space 
to be allocated for conduct of the trial then we could probably 
compromise the service that was being provided….  So, we 
discussed with the sponsor [MVI] and the sponsor had 
another NGO established called MCTA, Malaria Clinical Trial 
Alliance.  That was mainly funded to support sites in 
developing infrastructure.  So, we got funds from this Malaria 
Clinical Trial Alliance for us to build new structures for these 
nine dispensaries.  The local government, the district 
medical officer allocated a piece of land to be built … close 
to the government health facility to support the clinical trial 
and that’s how the arrangement was made.  We supervised 
the construction locally and you had to make sure that the 
furniture [was] installed to make sure that we had a 
conducive environment for conducting the clinical trial using 
[trial] dispensaries.   
The funding from the MCTA included money earmarked not only for the building of 
dispensaries but also state-of-the-art spaces for research, the transfer of 
technology, setting up of laboratories, and establishment of virtual networks for 
communication and the sharing of data at the Korogwe Research Centre.  
I spoke to Simon, the site coordinator at the Korogwe Research Centre, one 
afternoon.  He expressed his pride of the investments into infrastructure in Korogwe.  
Remarking about the laboratories, he said, “we are in a developing country and 
getting such a laboratory like the one in Korogwe, you cannot find many in this 
country, there are very few.  We are privileged because our … donors decided to 
establish this lab here in Korogwe.”  With this, Simon expressed the idea that 
Tanzania was lagging behind other places in the world and that the setting up of 
spaces such as an internationally recognized laboratory helped improve Tanzanian 
development and create opportunities for further research.  He was also expressing 
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the shrewd ability of researchers to establish partnerships and draw funding from 
transnational organizations to establish the laboratory in Korogwe.  
 
 
Figure 4: Trial dispensary. 
Several trial staff members related the building of infrastructure to 
improvements in health care delivery for both trial participants and the surrounding 
community.  I interviewed Wilson, a laboratory technician, one afternoon in the 
conference rooms at the Korogwe Research Centre.  He had just been working in 
the laboratory and was still wearing his white laboratory coat as we discussed his 
involvement in the vaccine trial.  Speaking about the impacts of the trial, he said, 
“The infrastructure was built to conduct the trial so that is something that will be left 
behind.… That has improved care, especially for children who are treated at the 
hospital.”  He was proud of the achievements of the trial, expressing that they not 
only helped improve the health of the children in surrounding communities but were 
lasting impacts of the trial and the vaccine partnership.  Simon also spoke about the 
building of health care infrastructure: “The RTS,S project has built some … 
dispensaries that are based in our study villages.  By the time the project ends, 
those properties will remain in the hands of the government.  That infrastructure will 
be the property of that community, of the village government, of the particular 
areas.”  Each of the vaccination dispensaries built for the trial were brighter, newer 
and cleaner than any government dispensary or hospital in the area and came 
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equipped with wooden furniture used for the running of the trial.  These formed parts 
of the investments in the area that lasted past the end of the trial.   
One morning I interviewed Ibrahim, a data manager, in the conference room.  
He spoke quietly and provided background on the phase 3 trial activities and his 
work in the data management offices in the basement of the Research Centre.  
Speaking about the positive impacts of the trial, he said, “we have a good 
laboratory.  The equipment, personnel, technicians are very good.…  It helps the 
community [that] we’re here.”  Grace, a laboratory technician, mirrored these 
sentiments one afternoon as we sat in her small office at the Korogwe Research 
Centre.  Grace spoke about the legacy of the RTS,S trial: “The infrastructure was 
built to conduct the trial so that is something that will be left behind.  The 
infrastructure helps other researchers to come in”.   
 Capacity building can take different forms but for several informants, the 
buildings, infrastructure and technology constructed and set up to conduct the 
RTS,S malaria vaccine trial in Korogwe were positive and beneficial impacts of 
research partnership and clinical trial.  Through the construction of buildings and 
setting up of infrastructure and technology, the Korogwe Research Centre provided 
an opportunity for Africans to do cutting-edge research.  As well, these buildings 
were thought to help improve health care provision for trial participants and 
community members while the trial was ongoing, which Wilson discussed above.   
Importantly, these material constructions were left behind in Korogwe after 
the trial ended.  Through the material objects originally built for the vaccine trial, the 
potential opened for future medical research to be conducted in Korogwe and the 
improvement in health care delivery to be continued past the end of the trial.  Thus, 
the infrastructure, buildings and technology not only supported the development of a 
malaria vaccine and improved health care provision but also could be called on to 
develop medical interventions and provide health care in the future.  For these 
reasons, several informants viewed the partnership and vaccine trial as great 
successes in building sustainable research and health care capacity.   
These materials also played a role in partnership.  The buildings, 
infrastructure and technology enabled people to conduct internationally recognized 
research.  This was, as Simon alluded to, not abundantly available elsewhere in 
Tanzania.  The ability to work in and with such objects drew in researchers and 
other staff to partner with GSK and MVI and work at the Korogwe Research Centre.  
For example, I spoke to Nathanial, a laboratory technician, one afternoon in the 
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haematology laboratory.  He reflected on the laboratory equipment: “I am so happy 
to work in this laboratory, with these machines.  They are so new and advanced, 
more than anything you would find in the laboratories run by the government.”  
Since trial staff personally benefited from this kind of capacity building, and saw 
communities benefiting as well, they portrayed the buildings, infrastructure and 
technology as successful impacts of the vaccine partnership and trial.  At the same 
time, as the trial was ending, staff may have desired to highlight the more 
permanent impacts of the trial, including the buildings, technology and infrastructure.                  
The Training and Employment of Staff  
Although the RTS,S vaccine trial built material and technical capacity, 
several informants spoke about the building of a different kind of capacity.  For 
many, capacity building also involved training and improving people’s abilities to do 
new kinds of work.  Commencing in 2009, the RTS,S vaccine partnership invested 
in building human capacity by providing specialized training to the over 100 trial staff 
members in Korogwe.  This training improved the ability of Africans to carry out the 
large-scale clinical trial at an international standard.  Doctors were trained to enrol 
participants in the vaccine trial, handle evidence and fill out paperwork.  Laboratory 
technicians learned new techniques for analyzing tissue samples and received 
special certification to conduct internationally standardized diagnostic tests.  Data 
managers were trained to enter data into a new computer program and to ‘clean’ the 
data to remove mistakes.  And fieldworkers who were hired to live in study villages 
during the trial received training in first aid and rapid diagnostic tests, as well as how 
to engage with communities.  At the beginning, and every two years thereafter, staff 
were trained in the procedures of Good Clinical Practice Guidelines (GCP).  GCP is 
a set of global standards that staff had to adhere to for the data collected over the 
course of the trial to be comparable across the 11 RTS,S trial sites in Africa 
(Simpson and Sariola 2012).  Additionally, each staff member was instructed in how 
to interact with communities and trial participants.  As Erick, a trial fieldworker, 
explained one afternoon while interacting with research participants at a trial 
dispensary, “trial staff are trained to treat participants with care and respect.”   
The training of East Africans to conduct the trial was a departure from the 
phase 2 RTS,S vaccine trial.  In that previous trial, many of the people carrying out 
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the trial were from Europe.  Speaking to Simon, he provided some background on 
the previous RTS,S trial.  “All the offices were occupied by the experts from Europe 
for coordination, data, lab.  Even the PI [Principal Investigator] was from Europe.”  
Simon continued: “By the time this project was initiated, there were very few 
Tanzanians who were able to do this kind of work.”  Although the phase 2 RTS,S 
trial was largely conducted by Europeans, for the phase 3 trial, none of the staff 
members originated from outside of Africa.  Out of around 100 staff members, all but 
two staff members came from Tanzania, with the other two originating from 
neighbouring Kenya.  Simon explained that this shift towards more local staff was to 
improve employee retention, since it was thought local staff would be more likely to 
stay on throughout the entire trial.  It also gave East Africans the chance to run a 
large-scale trial.  Tom, a British malaria researcher involved in a West African 
RTS,S trial, reflected on this: “[F]or the African investigators this [trial] has been a 
wonderful opportunity to learn things on the ground.”   
More than having the opportunity to gain new skills and learn, the RTS,S 
partnerships made it possible for African researchers to obtain funding for post-
graduate programs.  Tom said, “I’m sure, if you look at the end there will be quite a 
few people who will get a Master’s or a PhD through the trial….  They wouldn’t have 
been able to do that if they hadn’t been funded by GSK and MVI.  So, I think 
indirectly [the trial] has provided opportunities.”  At the Korogwe Research Centre, a 
laboratory technician completed a PhD in molecular biology at a French university 
and another laboratory technician completed a PhD at a university in the United 
Kingdom.  These two laboratory researchers had worked at the trial and 
simultaneously carried out scientific research by collecting data about children 
admitted to the Korogwe District Hospital.  Also, Simon completed his Master’s at a 
Tanzanian university by conducting research about the RTS,S vaccine trial18.  In 
these cases, the trial and the vaccine partnership was beneficial to these individuals, 
opening opportunities to advance their careers.   
Beyond learning new skills or obtaining advanced degrees, the trial allowed 
staff to earn a good salary.  Hassan was a trial fieldworker I interviewed in the 
                                              
18 Permission for these ancillary research projects was granted by the Ancillary Study Review 
Committee (ASRC), a committee established by MVI, GSK and the African clinical trial sites.  The 
application for ancillary research went through an application and review process and required 
ethical review by an institutional review board (IRB) in the home country and Tanzania.  The 
laboratory research drew on data collected for the trial while the social science research was 
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conference room at the Korogwe Research Centre one afternoon.  He related the 
salary employees received to improvements in Tanzania: “The salary we [staff] are 
being given, it helps us as Africans and as a community.”  For some, this salary 
allowed them to invest.  For example, Hassan was saving his salary to attend 
medical school and Wilson used his salary as a laboratory technician to buy land 
and build a house in Korogwe.  Denis, a trial driver, said he invested his salary into 
educating his children at a private school.  Thus, the establishment of partnerships 
with organizations from wealthy countries opened opportunities for trial staff that 
would not otherwise have been possible.       
Through the RTS,S vaccine partnership and clinical trial, human capacity 
was built in Tanzania.  Trial staff obtained training in health care provision and 
research and some obtained funding from partners to attend post-graduate 
programs.  While the trial was ongoing, staff expressed an appreciation of the salary 
they received, which helped them, their families and extended social networks, 
which Hassan spoke to.  Many were also pleased that they obtained training that 
could allow them to conduct clinical trials or work in different health care or policy 
settings in the future, something I will discuss further in chapter 3.   
Overall, some informants viewed the training of Africans as an important 
value of the vaccine partnership and clinical trial.  This training had the potential to 
strengthen the Tanzanian workforce and improve the ability of Tanzanians to 
provide health care and conduct research.  Trial staff deemed the building of human 
capacity as successful and positive because they each personally benefited from 
their affiliation with the RTS,S vaccine partnership and trial and wanted me to see 
the positives.  As well, as a majority faced unemployment, they may have wished to 
look to the future impacts of capacity building on Tanzania, beyond the RTS,S trial.  
However, unlike the buildings and infrastructure constructed for the RTS,S trial, 
people had the ability to move and leave Korogwe, or even Tanzania.  Thus, the 
human capacity built for the trial was mobile.  This issue complicates the narrative of 
success put forth by informants, an issue that will be discussed in further detail in 
chapter 3.   
                                                                                                                                
carried out amongst the caregivers of participants, community members or trial staff, as was the 
case with my own research.   
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Health Care, Malaria Control and Health Education  
Informants identified additional positive impacts of the RTS,S partnerships 
and vaccine trial, including the provision of health care, malaria control, and health 
education.  For the health care, this included the provision of free emergency 
transportation and medicines to those willing to participate and some of these 
services were also made available to children in need who were not participating in 
the clinical trial.  Health care was provided in the pediatric ward of Korogwe District 
Hospital and trial dispensaries by doctors, clinic officers and nurses that worked for 
the RTS,S trial.  Simon described these services and their impacts:  
We are not only working for participants involved in the 
malaria vaccine trial but also across the community....  You 
can find that a parent that has a child in the study, 
sometimes he or she came to a dispensary accompanied 
with other children.  For example, a mother that has other 
children and she came to our clinic and we find all the 
children are sick…. [W]e cannot discriminate and say we will 
only treat the one participating in the study.  We tried to see 
how the project can make sure that the other children are 
being helped.  We have done this for some time and the 
community is quite appreciative….  [W]e are also supplying 
medication in the pediatric ward of the Korogwe District 
Hospital, which is admitting all people in the community who 
are under five [years old].  We supply medication … because 
of the status of the country’s economy, sometimes it is not 
easy to find medicines in the pediatric ward.…  One of the 
wards that is performing the best is the pediatric ward 
because the … staff in the pediatric ward … are 100% paid 
by the trial.  They are providing medical care to whoever is 
admitted to the ward, regardless if they are participating in 
the trial.   
The practice of providing health care to children in need was supported by 
the trial funders, as Sharon explained:  
[W]e knew sometimes … that if a trial participant’s brother or 
sister got sick that we had to put into the budget that we 
would also be giving if there were stock outs of medicine, 
that we were providing that resource for the family.  That was 
hard explaining to the people that are sitting in a fancy office, 
trying to explain that we have a mother that has a sick child 
and there was no medicine at the dispensary.  That was all 
part of the whole mission driven nature of this.   
Along with health care provision, the vaccine trial provided malaria control.  
Improvements in health care provision, including early detection and treatment of 
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malaria amongst community members, was key to this control.  Additionally, each 
trial participant received a free insecticide-treated bed net.  Trial staff provided these 
through a donation by the Tanzanian government, with funds stemming from global 
health donors.  Simon spoke about the impacts of the trial on malaria control: “By 
the time we were planning this study, we promised a bed net for each individual who 
participated in the trial.  Keeping in mind that our mission is not only … the malaria 
vaccine but we wanted to see to the well-being of the community, to make sure that 
the child is protected.”   
Both Sharon and Simon referred to the RTS,S trial as a “mission”.  They 
were espousing the viewed that the work they did was important for more than 
bringing a drug to market.  This expression uncovers that these informants viewed 
their work as more than a salary, that it provided them with a sense of meaning 
because they saw themselves as helping people in need, even if temporarily.  Many 
people involved in the trial thought of their work in a similar way.   
Beyond health care provision and malaria control, several informants 
discussed the role of the vaccine trial in improving health outcomes in communities 
through health education.  Several put forth the view that trial staff played a role in 
educating communities about their health and the need to prevent and treat malaria.  
As Dr. Cohen said, “The trial has had an educational effect on the population 
because the doctors and nurses have discussed the trial, malaria and health more 
generally with the villagers, the elders of the villagers and the population.”   
I spoke with Hassan who said, 
[B]efore we were here, people died of malaria, there were a 
lot of cases of malaria.  But after that, not only did we help 
them with malaria but we gave them the right information 
about how to fight malaria, on how to use bed nets and this 
information was not only given to participants but when we 
were doing the village meetings we were telling this to 
everyone.  We told them that, even if you’re being 
vaccinated you should use bed nets.  You see?  Things like 
that, the right information given to them at the right time, it 
might help.  And this helps to decrease the rate of malaria in 
the area. 
Nathanial, a laboratory technician, also discussed the provision of health 
education when I spent time with him in the haematology laboratory at the Korogwe 
Research Centre one afternoon.  Nathaniel, wearing a white laboratory coat and 
latex gloves, was creating blood slides, drawing a bit of blood from a small vial and 
smearing a thin layer of it across a small piece of clear glass.  Looking out the 
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laboratory window to the pediatric ward of the Korogwe District Hospital, Nathanial 
recalled that a trial participant had come into the hospital vomiting black liquid.  
Health care providers could not give the child quinine to treat the malaria that he 
had, they feared the drug would react badly to the herbs he had been given by a 
traditional healer and kill him.  Nathaniel said, “I think a lot of children die because 
they are taken to traditional healers”.  Nathaniel asserted that fieldworkers were 
instrumental in communicating to caregivers of trial participants to not to make use 
of traditional healers.  He spoke about community members, saying: “These people 
are uneducated.  But the fieldworkers are educating them, telling them to take their 
children to a dispensary when they are sick.” 
Hassan shared his thoughts on traditional healing practices:  
Sometimes a child is sick, maybe with malaria, high fever 
and a traditional healer wastes time.…  But the fever goes 
up and up and when they finally get here [to the hospital] 
they give the physicians a lot of work.  So, we told them, 
when you see a child is sick, especially with fever, never 
take the child to a traditional healer.   
Hassan also discussed how trial staff dealt with people making use of traditional 
healing practices:  
Every time we see the child we ask, ‘Has this child seen a 
traditional healer?  Has he had concomitant medication?  
You have to report this to us because it might affect the 
child’.  So, some of them are ashamed to tell us but most of 
them are ashamed to take the trial children to the traditional 
healer because we tell them that we believe we can help 
your child in every way so you don’t have to take your child 
to a traditional healer.  We are giving them information that a 
traditional healer can’t help you; this child should be taken to 
the hospital.   
The fieldworkers I spoke to often described their work in the communities as 
a form of education.  As Hassan said, “not only did we help them with malaria but 
we gave them the right information about how to fight malaria, on how to use bed 
nets, and this information was not only given to participants but when we were doing 
the village meetings we were telling this to everyone.”  Also, community members 
were told by fieldworkers and other trial staff to take their child straight to a health 
care facility at the first sign of fever to avoid death due to malaria, which is fast 
acting and can kill young children within 24 hours (Trampuz et al. 2003).  Hassan 
expanded on this point:  
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[B]efore we were here the mortality rate was quite high, a lot 
of children were dying.  It might not be malaria but they died 
because of the ignorance of their parents, they did not take 
them to the health centre at the right time.  [But] they saw 
how we treated them and they copied that.…  They told their 
fellow people about how we got them treatment. …  So, the 
information given was going to everybody and helping them 
in the area.  
Erick related trial activates to education: “We use it [trial activities] as [a] 
means of giving people education so that they can understand how to live a healthy 
life, how to maintain their environment.”  Ibrahim, a data manager, also spoke about 
the educational effect of the trial, describing how community members came to 
understand through trial staff the need to cut back grasses and not allow standing 
water to form around their homes, in order to discourage the breeding of mosquitoes 
that carry malaria. 
 From the perspective of several informants, there was a lack of good health 
care and health education in communities in and around the town of Korogwe.  To 
fill this gap, the vaccine partnership and trial successfully provided improved health 
care, malaria control and health education to communities.  These activities were a 
mechanism to distribute resources to those who had no other way of accessing 
them.   
However, although these activities and provision of material resources were 
portrayed as benevolent, they were necessary for ethical reasons.  As described in 
the introduction, randomised control trials must adhere to international ethical codes 
and guidelines.  These codes stipulate that the placebo group of a clinical trial must 
receive the best treatment and forms of prevention currently available (Angell 1997; 
Sariola and Simpson 2011).  One of the best ways to prevent malaria is through the 
use of insecticide-treated bed nets and thus, their provision to trial participants 
allowed the trial to uphold ethical standards (Khatib et al. 2008).  As well, medical 
research conducted in resource-poor settings must also include the provision of a 
high standard of care (Sariola and Simpson 2011; Angell 1997).  This means that 
while informants portrayed health care and health education as beneficial to 
communities, they were also instrumental and served the needs of the vaccine 
partnership and trial.  At the same time, informants were thinking back over the 
course of the clinical trial and desired to focus on the positive aspects, including how 
the trial gave back to communities by providing health care, resources and 
education.          
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Community Engagement  
Trial staff spoke of another positive impact of the RTS,S vaccine partnership 
and trial: the establishment of relationships with people living and working around 
the Korogwe Research Centre.  These relationships were formed with a range of 
people on the ground in Tanzania, from hospital administrators, district medical 
officers, community leaders to community members.  However, trial staff tended to 
focus their accounts on the building of relationships with people in the villages and 
towns that were impacted by the RTS,S clinical trial.   
Relationships between trial staff and communities were built through a series 
of meetings and communications, which trial staff called “sensitization” and 
bioethicists term “community engagement”.  As the bioethicists Emanuel et al. 
(2004) have argued, community engagement and the establishment of partnerships 
minimizes risks of exploitation, ensures the fair distribution of benefits, and improves 
the informed consent procedure.  In Korogwe, RTS,S vaccine trial activities 
commenced in 2006 in preparation for the phase 2 trial, which occurred from 2007 
to 2008 (Olotu et al. 2011).  Trial activities continued into the phase 3 trial, which 
ended in 2014.  Trial employees regularly engaged with community members 
throughout the two phases of the vaccine trial but the most intensive engagement 
occurred before phase 2 and 3 began and during the first few months of the two 
trials, when children were being vaccinated.  I was not present in Korogwe at this 
time but people recounted their interactions with community members when I arrived 
in Korogwe in 2013.  This recounting shed light on how trial staff perceived and 
negotiate relationships with community members throughout both phases of the trial.  
As will be discussed below, informants often claimed community engagement was 
successful.  These activities were portrayed as not only leading to community 
acceptance of medical research and a speedy enrolment of participants in the two 
vaccine trials, but also as benefitting community members in various ways, which 
will be discussed below.      
In order to conduct both phases of the RTS,S trial, trial employees carried 
out censuses of villages.  These censuses helped staff identify children and 
pregnant women who were close to giving birth and who fit the inclusion criteria of 
the trial.  The inclusion criteria stipulated that the child had to be within the study age 
range of 6 to 12 weeks for the younger cohort of participants, and 5 to 17 months 
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old for the older cohort, and healthy with no pre-existing conditions, like HIV (human 
immunodeficiency virus).   
Once the censuses were completed, trial staff had a series of meetings, or 
sensitization, with community members.  Simon had a lot to say about sensitization, 
having been very involved in the process during both phases of the trial.  “[T]he first 
thing we did was sensitize the village leaders and influential people in the 
community….  We brought them together in a meeting and we explained … the final 
aim of what we’re doing and how the community would benefit from the trial.”  These 
village leaders consisted of religious leaders, elders of the community and elected 
officials.   
Later, meetings with community members were held in villages.  Simon 
explained the role of community leaders in these subsequent meetings:  
By the time we conducted the village meetings, we had 
these village leaders who were aware of what we were 
doing.  They were the ones that organized those village 
meetings and in case of questions from the community, they 
were the ones to answer the questions.  So, the community 
built trust in us because we are following the right official 
government channels….  And those leaders were telling 
them that it is good for them to join. 
Although laboratory staff rarely visited the villages that were involved in the 
trial, Grace had been very involved in community sensitization out of a desire to 
connect with and understand the people impacted by the trial.  She attended many 
of the sensitization meetings and described the process:  
First, we made a date, an appointment, and then we all 
[went] there together.  Then we just [started] talking, saying 
who we are, what we want to do, the pros and cons of 
participating and then they [community members asked] 
questions, doubts, anything ... then we [went] to the village 
looking for participants and there [were] those that agree [to 
participate].   
Thus, the sensitization process informed community members of research 
activities, informed them about the purpose and benefits of the vaccine trial, and 
attracted interest amongst caregivers to enrol their children in the trials.  From what 
Simon and Grace said, these meeting helped create trusting and collaborative 
relationships, opened a two-way dialogue between the trial staff and those living in 
areas impacted by the research, and allowed people to ask questions.  These 
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meetings also served as a preamble to informed consent by providing information to 
the caregivers of potential trial participants.   
 Although Simon described the sensitization process as straightforward, 
Grace discussed difficulties with developing relationships with community members.  
I first met Grace at a medical research conference in Arusha, Tanzania in 2012.  
She had just finished presenting a paper and I asked her about her experiences of 
the vaccine trial.  Grace explained that during the second phase of the trial, 
community members had started rumours.  This piqued my interest and when I had 
a formal interview with her in her office at the Korogwe Research Centre in 2013, I 
asked her more about the rumours.  Grace said, “for [the] previous … phase 2, there 
were problems, it was difficult.  People had to get used to us because sometime 
they say … you just take blood, you don’t do anything.”  Grace recounted that some 
community members feared that the trial staff were “vampires and we take blood”, 
blood that was then sold in Europe.  Grace explained that some community 
members did not trust trial staff so they did not enrol their children in the trial.  These 
rumours persisted over time, as Grace explained: “Even the people here [in] the 
next village, some still believe we are vampires and they are scared to even cross 
by this building [the Korogwe Research Centre].”   
Grace then described how trial staff and community leaders built trust with 
community members to encourage enrolment into the trial.  “We … cooperate with 
village leaders in case … there is something misunderstood or rumours about our 
study.  We used their leaders to explain to them that really, we are not bad.”  Later 
she said, “You sensitize [community members], you say no, [the rumours are] not 
true.  And some of them they get sensitized by their neighbours who understand.”    
During an interview with Hassan at the Research Centre, he also spoke of 
rumours and how they were overcome.  He said, “some people were saying that 
they were given poison, that they were poisoned.”  Hassan explained this in more 
detail: 
We had problems recruiting participants because when we 
go there and greet them, we tell the people what we are 
doing with the project, that the vaccine will do this and this 
and this.  When we went away, some other people tried to 
twist the information….  So, the information that [those 
people] gave the participants was not good information.  
Participants then had a lot of doubts.  Our job as fieldworkers 
then was to keep away those doubts with the best 
information we had.  Before we went there we had meetings, 
we were told how this vaccine was made.  Even the 
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[inventor, Dr. Joe Cohen] who made the vaccine … came 
here, we had a chat with him.  He told us about how he 
invented the vaccine, for how long he stayed in the lab.  We 
really had a lot of information on the vaccine.  So that helped 
us clarify a lot of the issues we had about the vaccine....  
[Community members] were given wrong information so 
what we did is we clarified.  It is true that this was seen as 
just a trial but it [RTS,S] underwent a lot of phases until it 
was administered to people….  Another thing we told them is 
that this small group of people who volunteered to participate 
would help us to help [many] Tanzanians.  So, people are 
willing to help on behalf of other people.   
Erick had begun working at the Korogwe Research Centre during the phase 
2 trial and become a fieldworker supervisor during the phase 3 trial, serving as a 
bridge between trial administrators and fieldworkers.  I interviewed him one 
afternoon in the conference room of the Research Centre and he recalled the 
sensitization process during the phase 2 RTS,S clinical trial: 
From the beginning, we experienced a lot of challenges….  
[W]ith people, there is a lack of proper knowledge about the 
study because some people thought we were not as we say 
we are, that we are here to collect … and sell their blood.  
Others said that these people are not good, why do they 
treat you for free?  They give you free transport and you 
don’t pay anything.  Are they good?  So, from the beginning 
… there were several drop-outs.   
To overcome this, Erick said trial staff “conducted several sensitization meetings, 
giving them proper knowledge about what is a vaccination trial….  [T]hey become 
familiar with our project and the work….  It’s fine at this moment.” 
During my interviews with Grace, Hassan and Erick, each attributed the 
rumours to ignorance, and a lack of knowledge and trust.  From their perspectives, 
the rumours were a passing issue remedied with more meetings with community 
members, trusted officials vouching for the good intentions of trial staff, and the 
provision of more information.  These trial staff explained that by taking these steps 
to build relationships with communities led to an increase in acceptance over time.  
As Hassan said, “with [phase 2] we had problems but with [phase 3] people were 
just referring to what we did in [phase 2] so it wasn’t that hard to recruit people 
because they knew we were giving the best service ever given to these people here 
and they appreciate that.”  Referring to community engagement activities during the 
third phase of the trial, Grace said, “We were received positively.”  Over time, there 
was even demand amongst people to participate in the RTS,S clinical trial.  Grace 
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explained that after the trial began, some community members said to trial staff that 
they wished they had not doubted the trial and enrolled their child when they had the 
chance.  As Grace said, some even wished to enrol more than one child in the trial.  
“We had people want to get in but the recruitment already closed.  If a mother has a 
child that is in [the trial],… then she gets pregnant and says, ‘I even want this one in 
the trial’ but [we] would say, ‘No, it’s not possible because recruitment has ended’.”   
Another staff member spoke about community engagement as successful.  
Joseph had been involved in the phase 2 and 3 RTS,S trials and when we spoke in 
the conference room, he summed up community engagement activities: “[E]ven in 
areas where we didn’t have the phase 2 trial, still the participation and acceptability 
rate was high.  So, the main thing that I saw was the way we did the sensitization, 
the approach of the study to the community.  So, that is one of the main reasons we 
succeeded.”  Joseph defined success as the ability of trial staff to conduct 
sensitization and enrol participants into the trial.  
Simon also spoke about success, the overcoming doubt and building trust 
with communities:  
When you go to the community and you say you have a new 
vaccine that you need to test and you say you are testing it 
to the people who are not ill, [it] is a bit difficult to understand 
for common people from the village.  Telling them, can you 
bring your child to test our vaccine, it is not that easy.  I could 
really understand their hesitations and doubts because if it is 
you, you need to sit down and get enough explanation so 
you know that this thing has been monitored by international 
people and … to make sure that we are not harming the 
community….  We were very successful because the 
community was happy with us and they are happy to 
continue working with us.…  We were able to assure the 
community that what we were doing was positive, that is was 
for the benefit of the community, especially when we have 
the vaccine.   
Simon and other staff attributed the successful enrolment of participants to 
their community engagement, provision of information, and communication of the 
benefits of research to people living around the Korogwe Research Centre.  This 
provision of information not only improved community acceptance and enrolment 
into the trial but was portrayed as helping communities overcome general ignorance 
about science, medicine and research, an added benefit of the vaccine trial.   
Although some trial staff described the success of community engagement 
by referencing the rumours spread amongst community members and how they 
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were overcome, there is another way to understand these rumours.  Geissler and 
Pool (2006) wrote about their experiences of medical research in Africa and the 
spreading of rumours and supplemented their experiences with reports from 29 
researchers and colleagues involved in medical research across Africa.  In this 
article, the authors describe several kinds of rumours but I focus on the rumours 
about blood stealing and vampires, which may help explain the rumours about the 
RTS,S trial.   
Geissler and Pool (2006) found that that beliefs about vampires and blood 
stealing are often attributed by medical research staff to “traditional beliefs”, like the 
supernatural and witchcraft.  The authors contended that although many rumours 
likely stem from pre-colonial African ideas about the supernatural, this explanation 
implies that these beliefs are irrational and limited, and that they will eventually be 
replaced by modern, rational knowledge once people become educated and 
developed.  However, this explanation posits a simple idea of ‘modernization’, 
whereby one modern and scientific rationality exists at the end of historical progress.  
Although ensuring that research communities understand the procedures of medical 
research can improve acceptance, a lack of knowledge does not fully explain why 
rumours are spread.  This is because rumours can occur in places where there are 
higher levels of education, such as in cities, and they can occur in relation to familiar 
interventions, like injections, which have been part of African health provision since 
the colonial era (Geissler and Pool 2006; Vaughan 1991).   
Geissler and Pool (2006) argue that although vampire and blood stealing 
rumours can relate to traumatic colonial encounters, they are rooted in the present.  
The rumours about blood stealing are a way for local communities to use their own 
terminologies and models to debate and express their concerns about medical 
research.  As blood is often viewed as a source of wealth, the rumours can be a 
critique of the unequal distribution of benefits available through science.  Rumours 
about blood being stolen by researchers for their own gain speak to a sense of 
colonial and post-colonial exploitation and inequality.  It also allows expression of 
and debate about the ambivalence of research participation, related to the 
advantages (which is usually free treatment) and the disadvantages (giving bodily 
tissues, like blood).  The rumours of blood stealing thus often represent medical 
research as an activity that extracts more than it gives and speaks to a desire on the 
part of locals to see the benefits of research circulate more widely in research 
communities.   
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Although some community members in Tanzania changed their minds about 
joining the trial, the rumours of blood stealing and vampires may speak to a 
problematic relationship between researchers and the community.  For community 
members, rumours can indicate a level of ambivalence towards medical research 
and a desire for greater benefits from the research.  Not taking the rumours 
seriously and addressing them could prevent dialogue between communities and 
researchers and could hinder future research from being conducted and research 
findings from being implemented in the future (Geissler and Pool 2006).  However, 
although there is an alternative way of understanding rumours of blood stealing, the 
RTS,S trial staff I spoke to largely viewed the rumours as a sign of ignorance and 
something that decreased when people received more education about medicine 
and research activities from trial staff.  Thus, instead of questioning these rumours 
or thinking critically about them, trial staff understood this situation as having a 
positive outcome.     
Once community engagement was carried out and staff felt they had 
established collaborative and trusting relationships with communities, follow-up 
meetings were carried out with individual families.  Explaining this next step, Simon 
said,  
[F]or those individuals who were selected to be in the study, 
we also had house-to-house sensitization for the family.  So, 
if they need more information … we had a mechanism to go 
house-to-house and educate, clarify or answer questions 
that people felt shy asking in front of the public.   
After this stage, staff attempted to attract people to enrol their children in the 
vaccine trial.  First, trial employees delivered invitation cards to the caregivers of 
children who were identified as potential participants.  These invitation cards 
directed caregivers and children to visit the trial dispensaries closest to their home at 
a particular day and time.  Caregivers who arrived at the vaccination dispensary the 
day they were invited would receive information about the trial, including an 
explanation of the risks and benefits of joining.  At that time, caregivers had the 
opportunity to speak to trial doctors and administrators privately and read the 
consent form in one of the rooms of the trial dispensary.  If caregivers agreed to 
enrol their child in the trial, they signed the consent form.  If the caregivers were 
illiterate, staff read the consent form aloud to them and a trial employee would serve 
as a witness as the caregivers signed an X on the signature line of the consent form.  
Although the focus during sensitization had been on obtaining community 
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acceptance, when it came to obtaining consent for medical research, the ethics 
focused on individuals.  This consent process depoliticized ethical debates about 
transnational medical research and instead focused on the following of rules and 
filling out of forms to prevent exploitation (Molyneux and Geissler 2008).            
Some staff spoke with pride about how the Korogwe Research Centre was 
one of the first RTS,S trial sites to enrol all their participants ahead of schedule.  The 
speed at which enrolment occurred was often referred to as a sign that community 
engagement was successfully conducted during the phase 2 RTS,S vaccine trial 
and that trial staff were able to develop trusting relationships and a sense of 
partnership with community members.  Once participants were enrolled, community 
engagement continued.  Since a fieldworker lived in each of the study villages, they 
served as the main mediators between the Korogwe Research Centre and trial 
participants and communities throughout the trial.   
While many trial staff that I spoke to described community engagement as 
the reason that rumours were overcome, Hassan spoke frankly about the role of 
material resources in shaping research relationships.  “We were telling [community 
members] that we were not paying any parents for participating but there are some 
benefits that they could get.  Like medical benefits, we would treat children until the 
end, freely.  There will be free transport.  These things motivated some [to join the 
trial]….  [T]he people from the rural areas really needed this help.”  In addition, 
Hassan stated above: “it wasn’t that hard to recruit people because they knew we 
were giving the best service ever … and they appreciate that.”  These quotes are 
telling.  Although the rumours may have indicated that communities thought medical 
researchers were benefiting through the extraction of blood, this may have become 
less salient as communities received health care and other benefits from the trial.  
Few trial staff openly discussed this ethical issue, that community members may 
have accepted the RTS,S trial in order to gain access to health care.  This would 
have undermined prevailing ethical doctrine that requires consent to be provided by 
autonomous individuals, free of coercion (Geissler 2013).   
More than shaping acceptance of the vaccine trial, community 
engagement—along with the provision of material resources—may impact future 
research endeavours.  Simon explained: “the community, they can have high 
expectations and if you don’t meet their expectations they might jeopardize your 
work in the community.  If this happens, you are creating a bad future.  If you don’t 
meet the community expectations, it can make it difficult to return for another study.”  
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Thus, meeting community expectations may facilitate drug companies and medical 
research organizations entering the area in the future.  This made it critical that 
RTS,S trial staff took their interactions with community members seriously, as future 
research could benefit them personally, bringing future employment.     
What Simon said about developing relationships with communities relates to 
what Nguyen (2005) writes about the establishment of HIV positive communities in 
Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire.  Accessing HIV drugs was difficult for many Africans in the 
1990s.  Dr. Dupont, French a HIV/AIDS (acquired immunodeficiency syndrome) 
doctor who practiced in Abidjan, found that one way to provide drugs and other 
resources to HIV positive patients was to tap into medical research funds.  He set up 
a laboratory and was able to draw in a community of people willing to enrol in 
medical research.  Dr. Dupont was then able to channel drugs and other resources 
to these people because they served as research participants.  Through the 
provision of drugs and care to HIV positive patients who had enrolled in research, 
Dr. Dupont was able to win the hearts and minds of people with HIV and these 
people were more willing to enrol in subsequent research studies.  Over time, he 
developed a loyal group of people to call on for studies.  Simon spoke about 
relationships with community members in a similar way, as a winning of hearts and 
minds.   
From the censuses, to the sensitization process, to the consent process, 
many informants deemed community engagement successful.  One main outcome 
of this engagement was the building of collaborative relationships between trial staff 
and communities.  From what Grace, Hassan and others said, formation of this kind 
of relationship created trust.  This trust helped members of the study communities to 
learn about and accept trial activities, and dispel rumours and misconceptions about 
research activities, as well as lead to the rapid enrolment of participants into the 
RTS,S trial.  At the same time, relationships between researchers and communities 
were mediated by material resources.  In order to avoid a “bad future”, as Simon 
described it, community expectation for the research had to be met, including the 
development of an effective vaccine and access to medical and emergency care for 
trial participants and other children in the community.  Provision of these material 
resources won people over.  Hassan claimed that this allowed for the smooth 
running of the phase 3 trial and Simon explained that this may serve future 
researchers who come to the area to conduct medical research.  Thus, community 
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engagement involved the negotiation of relationships and provision of material 
benefits that met the expectations of the community.   
Another result of community engagement that trial staff touched upon was 
the provision of education.  Sensitization was not entirely smooth and some staff 
discussed rumours spread amongst community members.  Although these rumours 
may have indicated some dissatisfaction with the unequal relationship between trial 
participants and researchers, trial staff believed they overcame the rumours through 
greater engagement, the building of trust, and provision of more information to 
community members.  Importantly, although there was an ethical imperative to 
engage with communities, when trial staff reflected the community engagement 
activities, they appeared proud and happy that they connected with community 
members.  Some spoke about how these meeting helped entire communities, not 
just caregivers of trial participants, to gain a greater understanding of science and 
medicine.  This narrative allowed staff to demonstrate to me, and perhaps to 
themselves, that they were doing more than serving the needs of the RTS,S vaccine 
trial, that the benefits of the RTS,S trial extended to communities who were provided 
with a service. 
Success and the RTS,S Clinical Trial 
Michael summed up the accomplishments of the vaccine trial: “There were a 
lot of naysayers that said that you’re not going to be able to pull this trial off in Africa, 
a phase 3 [trial] of this scale and with the data requirements.  So, we did have to 
take some centres and develop them up to that level but I think … that the sites and 
partnerships succeeded.”  Sharon said:  
[T]here are … legacies that came out of these research 
centres working with the local hospitals, strengthening ties 
with the communities.  That’s [a] long-term legacy … that will 
last with the centres and the people in the communities and 
their country….  There is the big picture, being part of a 
genuine scientific breakthrough of a vaccine, and then there 
is the local legacy that will serve the sites well.   
Dr. Cohen also described the RTS,S trial as a success:   
It’s been an enormous endeavour.  There was a scientific 
difficulty but there was also this tremendous challenge of 
performing clinical trials in the African context under 
conditions that would withstand all the standards—ethical 
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and clinical procedure, et cetera—that are applied to any trial 
you would do in the US or Europe and would actually be 
robust enough to respond to regulatory requirements.  So, 
we needed to make sure that the trial we were doing would 
live up to those very high standards.  From the first trial we 
ran in Africa in late 1990s to now it has taken 25 years.  An 
enormous amount of work has been done but most 
importantly, in succeeding in doing trials that were regulatory 
proof and were robust and according to regulatory standards 
Sharon echoed this: 
[P]eople from the West and the North would say, ‘Well, it 
really can’t be done in Africa, there will be too many 
contaminations’.  We monitored the labs over the course of 
five years and ultimately the contamination rates were lower 
than US lab standards, we have that data….  It was the 
dedication to excellence.   
Having reflected on the various practices and impacts of the RTS,S clinical 
trial, these three informants considered the partnerships and clinical trial successful, 
as did many others I spoke to.  Many people spoke in certainties but the outcomes 
of the clinical trial, beyond the development of a malaria vaccine, are difficult to 
assess and quantify.  But informants were part of an interpretive community (Mosse 
2005).  All gained a salary, skills and improved their resumes, which may allow them 
to gain future employment.  Some staff have become internationally recognized 
researchers through their partnerships with Northern organizations and publications 
in international journals.  Thus, informants had particular interpretations of the 
outcomes of the clinical trial, which was shaped by their own experiences of 
success.   
At the same time, when I spoke to informants, they were coming close to the 
end of the RTS,S trial or the trial had already ended.  This time evoked a desire to 
think back over how the trial started and how it operated.  Informants may have 
desired more than to portray events to me, they may have wished to reaffirm to 
themselves that the trial was meaningful and had positive outcomes.  Thus, 
speaking to me may have been a platform for people to reflect on their experiences 
of the trial.  By focusing on the success of the trial and partnerships, they could tell 
themselves that the care and labour they provided was worth it and benefited more 






Although scholars debate about what constitutes value in medical research 
when it is conducted in resource poor settings, many of my informants had clear 
ideas about the value of the RTS,S vaccine trial in and around Korogwe.  Several 
said that the value of the RTS,S trial was not only its development of a malaria 
vaccine but its ability to build material and human capacity in Tanzania, improve the 
health and education of community members living in and around Korogwe, and 
establish partnerships with communities.  When informants claimed to be doing 
upstanding work in a resource poor setting by providing health care and malaria 
control, and developing collaborative relationships with communities, they wished to 
portray their work as ethical and positive.  They were demonstrating that they were 
not just experimenting and extracting from communities in resource poor settings 
but also giving back to these people and places.  As well, many expressed a sense 
of pride at being involved in a project that may lead to a pharmaceutical product that 
can save the lives of countless children.  Applying Mosse’s (2005) term, these 
people were enrolled in an interpretive community and had their goals, aspirations 
and intentions addressed by the trial.  This meant they had a vested interest in 
portraying activities and events in a particular way to me.   
But more than portraying the trial to me, informants may have desired to tell 
themselves they had engaged in meaningful work and used their discussions and 
interviews with me to assure themselves of this.  A majority of the staff were on 
short-term contracts that ended when the trial did and would not gain glory for 
developing RTS,S or any part of the profit from the sale of the vaccine.  Viewing the 
trial as successful, beneficial and meaningful in its ability to give back to 
communities and develop a vaccine that may save many lives could have helped 
informants contend with the end of the trial, its ambiguous outcomes as people 
waited for the vaccine to be provided, and the unequal relations they had with their 
Northern partners.  While in this chapter I explored informants’ portrayals of the 
vaccine trial, in the next chapter I turn to an exploration of the spatial and temporal 













Chapter 3: Building a Legacy? The Ambivalent Impacts of 
the RTS,S Clinical Trial  
Introduction 
With the rise of partnership as the primary mechanism for funding 
transnational medical research, research institutes explicitly claim to contribute to 
improving research capabilities and public health care systems in resource-poor 
countries, which is framed as “capacity building” (Crane 2013; Street 2014; Simpson 
and Sariola 2012).  For the development of the RTS,S vaccine, Northern partners 
built a research centre in Korogwe, a place where malaria was endemic.  As well, 
several health care dispensaries were constructed in surrounding villages to support 
trial activities.  Along with the construction of buildings and infrastructure, technology 
was provided and assembled.  These material things were necessary for conducting 
the clinical trial and from the perspective of clinical trial staff in Tanzania, vaccine 
scientists at GlaxoSmithKline (GSK), and trial funders/coordinators at the Malaria 
Vaccine Initiative (MVI), these things made positive and lasting impacts on 
Tanzania.  However, observations and discussions with trial staff exposed a more 
complicated situation when the RTS,S vaccine trial came to an end.   
Social studies of science and technology encourage us to perceive material 
structures and technologies as more than assemblages of metal, concrete or 
electronic components, but also complex arrangements of meanings, social 
relationships and knowledge practices (Star 1999; Bijker 2007; Latour 2000).  With 
this in mind, these things can be conceived of as gifts given by Northern institutes.  
A way to understand gifts is to draw on social scientific writing about gift giving in 
pre-industrial societies.  Malinowski (2014 [1922]) found amongst the tribes of the 
Trobriand Islands that gift giving led to an inequality between the donor and 
recipient.  The more gifts that a leader was able to give away, the more power they 
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had, increasing their reputation and prestige.  Recipients of gifts became 
increasingly dependent, which reduced their power.  Mauss (2011[1925]) has also 
written about the spectre of gifts and their economic benefits and costs.  Contrary to 
the general perception that gift giving is separate from economic motives, he argues 
that gift giving is obligatory and interested.  Gift exchanges are frequently rooted in 
economic and social objectives, which can include expectations of reciprocity.  
Receiving gifts obligates the recipient to pay back the gift or potentially lose honour, 
meaning that gift giving serves profitable ends, advancing personal or communal 
interests (Mauss 2011 [1925]).  There are similar concerns about philanthropic and 
development aid.  Donors may claim that their donations to poorer regions of the 
world are altruistic but gifts can conceal self-interested motives (McGoey 2015).   
As these scholars argue, gift giving is a complex social exchange steeped in 
meaning.  In the case of the RTS,S vaccine trial, the building, infrastructure and 
technology provided by Northern partners were unusual gifts.  They were given so 
institutes could partner and work together to care for these things and develop the 
RTS,S vaccine until the end of the clinical trial.  In exchange for these material 
things, staff in Tanzania provided data and blood samples to their Northern partners.  
Although informants at GSK and MVI portrayed these material things as beneficial to 
Tanzanians, the underlying motive of giving these gifts was the production of a 
pharmaceutical product that has the potential to make a large profit.  Viewed in this 
way, the provision of these material things may benefit the giver more than the 
receiver.   
But more than this, the end of the clinical trial exposed that these things may 
be less beneficial than portrayed, as they had uncertain futures.  I argue that the 
buildings and infrastructure had ambivalent impacts.  On one hand they enabled 
medical research and health care provision during the RTS,S clinical trial but on the 
other hand, they were spatially circumscribed from the surrounding area and their 
operability was dependent on ongoing funding from wealthy donors.  Furthermore, 
trial staff were obligated to care for the buildings, infrastructure and technology 
because they were given as gifts that opened the possibility of future partnerships 
with other wealthy institutions.  However, their Northern partners had no such 
obligations to care for these things once the partnerships ended.  Drawing on 
feminist theory, care can be defined as everything people do to repair, maintain and 
continue the world so they can inhabit it.  This labour relates to the capacity for 
affect and signifies attention and worry for things that may be harmed.  But caring 
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labour is complex, making it difficult to enclose in a schedule or fixed tasks that 
starts and ends.  Despite being vital to maintaining a liveable world, these activities 
are often devalued, taken for granted and considered unimportant while the capacity 
to be independent, autonomous and self-sufficient tends to be more highly valued.  
Therefore, caring is a practice involving asymmetry, with some getting paid, or not, 
for caring so others can forget its necessity (de la Bellacasa 2011).  Relating this 
back to the RTS,S partnership, the end of the vaccine trial exposed relationships of 
dependency and inequality between Northern and Southern partners as these 
material things became things that trial staff had to continue to care for as they 
sought new research partnerships.       
This chapter focuses on the materiality of the trial, with attention given to 
how these systems were gained, configured and functioned.  But more than this, I 
explore aspects of medical research not represented in scientific journal articles or 
research protocols.  These include the affect and reflections that informants 
expressed as the trial wound down and after it ended, and the ways that people 
provided caring labour, which allow these technical systems to survive, be 
maintained or shut down.  First, I provide an overview of the social science literature 
about infrastructure.  Second, I describe the infrastructure and technology set up for 
the clinical trial.  Third, I examine the way the clinical trial infrastructure was 
enclaved, or spatially circumscribed, from the wider context in Korogwe.  Fourth, I 
explore how the end of the trial effected trial staff, the material things, research 
activities and caring practices.  Finally, I describe how the material things provided 
by Northern partners created dependencies for clinical trial staff.  This exploration of 
the material impacts of the trial, the reflections and affect informants expressed, and 
the care that trial staff provided to these things uncovers social relationships and 
hierarchies between the people and organizations involved in developing the RTS,S 
vaccine, and is an avenue to understanding contemporary configurations of 
transnational medical research. 
Theorizing Infrastructure   
There has been a growing interest in infrastructure in anthropology, taken as 
both an analytical object and metaphor.  Infrastructure is conceptually connected to 
the Enlightenment ideas of the world in movement, in which change and the 
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circulation of people, goods and ideas opened possibilities for progress.  Seen 
through this lens, the provision of infrastructure is intimately tied to the shaping of 
modern society and the future.  For this reason, it is difficult to untangle 
infrastructures from evolutionary ways of thinking (Larkin 2013; Hetherington 2014).   
Infrastructure as an analytical focus can be traced back to critical and 
Marxist theory.  Marx viewed infrastructural technologies as enacting the course of 
history itself by bringing about change.  Through this change, he thought progress 
could be enacted and through this progress, people could gain freedom.  From a 
Marxist perspective, infrastructures were structures meant to provide stability that 
allowed for the organization of the market economy and the eventual emergence of 
higher order processes, which were imagined as civilization, development, progress 
or freedom.  With this process in mind, it explains why infrastructure provokes deep 
affectual commitments, particularly in resource-poor countries (Larkin 2013; 
Hetherington 2014). 
Science and Technology Studies (STS) has taken the study of infrastructure 
a bit further.  STS researchers have looked at complex data systems, cooperative 
work environments, transportation systems, and construction of large development 
projects (Star and Ruhleder 1994; Hughes 1987; Latour 1996; Bijker 2007).  These 
scholars subvert human-centred politics, where objects are excluded and viewed as 
mere inanimate things.  Instead, in their analysis, material objects are central to 
politics with the capacity to act, translate and mediate.     
Anthropologists have contributed to this scholarship with examination of 
infrastructures such as railways in India (Bear 2007), roads in Peru (Harvey and 
Knox 2008 and 2012), oil extraction in Equatorial Guinea (Appel 2012), water 
provision in Mumbai (Anand 2011), and the building of medical research 
infrastructure (Crane 2013; Geissler 2014; Okwaro and Geissler 2015; Street 2014 
and 2016).  These scholars demonstrate that infrastructures are more than just 
material things; their construction and use relate to social and political histories and 
systems and tell us something about contemporary formations of state and non-
state actors.  They also reveal the reinforcement and reproduction of political and 
economic systems in material form. 
Several social scientists attempt to define infrastructure as a way to 
understand it.  Bowker and Star (2000) argue that an infrastructure is a black box, 
an apparatus that is durable but only visible when it breaks down.  Infrastructures 
can be conceived of as a “system of substrates” (Star 1999: 380), which underlie 
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other systems and include sewers, wires and pipes.  Larkin (2013: 329) asserts that 
infrastructures are “matter that enables the movement of other matter”; they are 
objects upon which other objects operate.  Focusing on medical research in Africa, 
Geissler (2015b) argues that research sites are conduits for materials, data and 
people, linking global centres of scientific investigation to surrounding villages.  At 
the same time, they are matter themselves, making infrastructures conceptually 
difficult to define (Star 1999; Larkin, 2013).  Since infrastructures involve many 
interconnected systems that are part of ever-proliferating networks, it is important to 
define what will be included under that term (Larkin 2013).  In this chapter, I look at 
specific parts of the infrastructure and technology that supported the testing of the 
RTS,S vaccine.  This includes the physical buildings constructed at the Korogwe 
Research Centre and trial dispensaries in surrounding villages, as well as the 
power, communication, virtual and resource networks that were established to 
conduct the trial. 
Looking specifically at the infrastructure built to support medical research in 
the South, anthropologists (Geissler 2014; Street 2014; Crane 2013) liken these 
formations to enclaves.  Described by anthropologists (Appel 2012; Ferguson 2005) 
who write about oil and mineral extraction, enclaves are set up in a way that enables 
companies to disentangle from local social, environmental, legal and political 
situations of surrounding areas, helping remove responsibility and liability for the 
surrounding area in which they operate.  This practice of disentangling is enabled by 
“modularity”, or the use of self-contained, mobile infrastructures, which operate in 
the same ways in the world regardless of where they are set up (Appel 2012: 693).    
Geissler (2014), examining medical research in Africa, argues that although 
public health research generally aims to find treatments for diseases largely 
affecting the poor, public health research stations often operate in similar ways to 
the pharmaceutical, manufacturing and extraction industries.  He refers to medical 
research centres and field stations as “islands” that when put together becomes an 
“archipelago” of research hubs that are in a protected enclave, established to 
exclude.  Each centre operates somewhat autonomously from the surrounding 
setting, protecting and concentrating scientific and clinical capacity and material 
resources.  These facilities support the flows of expertise and funding stemming 
from centres for technology and science in Europe and North America.  They 
procure resources for their operation and send information collected in the 
surrounding area to institutes abroad.  These research centres have weakened 
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relationships with nation-states, often operating through para-statal organizations 
that have both state and corporate traits but rely on state health facilities and state 
regulation for the recruitment of participants and for health care referral after 
research concludes.  These enclaves are linked through transnational circulations of 
resources, data and expertise, which ‘hop’ or crisscross the world and do not 
necessarily touch upon national structures for research generation and use 
(Geissler 2012: 200).  Existing public health care facilities become sites for 
research, places to recruit research participants, and hire professionals to carry out 
research (Geissler 2015a; Crane 2013).  This situation mirrors the configuration of 
the infrastructure constructed to support the RTS,S vaccine trial. 
Although the material configuration of infrastructure can help describe how 
the contemporary scientific production industry operates, infrastructure can also 
serve as a metaphor.   Drawing on a Marxist perspective as described above, social 
science literature explores how infrastructure is entwined with ideas of progress, 
possibilities of the future, and of being modern.  Due to this entwining, infrastructure 
is able to mobilize affect, including senses of pride, frustration and desire, feelings 
that can be profoundly political.  Affect can also be evoked with the failure of 
infrastructure projects when possibilities are foreclosed (Larkin 2013).   
I build on this scholarship with my examination of the infrastructure and other 
material things provided to support the RTS,S vaccine trial in Korogwe.  I attend to 
the ways the infrastructure, buildings and technology were configured and operated, 
and how people thought about and cared for these things at the end of RTS,S trial.  I 
now turn to a description of the material things that were gifted to researchers in 
Korogwe to support vaccine trial activities.       
Making a Place for Science  
The Korogwe Research Centre tested RTS,S in a clinical trial from 2009 to 
2014.  I arrived in 2013, near the end of the trial, thus missing when the vaccine was 
administered to participants.  I was not alone in not observing RTS,S directly; only a 
small number of the 100 staff members of the trial had seen this vaccine.  
Nevertheless, the impacts of RTS,S were evident in many places.  Clinical spaces 
had been built to hold, move, administer and test the RTS,S malaria vaccine with a 
degree of secrecy necessary to maintain the blinding of the trial, so that trial 
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participants and most trial staff did not know who had received the RTS,S vaccine or 
an alternative vaccine.  People also recalled for me how the trial spaces were once 
used, situating the vaccine in specific times and places.   
A phase two clinical trial for the RTS,S vaccine was carried out using space 
at the Korogwe District Hospital but more space was needed to conduct the much 
larger phase 3 trial.  Thus, places for scientific research had to be established.  
Socio-technical assemblages were created—which included the construction of 
physical infrastructures, transfer of resources, including laboratory equipment and 
medical supplies—and staff were trained to carry out the testing of the vaccine 
(Street 2016; Simpson and Sariola 2012).   
When I arrived at the Korogwe Research Centre in 2013, Simon, the trial site 
coordinator, gave me a tour.  I noted how starkly the Research Centre stood in 
contrast to many of the surrounding buildings.  The Research Centre was 
constructed out of concrete that was cleanly whitewashed, with a tin roof that 
captured rain to supply the building with water.  Built in the shape of a square, 
offices, conference rooms and laboratories were located around the outer periphery, 
each with barred windows, and there was an inner courtyard of young orange trees 
in the middle.  Concrete benches were positioned around this inner courtyard.  The 
main entrance into the trial site was open and had a concrete sitting area built into 
the structure of the building for people to socialize.  A bulletin board at the entrance 
had black and white photographs of the building when it was first built.  There was 
also a large sitting area built out of concrete at the back of the building that 
overlooked the green Usambara Mountain range.  The Research Centre was 
surrounded by lush, verdant farming fields.  Cool breezes moved through the trial 
site and people often met in the hallways to converse or eat lunch together.  The 
Korogwe District Hospital, a low, crumbling, yellow building, was on the other side of 
the parking lot from the Research Centre.   
During the tour, Simon explained that the Korogwe Research Centre had 24-hour 
electricity supplied by a generator with a backup generator that started automatically 
whenever the main generator stopped.  This meant that the building was not 
dependent on the unreliable local electricity grid.  There was cell phone coverage in 
the area that aided communication between trial staff and the caregivers of 
participants.  Wireless internet was available at the Research Centre, allowing staff 
to be linked with the rest of the world.  An incinerator was also installed, allowing for 





Figure 5: The haematology laboratory. 
As he was introducing me to trial staff, Simon showed me the ground floor of 
the Research Centre, which held the various offices, two conference rooms and two 
laboratories, which were all air conditioned.  The haematology laboratory was 
situated along most of the front of the trial site and overlooking the parking lot and 
District Hospital.  This laboratory held spaces for analyzing blood samples, 
preparing blood slides, examining blood slides for malaria with microscopes, filling 
out paperwork, and archiving blood slides and paperwork.  When Simon and I 
walked into the laboratory, four men dressed in white laboratory coats were filling 
out paperwork and looked up to introduce themselves and welcome me.  Simon and 
I then looked at the microbiology laboratory situated along one side of the Research 
Centre.  Explaining this room, Simon said, “this laboratory is used to test blood, 
urine and stool samples from ill patients who are admitted to the District Hospital.”  
Two laboratory technicians were talking to a nurse in a pink uniform who had 
delivered tissue samples from the District Hospital in an insulated plastic container.  
Each stopped conversing to introduce themselves and welcome me to the Research 
Centre.  Each of these laboratories had up-to-date equipment to conduct preliminary 
analysis of tissue samples and prepare samples to be sent abroad for further 
analysis.  Next, Simon showed me the small kitchen and dining area that staff could 
use to store, prepare and eat food.  Two women were conversing in the room and 
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as I was introduced to them, Simon explained that they cleaned the Research 
Centre.      
Simon and I moved to the basement of the Research Centre, which held the 
data management offices, archive and pharmacy.  The rooms were along a dark 
hallway lit by florescent lights and there was a metal gate at the entrance.  The first 
office was the pharmacy and stores of pharmaceutical drugs and medical devices 
were crammed on shelves along the right-hand side of the room, with a long desk in 
the middle.  Simon introduced me to the head pharmacist and junior pharmacist.  He 
explained to me that they were employed to order and dispense drugs, as well as 
maintain the cold chain for the RTS,S vaccine (this involved keeping the vaccine 
between the temperatures of 2 and 8 degrees Celsius).  Next to the pharmacy, there 
was a small office for the data manager and an archive situated next to that office.  
The archive held several shelves filled with binders containing participant 
information from past and ongoing medical research.  Simon explained, “This 
archive contains records from the phase two RTS,S malaria vaccine, beginning in 
2006”.  Next to the archive was the main data management office.  This room had 
wooden desks along the outer periphery of the room, with a small, barred window 
facing out the back of the building.  Along the walls were shelves holding folders, 
binders and boxes.  One smaller desk was by the door and had a computer and 
large photocopier and printer on it.  When Simon showed me the space, I found six 
staff members sitting in front of computers with binders full of paper next to them as 
they entered data into laptop computers.  Simon introduced me to the data 
management staff and explained that the data they were typing into computers was 
uploaded onto the server and available to GSK in Belgium.     
A few days after arriving in Korogwe, I was invited by Brayson, one of the 
trial doctors, to visit the pediatric ward of the Korogwe District Hospital.  This ward 
served as another area for trial activities and Brayson explained that all the staff 
members of the pediatric ward, including doctors and nurses, were employed by the 
trial.  As well, the pediatric ward of the hospital received all of its funding for 
diagnosis and drugs from the RTS,S clinical trial.  The electricity from the Korogwe 
Research Centre did not extend to the hospital so electricity in the pediatric ward 
regularly cycled on and off.  The pediatric ward was an existing resource with its 
own infrastructure, which was used by the trial to support its activities.  In exchange, 
the trial improved the standard of care provided to all patients admitted to the ward.                   
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Over the weeks that I was in Korogwe, I visited dispensaries built for the trial.  
Scattered in villages around the Korogwe Research Centre, these dispensaries 
enabled over 1,500 participants and their caregivers to attend key meetings with trial 
staff, receive the RTS,S or alternate vaccine, and provide bodily tissues used to 
monitor the vaccine’s efficacy and safety, as well as to access health care near their 
homes.   
Korogwe was chosen to conduct the third phase of the RTS,S clinical trial by 
a team at MVI.  Sharon, a representative of MVI, had been involved in choosing the 
11 clinical trial sites across Africa.  During an interview in 2015, she reflected on 
these decisions: 
The sites were all selected to balance out the areas that had 
a lot of impact of malaria and [employees] that had a breadth 
of experience.  We really wanted to balance out the sites.  
Certainly geography, we wanted east, west.  We wanted 
Francophone sites.  [W]e had two [sites] in Tanzania and 
three in Kenya and two in Ghana to create ‘economies of 
scale’ in terms of getting protocols through the national 
ethics review committees.  Seasonality of malaria, places 
that had pediatricians, [since] not all sites deal with children.  
There were a whole lot of things that had to be considered 
and weighted.   
Sharon, speaking about capacity building, said, “A lot of the sites didn’t have 
any internet when we started working with them back in 2006….  And one of our 
sites didn’t have electricity!”  She expanded on this: 
If we get down to the very technical, 8 of our 11 sites had no 
specific capacity in their laboratories to do microbiology so 
micro. labs were all developed and so were lab 
technicians—that’s just one piece … that we needed for the 
trial … to make everyone come up to the same standard.   
Explaining where the funding for this originated, Sharon said, “[MVI] 
sponsored a lot of ways for the capacity building, the education, the training and that 
was in the context of the trial.”  
The quantity of building at the Korogwe Research Centre differ from that of 
the other RTS,S clinical trial sites.  Although each of the RTS,S vaccine sites 
required some building and transfer of resources in order to support the vaccine 
trial, Korogwe had an unusually high level of investment, making Korogwe a special 
case.  The amount of building related to how much infrastructure already existed in 
the place.  Sharon revealed that Korogwe received so much funding “because … its 
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geographical location; it’s pretty remote. … It really didn’t have anything there.”  
Remarking about the Korogwe Research Centre, Sharon said: “That building was 
built to provide the laboratory, the clinical space, the space to store all the records 
and the data management. …  [T]hat space became the research centre hub.”   
Although Korogwe started at a disadvantage in terms of built infrastructure, it 
had some attractive qualities that spurred investment.  Beginning in 2000, 
researchers have been tracking malaria immunity and mortality in children and 
pregnant women in the highlands and lowlands of the surrounding area through an 
ongoing research project named ENRECA, in collaboration with the University of 
Copenhagen.  This data enabled longitudinal tracking of malaria in the area, which 
allows the impacts of the RTS,S vaccine to be better understood.  Also, the 
Korogwe District Hospital had a pediatric ward which could provide health care to 
trial participants and there was existing human capacity since a few clinicians, 
fieldworkers, nurses and laboratory technicians had been trained to carry out 
previous research studies.  Speaking to Joseph, a trial administrator and doctor, one 
morning in the conference room, he said, “we started with an intervention on 
intermittent preventive treatment for malaria in infants and there after our site 
expanded in terms of infrastructure and human resources and then we got the 
RTS,S phase two and we did it very well.  The decision was made that it should go 
for phase three … before it could be approved for public use.”  Beyond these 
capabilities, it was important that when the trial began in 2009, the lowland areas in 
Korogwe and Handeni Districts had a sufficient level of malaria transmission that 
allowed RTS,S to be tested for its capabilities to prevent the disease.  Additionally, 
communities had demonstrated a welcoming attitude towards medical research 
(despite concerns being raised at the outset of research) and caregivers had 
enrolled their children in a second phase of the RTS,S trial.  There was an 
expectation that people in the area would be welcoming and willing to enrol their 
children in the third phase of the trial.    
Taking a longer view of history, scientific research has been conducted near 
the Korogwe Research Centre for over a century.  The Amani Research Centre, 
situated on the Eastern Usambara Mountains just outside of the town of Muheza, 
was a two-hour drive from Korogwe.  German colonizers of East Africa founded 
Amani in the late 19th century.  After World War I, the British colonized Tanzania, 
which was called Tanganyika at the time.  Amani became a centre for malaria 
research with the East African Malaria Institute established there as part of the 
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imperial aim to eradicate malaria and improve development and colonial welfare in 
the British colonies of Africa (Geissler and Kelly 2016).  In 1979, the Amani 
Research Centre established a centre for medical research in the nearby town of 
Tanga, about 100 kilometres from Korogwe (NIMR 2017; Mmbando et al. 2010).  
Speaking to malaria researchers in Tanzania, they explained that Amani had closed 
in 2005 due to unstable electricity supply and poor roads leading up the hill to the 
station.  Researchers moved to Tanga town where there were offices and 
laboratories on the grounds of the Bombo Regional Hospital.  This centre was called 
the National Institute for Medical Research (NIMR) Tanga Research Centre.  A lot of 
the research conducted at this Centre focused on malaria.  Joseph said: “when 
research [was] to be conducted, … the sponsor looked for local investigators and it 
happened that we are located in Tanga.  So, human resources are available at our 
site with the relevant expertise to do the trial.”  Coming from Tanga Research 
Centre, a couple of researchers were appointed as senior staff members of the 
RTS,S vaccine trial, making up the small number of permanent staff members. 
The Research Centre started at a disadvantage when compared to other 
RTS,S trial sites across Africa.  In order to conduct the third phase of the vaccine 
trial, Northern partners invested to construct buildings and establish electricity, 
communication technology and virtual networks, laboratories, offices, and data 
storage spaces.  However, with medical and malaria research spanning over a 
century in the region, the Korogwe Research Centre was not a completely blank 
slate as Sharon alluded to above; research capabilities, knowledge about malaria in 
the region, and health care services already existed and could be built upon, which 
attracted funders to invest in the area.   
Understanding how Korogwe and surrounding areas were perceived as good 
places for research is important.  The dichotomy between attractive and less 
attractive sites illuminates what counts as ‘capacity’ when planning for medical 
research, and who decides this.  For this clinical trial, funders decided they were 
seeking a place that had enough capacity to ensure the trial could commence 
without starting from scratch.  An attractive place for funders was one that had 
existing medical facilities (including a hospital and rural health care dispensaries), 
pre-existing data about health outcomes in the area, and a number of people 
already trained in health care provision, data analysis and other skills and who could 
then be trained to conduct medical research at an international standard.  This place 
also had malaria transmission, potential trial participants, cell phone coverage, and 
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roads that connected the Korogwe Research Centre to the study villages and 
metropolitan areas.  The area lacked other facilities to support the trial but too much 
development may not have been desirable.  A lack of development meant that the 
surrounding area remained rural with a high prevalence of disease.  Also, what was 
constructed could specifically support the RTS,S trial activities.   
A number of people I encountered throughout fieldwork argued that the 
construction of infrastructure through the RTS,S vaccine trial was a positive benefit 
that not only served the trial but built capacity, with the potential of this capacity to 
support future medical research and improve health care provision.  Yet, as the trial 
ended, some expressed ambivalence about the trial and observations at the end of 
the trial uncovered a more complex situation than alluded to in the previous chapter.   
A Medical Research Enclave 
Although the Korogwe Research Centre was supporting the work of the 
RTS,S vaccine trial, it operated in a spatially circumscribed manner similar to 
enclaves established to support the activities of the extractive industry in Africa, as 
described above.  The Korogwe Research Centre was a field station affiliated with 
the para-statal organization NIMR.  It was run largely independently of the public 
medical research and health care system and most of its funding stemmed from 
institutions outside of Tanzania.  The Research Centre gained credibility as a 
generator of evidence about RTS,S in a place where falciparum malaria is prevalent 
and where the RTS,S vaccine may be available in the future.  But in order for the 
data to be considered valid and comparable across the 11 RTS,S trials sites in 
Africa, funders required that the data collected about the vaccine be analyzed at a 
higher standard than what could be carried out in the nearby public hospital 
laboratory (Street 2014; Simpson and Sariola 2012).  Therefore, the Korogwe 
Research Centre, and the infrastructure built to support the Centre, was necessary 
to produce credible data.   
The buildings and infrastructure of the Korogwe Research Centre was in 
many ways modular, like that of the extractive industry (Appel 2012).  Set up to 
experiment on people and extract information, blood and other tissue samples, the 
Research Centre had self-supporting infrastructure and mobile technology that 
enabled the RTS,S trial.  This enclave could be set up in a variety of locations, 
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wherever industry deemed desirable for experimentation and the collection of data.  
Resources came in to the Research Centre from abroad and the materials that were 
extracted flowed out of Tanzania, eventually moving to scientific and technological 
centres abroad.   
The buildings that were constructed at the Korogwe Research Centre 
provided spaces and infrastructure to support trial activities and protect it from 
aspects of the surrounding area that could make the findings invalid.  The buildings 
kept out the elements, enabled electricity to flow, and provided the foundation upon 
which science could operate (Street 2016).  This included the construction of places 
where tissue samples could be collected from trial participants, the establishment of 
internationally standardized laboratories to carry out preliminary processing of 
human tissue and data analysis, rooms and shelves to hold archives, and spaces 
where data could be uploaded onto computers and sent around the world via virtual 
networks.   
The building of two internationally standardised laboratories was key to the 
operation of the RTS,S clinical trial.  These physical spaces held the equipment 
necessary for conducting analysis of blood and other tissue collected in the course 
of the clinical trial and preparing tissue samples to be sent abroad for further 
analysis.  It also enabled the protection of the tests conducted from the surrounding 
places and people that could compromise their validity as scientific specimens.  
Additionally, the building of laboratories separate from the laboratories in the nearby 
District Hospital meant there was more control over the analysis and less 
dependency on public health care infrastructure (Street 2014 and 2016).  As well, 
these laboratories allowed Tanzanian scientists working at the Research Centre to 
participate as equals in the global scientific field.  As Crane (2013: 82) argues, 
access to “state-of-the-art” facilities is enabled by donors that provide the necessary 
tools to translate the suffering that people experience in Southern public hospitals 
and clinics into scientifically legitimate terms accepted in the global North.  This 
situation means that the terms by which global health science operate are 
determined by the scientific centres in Europe, North America and other resource-
rich parts of the world.   
The computers in the data management offices had vast amounts of data 
typed into them and were connected to places outside of Tanzania.  These 
connections required the building of virtual networks and power infrastructure that 
would work reliably and this capacity was necessary for data collection and the flow 
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of information (Simpson and Sariola 2012).  With Korogwe located six to nine hours 
away from the big cities of Arusha and Dar es Salaam, internet and electricity were 
often unreliable.  In order to overcome issues with connectivity, GSK paid for a pricy 
satellite connection to be installed, which did not rely on the internet.  As well, the 
computers in the data management office used energy from generators, which was 
a more reliable source of energy.  These large investments made in setting up a 
virtual network and functional technological systems allowed the trial to operate but 
these systems were created so the Research Centre was not reliant on the local 
power and internet infrastructure. 
The Korogwe Research Centre also had security features that helped 
separate it from the surrounding area and protect the place from theft.  Although the 
Research Centre had been built to be open, with no gates at any of the entrances, a 
few months before I arrived there had been a robbery with thieves making off with 
laptops and money found in several offices.  After the RTS,S trial ended, bars were 
installed on all the entrances to make it difficult for non-staff members to enter.  
Thus, the Research Centre was built, and adapted over time, in ways that both 
connected and disconnected it from the surrounding area.   
The Korogwe Research Centre operated like a resource extraction enclave 
in particular ways but in other ways, it was distinct from this configuration.  Offshore 
oil extraction is able, through the practice of enclaving and the setting up of modular 
infrastructures, to produce profit while minimizing or evading contestation from local 
people (Appel 2012).  Medical research is not able to do the same.  For medical 
research, it cannot be completely cut off from the surrounding areas since it must 
interact with local communities in order to locate bodies for experimentation.  These 
activities mean medical research cannot be easily disentangled from the 
surrounding area and people, and it cannot operate away from the places where 
people live.   
Ethical considerations arise when research involves humans and ethical 
considerations are heightened when research is conducted in resource-poor 
regions.  Questions about the value of medical research, of how research activities 
can improve circumstances for communities, become central to the way that people 
think about and practice medical research (Kelly and Geissler 2011).  With a desire 
to appear to act in the best interest of communities, companies and organizations 
involved in medical research claim to make positive impacts on the area they 
operate through the building of medical research and health care capacity, provision 
 
136 
of health care, and education of locals.  However, the outcomes of the RTS,S trial 
were ambivalent, in part due to how the Research Centre operated as an enclave, 
separated from the surrounding area.   
Infrastructure Frozen in Time, Repurposed or Decaying 
Up until this point I have analyzed the infrastructure and technology that 
supported the RTS,S clinical trial when it was in operation.  However, when I arrived 
at the Korogwe Research Centre in 2013, the trial was slowly winding down.  At that 
point, the RTS,S malaria vaccine had been administered to participants and staff 
were carrying out the last of their data collection.  And yet, there were traces of the 
RTS,S malaria vaccine in parts of the Research Centre and trial dispensaries.   
In one room of the haematology laboratory, the vaccines had been kept cold 
in two large refrigerators before being administered to participants.  During my tour 
of the Korogwe Research Centre when I arrived in 2013, Simon had showed me this 
room.  He pointing to a sign on the door that warned unauthorised people to refrain 
from entering the room but Simon opened the door and allowed me to peer into the 
room from the entrance.  Simon explained, “This small room is off-limits to everyone 
but the pharmacists.  The RTS,S vaccines were kept in the refrigerators,” and Simon 
pointed to the two large grey appliances crammed into the small room.  The two 
pharmacists who had been tasked with maintaining the vaccine cold chain had 
monitored the quality of the vaccines and the temperature of the refrigerators 
regularly.  The prohibition on others entering the room remained in effect even after 
the vaccines had long gone.  This barred people from using the room or the 
refrigerators.  This infrastructure was created to support the cold chain and maintain 
the blinding of the trial.  However, this infrastructure was frozen in time and awaiting 
another drug trial in need of a cold chain.  Thus, this infrastructure only served future 
medical research and experimentation.  
I spoke to Caroline, a trial pharmacist, one morning in one of the conference 
rooms of the Korogwe Research Centre.  Caroline explained that the vaccines 
arrived in Tanzania from Belgium and were held at the Research Centre in the room 
that was off-limits.  When children were being vaccinated with RTS,S, Caroline said, 
“we had to transport almost 60 to 80 vials”, at a time, which were taken to different 
trial-run dispensaries in the surrounding villages when children were being 
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vaccinated.  Throughout all this movement, the pharmacists maintained the cold 
chain using boxes made of Styrofoam and cooler packs to transport and keep the 
vaccines cold.  Caroline described how the temperature was monitored: “The 
temperature device … provided by GSK, it monitors the temperature, reading the 
temperature on the inside and you can read it on the outside [of the box]”.  These 
devices served as digital thermometers and were checked continually throughout 
transportation of the vaccines.  After the vaccines had been administered each 
morning, the temperature devices were connected to a computer and information 
was uploaded and sent to GSK.  This was to ensure that the study protocol was 
followed precisely and the cold chain was maintained, meaning the vaccines were 
still effective when administered to participants.     
I followed the path of RTS,S to one of the trial dispensaries.  In the last two 
months before the end of the trial, everything was in high gear.  Each morning, a 
team of two doctors, two nurses and several fieldworkers visited one of the eight trial 
dispensaries on rotation to collect blood samples, biometric data and medical 
histories from the children enrolled in the vaccine trial.  Each of the caregivers of the 
trial participants had received an invitation card a day or two before informing them 
to take their child to the nearest trial dispensary for the visit.  Anywhere from 10 to 
40 of the 1,505 participants were invited to come to a dispensary at a time and a 
new set of participants were invited each morning.   
Beginning early in the morning, several trial staff members assembled at the 
Korogwe Research Centre.  I joined them and we drove in three large white vans for 
over 40 minutes along bumpy orange coloured dirt roads.  One of the Styrofoam 
boxes sat next to me.  Although it had once held RTS,S vaccines, that morning it 
held large binders filled with paper files that recorded information about trial 
participants.  I could imagine what it was like to accompany the RTS,S vaccines to 
the dispensary as I struggled to keep the box from bouncing around every time we 
hit a dip in the road.  The morning air had not yet warmed to its usually hot afternoon 
temperatures and with the windows open in the back seat a cool breeze flowed 
around inside of the truck.  We passed sisal plantations, villages and farmland and I 
spotted people tending crops, bicycling along the side of the road and chatting 
together under trees.  The other trucks traveling with us had extra space and were 
picking up participants and their caregivers from the surrounding villages as they 
drove along to the trial dispensary for the visit.   
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When we arrived at the trial dispensary, Joseph gave me a tour of the 
building.  It was clear what the different rooms were being used for at the time but its 
layout was built for its original use: to vaccinate children.  The large porch was open 
with corrugated metal roofing overhead to keep out the sun and rain.  Joseph said, 
“Originally, this area was used for participants to wait to be vaccinated.  We also 
kept participants for 30 minutes after they received the vaccine so nurses could 
monitor their immediate reaction to the vaccine.”  Walking across the porch we 
faced three rooms.  One room was large, holding two wooden desks and two chairs, 
a bench for people to sit on as they waited to see a doctor, and shelves filled with 
children’s medicines and medical devices.  This space was used for providing health 
care to children in need or collecting medical histories when the team trial staff 
visited to collect blood samples.  But before, “it was where parents signed consent 
forms to enter their children into the trial,” Joseph explained.   
The other room held two smaller rooms with a front room leading into a back 
room.  The front room was small with a well-used metal sink.  The back room was 
used to extract blood from trial participants and fill out paperwork.  It had a 
permanent concrete table built out of the back wall that had been tiled.  This table 
held syringes and gauze to extract blood, along with lollipops to be given to children 
after their blood was drawn.  Joseph pointed to this concrete table and, discussing 
the vaccination process, said, “One of the nurses prepared the vaccines for 
administration here.”  Walking to the front room, he continued: “The nurse would 
then bring the vaccine, either RTS,S or the alternate, to this room.  She would hand 
it to a second nurse who would vaccinate a child”.  A pharmacist used a stopwatch 
to ensure this process was carried out quickly so the vaccines would not overheat.  
Joseph looked at the window in the room and told me: “During vaccinations, the 
windows in these rooms were covered with plastic so no one could look in from 
outside of the dispensary, and the main door to these rooms was kept closed.”  
Joseph explained that these steps blinded the study so no one but the nurses and 
the pharmacists knew who received RTS,S or the alternate vaccine.  This tour 
uncovered the ways RTS,S travelled and shaped the configuration of the 
dispensary.  This infrastructure, built to support the vaccination process, was later 
repurposed for other trial activities, including obtaining blood samples from trial 
participants and providing health care.   
As described in chapter 2, several informants perceived this health care 
infrastructure as a value of the medical research since the dispensaries had the 
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potential to operate as health care facilities.  However, after the RTS,S malaria 
vaccine trial ended, these spaces were not as functional as expected.  A 
“memorandum of agreement” had been signed between the Tanzanian Ministry of 
Health and the RTS,S clinical trial partners before the trial began that stated that the 
ownership of the trial dispensaries would be transferred to the government on the 
31st of December 2013.  Visiting one of the trial dispensaries early one morning a 
few weeks after the trial had ended, the door to the consultation room was open.  I 
was expecting the room to be empty but instead found three young men writing and 
reading.  Introducing myself to them, they said that they were nursing students 
studying for exams.  They explained that the dispensary provided a light and quiet 
space to study, an improvement to the dark and busy government dispensary next 
door.   
There was no government-funded doctor, clinic officer or nurse on duty to 
attend to patients who might come to seek care.  The Korogwe Research Centre 
had received a small amount of funding from MVI and the Tanzanian Ministry of 
Health to provide care in two dispensaries that had been built for the RTS,S trial.  
This funding was for a fieldworker to provide a limited level of care and preliminary 
diagnosis to those in need and help refer them to either a nearby government 
dispensary or, in case of emergency, the Korogwe District Hospital.  Hassan, a trial 
fieldwork, explained that this service as a way to give trial participants a bit more 
time to transition into using the government health care system regularly.  It was 
also to maintain good will with community members who might be called on to enrol 
children in medical research in the future.  Hassan was on duty that day but in the 
hours that I spent at the dispensary, no one sought care at the trial dispensary.  The 
shelves in the consultation room that had once held medicines and medical devices 
during the trial were empty.  Although the space built to support the RTS,S trial had 
the potential to provide health care, it was now devoid of the objects and substances 
that could facilitate that care.  After my visit to the trial dispensary, I spoke to a clinic 
officer that had worked for the RTS,S clinical trial.  He lamented the loss of 
medicines in the dispensaries and said, “The Tanzanian government is poor and 
relies on donor dollars.  Once the trial stopped, that was it.”  This lamentation, a 
form of affect, expressed how this clinic officer felt in response to both the trial 
ending and the dependency people had on outside donors to fund medical care.   
Several informants claimed that the infrastructure built for the trial, especially 
the trial dispensaries, would improve health care delivery in the area.  With these 
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newer spaces constructed in nearby villages, it was anticipated that people would 
access health care and avoid the government dispensaries, which were often in 
various states of decay.  But the buildings alone could not improve health outcomes.  
These buildings needed trained people and resources—drugs and medical 
devices—to make health care provision possible.  The Tanzanian Ministry of Health 
struggled to attract health care providers to rural places to work and had trouble 
even paying them regularly.  On a regular basis, necessary drugs and medical 
devices were out of stock.  Despite the perception that these dispensaries were a 
positive and valuable outcome of the clinical trial, these trial-run dispensaries 
operated separately from the public health care system and could not easily be 
linked into it when the trial ended.   The dispensaries were essentially litter from 
global health research, dumped once they were no longer of use.  The buildings 
were gifted to a resource-poor country with no thought for how they might be 
maintained as health care facilities, burdening people with expensive and 
operationally useless medical facilities that lacked the necessary resources to make 
them functional and beneficial to surrounding communities.  Thus, the provision of 
infrastructure did not directly lead to health care system developments and such 
narratives of success are dubious at best.   
Although the utility of the infrastructure built to support RTS,S was of 
questionable value, it had already begun a slow decline, even before the trial ended.  
The trial dispensaries, although newer than the government dispensaries nearby, 
showed their age.  At each of the dispensaries, built four years previously, the white 
paint was yellowing and cracks were showing in the walls.  The outer walls had 
begun crumbling where flooding during the rainy seasons had eroded them.  Paint 
had chipped off walls and the doors and floors of some dispensaries were 
disintegrating.  These features would have been unblemished and new when built 
but Tanzania’s tropical climate wore away at them.  Even so, the trial dispensaries 
stood in contrast to the surrounding setting, with its decaying and severely 
underfunded public health care system, evinced by the crumbling dispensaries 
nearby.  The government dispensaries next door provided an idea of how the trial 
dispensaries would look in a few years’ time if left unmaintained: yellowed walls, 
dirty and crumbling floors and walls, cracks in the plaster, broken furniture, 
mouldering paper work in corners and broken insect screens in windows.   
The deterioration was not confined to the trial dispensaries; the Korogwe 
Research Centre was also in a slow state of decay.  Some devices needed for the 
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smooth running of the RTS,S trial were in disrepair by the time the trial ended.  A 
few weeks before the trial drew to a close, I found Ibrahim, a data manager, trying to 
repair a printer and photocopy machine.  He had taken it apart to see if he could 
repair a broken part since the activities of the data office relied upon regular printing.  
“We are so near the end of the trial so they won’t replace this with a new one,” he 
explained as his frustration grew.  But the care he was trying to provide to the 
machine was not helping the situation.  Eventually, resigned, he gave up trying to fix 
the machine.  This affective expression demonstrated how Ibrahim felt about the 
loss of capacity at the end of the trial, complicating the narrative that the capacity 
that was built was static and indisputably positive.    
After the trial ended, I went to visit the data management offices in the 
basement of the Research Centre.  I found them in disarray.  All the patient files 
from the archive had been piled on tables and floors, and the desks and tables from 
the main office had been moved away from the walls.  A data manager explained 
that the archive and main data management office required repair because termites 
had infested the wood in the basement.  The place had been slowly chewed up in 
the last few years.  The Research Centre was not immune to the elements, like 
every other building in the area.  Despite investments in infrastructure and 
technology, places can be recalcitrant, with the environmental conditions making it 
difficult to prevent ruination (Sullivan 2012; Street 2014).   
Star (1999: 380) argues that when infrastructures are functioning, they are 
sunk inside and into existing structures and technologies and are thus taken for 
granted by the user and “by definition invisible”.  It is only upon infrastructure 
breaking down that it becomes visible to users.  In the everyday work life of staff, I 
found trial staff took many things for granted when they functioned.  People had 
routines that ensured the smooth running of the clinical trial.  These routines 
involved regular use of the infrastructure and equipment, such as electricity, laptops, 
printers or blood analysis machines, and these items became commonplace.  As 
well, staff provided care to these things to keep them functioning.  This labour went 
largely unseen by their Northern partners but it was necessary for the conduct of the 
trial.  However, upon technology breaking down, it became glaringly obvious to staff 
members how remote their location was.  Staff could not easily find replacement 
parts or equipment in the small town of Korogwe and many things had to be shipped 
to the Korogwe Research Centre from abroad.  The breakdown of equipment also 
indicated how dependent the Research Centre was on their wealthy partners.  Care 
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was not always enough to maintain operability and the buildings and the equipment 
required regular investments for upkeep.  With the government of Tanzania only 
providing minimal medical research funding (mainly in the form of salaries for 
permanent staff), funding for maintaining research equipment and infrastructure only 
came from wealthy organizations abroad.  In response to this situation, people 
expressed a sense of loss, frustration and resignation.    
An Abrupt yet Ambivalent Ending  
Several informants discussed how the building of infrastructure and provision 
of technology through the RTS,S trial improved health care provision and research 
capacity in and around Korogwe.  However, when pressed to discuss the end of the 
trial, several informants expressed ambivalence about its long-term legacy.  Ibrahim 
spoke about how the laboratory provided testing services to people in the 
community but then questioned the sustainability of this service: “It helps the 
community because we’re here.  But I don’t know if after the 31st of December, I 
don’t think it helps.”   
Wilson, the laboratory technician who had said before the trial ended that the 
infrastructure built improved care for children in the area, also expressed concern 
about the sustainability of this care. 
A major concern to me is the pediatric ward, the children we 
have been assisting [there].… [W]hen the project comes to 
an end, the systems that have been given to the children … 
will come to an end.… [B]efore this project started, the death 
rate in the pediatric ward was very high but now it has 
reduced tremendously.…  So, my worry is, if we won’t have 
someone to sustain this,… it’s going to be a major problem. 
After the trial ended, Wilson showed me around one of the laboratories.  The 
laboratory was empty and I asked about the loss of staff.  Wilson explained that 
there were few laboratory technicians left at the Research Centre because people 
were finding new jobs.  Very soon there would be no work to do because the 
substances needed to operate the blood analysis machines, which were central to 
their job, were running out and cost hundreds of US dollars to replace.  The 
remaining laboratory staff were using supplies left over from the last shipment from 
their Northern partners as they gradually closed down the laboratory.  Wilson did not 
know if they would receive any more supplies.  Without them, staff would not only 
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lack work but would be unable to continue testing the children that were admitted to 
the pediatric ward.  “All children admitted to Ward 5 should be treated equally to a 
trial participant but that may end in a few weeks,” he said, with resignation in his 
voice.  So, when the trial ended, so too did the testing services, undermining the 
quality of the health care provided to patients admitted to the pediatric ward.  With 
this, Wilson expressed his disappointment about the situation, over which he had 
little control.  
One morning I was in a car with two researchers working at the Korogwe 
Research Centre on a longitudinal study about malaria.  Driving to the Research 
Centre to start another day of work, one of the researchers spoke passionately 
about the end of the RTS,S clinical trial as he steered up the hill, passing homes 
and fields as we went.  He stated:  
It’s a shock for people when a trial ends.  It’s a shock for staff 
who are out of a job and it’s a shock for the community 
members who expect a certain level of care and services … 
After a trial ends, people wonder when another trial will 
begin.   There is a demand within the community for these 
trials.…  I wish the government would take on some of the 
responsibility of the trial and continue to offer some services. 
The expectation was that the state, not global health partnerships or a 
research study, should be the long-term provider and conduit of health care.  But the 
government lacked the funds to sustain the services provided by the RTS,S clinical 
trial.  With resources, including drugs, health care staff, and the substances 
necessary to operate diagnostic testing machines, withdrawn after the vaccine trial, 
high quality health care could no longer be provided in the hospital or the 
dispensaries.   
As well, with the clinical trial concluded, much of the human capacity built to 
carry out the trial was lost, with a majority of staff becoming unemployed.  Those 
who were well-educated and able to relocate felt confident about their abilities to find 
work and some planned to move to major Tanzanian cities and work for private 
clinics or laboratories.  Crane (2013: 138) refers to this as “internal brain drain”, 
whereby the public health care sector is abandoned for higher salaries from foreign 
NGOs and research, which does not always lead to improvements for health care 
delivery in impoverished places.  But for those who originated in Korogwe and were 
less educated, they expressed distress that they did not know what to do once the 
trial ended.  With no large-scale trial on the horizon, staff either did not remain in the 
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resource-poor area where the trial was conducted, or for those who remained, they 
saw an end to their employment and incomes.  Although medical research and 
health care infrastructure was built, it is questionable how sustainable this 
development is if few people remain in Korogwe to make use of it. 
Despite several members of the trial staff expressing frustration and 
resignation about the limitations of capacity building through the trial, Tom, a British 
malaria researcher at a West African RTS,S trial site, reflected on the perceived lack 
of investment into research capacity building: 
I think one thing that the Africans have felt is that there 
haven’t been enough of an investment research capacity 
development….  And that is where some of the conflict has 
been.…  But the purpose has been to get this vaccine 
registered and that’s what we should be doing, everything 
should be around that….  [T]here has … been a wish for 
some opportunities to do some Master’s courses or learn 
some small theoretical things and I think they were a bit 
frustrated … that there wasn’t some money for that.…  
[S]omeone else should have come in with that, to build on 
the sort of structure… 
By saying that someone else should have made investments into capacity 
building absolves GSK and MVI of their responsibility to African researchers and 
research centres.  But those I spoke to at GSK and MVI explained that they had 
invested quite a bit and it was no longer their responsibility to continue with that 
investment after the trial ended.  However, for trial staff, on the other hand, they 
experienced the ending of the trial very differently to people at GSK and MVI as they 
grappled with unemployment and a limited health care system. 
Street’s (2014) findings resonate with my own.  She conducted research at a 
government-run hospital in Papua New Guinea and explored the impacts science 
can have on a place.  Street found that when researchers propose to conduct 
scientific research in the hospital, they must profess to be directly investing in public 
health care capacities in order to gain ethical clearance by government research 
gatekeepers and international research funders.  However, when examining the 
impacts of a clinical trial for a malaria medication, she found that research capacities 
were built separate from the hospital and improvements were slated for some 
unspecified time in the future.  Researchers had only built enough capacity to 
conduct their research but not to become health care providers or improve the 
provision of health care in the hospital.  Similarly, GSK and MVI did not continue to 
be health care providers in Tanzania after the trial ended. 
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When the trial ended, this evoked a range of feelings from trial staff.   Many 
expressed happiness about the investments made in Korogwe and surrounding 
areas, as discussed in chapter 2.  But some questioned the long-term legacy of the 
trial when the clinical trial was both temporally and spatially circumscribed from the 
wider community and health care system.  As well, as the potentials of the trial were 
foreclosed, some staff expressed concern, frustration and resignation as things 
broke, ended or were not sustained.  Although some expectations were met for 
capacity building, the abrupt end of the trial exposed the limited obligations and 
commitment of transnational companies and organisations to places where research 
was conducted (Geissler 2015b).   
Care and Dependency 
At the end of the trial, it was uncertain if the Korogwe Research Centre 
would attract another research project.  Sharon said,  
We were the sole funder of [this site].… [F]or years this was 
the contract that kept them operating. … A hundred 
people,… fieldworkers, laboratory people, clinical staff, 
clinical officers….  What was going to happen to all these 
people?  There weren’t a lot of opportunities to just pick up 
another project.   
Some RTS,S trial sites in Africa had core support from large organizations 
like the United States Centres for Disease Control (CDC) or multiple large and 
ongoing research projects.  However, Tom explained that “some … African 
[research] centres which don’t have strong core support … are … very dependent 
on … big trials, for supporting infrastructure, paying the electricity, and so on.”   
The Korogwe Research Centre was one of the centres that lacked core 
support.  Attempts had been made to attract large research projects to the Research 
Centre.  Sharon explained,  
Obviously after five or six … years of developing capacity, 
one of the things we consciously did is that we began to 
think about the transition of the sites from this big project to 
how they’re going to become sites for other research….  One 
of the things that MVI did was sponsor a workshop with the 
investigators about ancillary studies and we did a whole 
session on grant writing.  We … have reached out to the 
other PDP’s [Public Development Partnerships] to try to 
drum up business … for these trial sites, to advocate for 
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them….  It’s a way for … the investigators and the teams to 
continue the ability to conduct rigorous research in the field. 
MVI also posted an advertisement for the Korogwe Research Centre on an 
Oxford-based research site finder.  With this resource, a company or organization 
that wishes to carry out medical research can search for research sites online and 
find hundreds of sites around the world.  Thus, the potential was there for Korogwe 
to continue medical research.  Sharon continued,  
[W]hat we have been trying to do centrally here is to tout the 
good reputation [of RTS,S trial sites].  I personally get calls 
all the time, ‘Oh, have you ever worked with this site’.  So, 
again I think there is a way to sustain some of the 
momentum in the sites.  That is something that we are very 
cognizant of and we did our level best to prepare for the 
transition but it’s challenging.… [A]t our 11 sites, some have 
been in business for 20 or so years and they have a diverse 
funding portfolio of projects, or they work on other diseases 
and have contacts with other drug companies to do other 
malaria drug studies.  And then some of them were really 
just conducting this one vaccine trial.   
Administrators at the Research Centre attempted to draw researchers to 
conduct projects there.  One day before the end of the phase three trial, a group of 
around 20 research students from Denmark visited the Korogwe Research Centre.  
They were given a tour and served lunch.  Administrators hoped that these students 
would consider conducting a research project at the Research Centre and help to 
bring in research funding.  A few weeks later, a faculty member from Denmark 
arrived at the trial site to establish a research project with a Tanzanian researcher 
affiliated with NIMR.  These researchers planned to track the health of children from 
birth to understand how diet during gestation can affect diabetes rates.  The 
Research Centre would serve as the hub for their activities and they would make 
use of the laboratories and offices to support their research.  However, this study 
was small-scale and would only involve two researchers, one Tanzanian and one 
Danish, and would not impact the Research Centre in a significant way since the 
samples obtained from research participants would be analyzed at the University of 
Copenhagen.      
It proved difficult to attract another large-scale research project to the 
Research Centre.  Joseph explained why another research project had not found to 
replace the RTS,S trial when it came to an end: “With respect to research, we are 
trying to diversify.  Not only do malaria research but in other areas, other diseases. 
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… [I]t’s unfortunate that we were caught before we were adequately prepared to 
diversify our research”.  I spoke to Erick, a fieldworker, about this issue before the 
trial ended.  He remarked: “We always cry for another study.  I don’t know if at the 
end of December if there is any promising answer but we are eager to see that 
these facilities are active all the time.  The problem is getting other projects that can 
use these facilities”.   
Despite being unable to draw another large-scale study to the Korogwe 
Research Centre when the RTS,S trial ended, this site remained attractive as a 
research site because it could host medical research in a rural area and be modified 
to support a variety of research studies.  This relates to Appel’s (2012) term, 
“modularity”.  As Appel argues, the infrastructure used for oil extraction is mobile, 
self-contained and compliant and can be set up in many places around the world to 
enable the oil industry to disentangle from surrounding areas where they work.  
Similarly, the Research Centre comprised of infrastructure that was self-contained 
and could be assembled in different settings. However, unlike Appel’s meaning of 
modularity, the laboratory equipment at the Research Centre had a particular 
function: to carry out analysis of blood and tissue samples before they degraded 
with further analysis conducted in more equipped laboratories abroad.  If a different 
kind of research was to be conducted in Korogwe, the laboratory equipment would 
need to be interchanged for other equipment.  With further inputs of resources from 
wealthy research partners, new laboratory equipment could be procured.  In order to 
diversify research activities, researchers in Korogwe would need to negotiate for 
more equipment and investments into the infrastructure and technology, putting 
researchers in a position of dependency in relation to incoming organizations (cf. 
Okwaro and Geissler 2015).   
Although many considered the RTS,S clinical trial—through the 
establishment of scientific infrastructure and provision of technology—had benefited 
Tanzania, in actuality the benefits were largely unsustainable.  Okwaro and Geissler 
(2015) have written about medical research infrastructure in East Africa: 
Developing infrastructure is … like joining an elite club of 
institutions that can continuously conduct research.  The 
converse scenario is what one observes in non-collaborating 
research departments, where institutions and scientists lack 
infrastructure and are therefore unable to compete for 
collaborators, resulting in a downward spiral of research 
inactivity and decay. (14) 
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Medical research funding in low-income countries is often unavailable from 
governments so researchers must collaborate with organizations willing to fund 
research activities.  Research can be short-lived and when studies end, so too does 
the funding, resources and support necessary for capacity building.  Therefore, 
research centres in resource-poor places are highly dependent on regular 
investments from wealthy donors to maintain and expand infrastructure and 
technology.  Securing funding for various medical research activities—including the 
building of research sites and obtaining laboratory equipment from outside 
institutions—is key to the success of research centres.  Research centres that do 
not have support from outside institutions for building infrastructure are unable to 
attract research and thus experience increasing inactivity, decline and decay.  
Research centres that have support from institutions abroad for the building and 
maintenance of infrastructure and laboratories are able to attract research projects 
and maintain active research centres (Okwaro and Geissler 2015).  However, in this 
situation, researchers are dependent on relationships with wealthy institutions to 
grow and sustain capacity, meaning that capacity building is not always stable.  The 
time-bounded nature of research projects means that the impact of research can be 
short-lived and impermanent, unable to directly lead to sustainable change.  As well, 
this situation reinforces unequal relationships between wealthy donors in the North 
and researchers in the South, despite these relationships being portrayed as 
partnerships (Geissler 2015b; Okwaro and Geissler 2015).   
Returning to the decaying technology at the Korogwe Research Centre, the 
breakdown of the printer in the data management office occurred before the RTS,S 
phase three clinical trial ended.  At this time it was uncertain if the Research Centre 
would continue researching RTS,S.  After the phase three trial ended, GSK informed 
administrators of the Research Centre that there was a possibility they would secure 
a contract to conduct the fourth phase of the RTS,S trial.  This fourth phase would 
be a pharmacovigilant study that would set a quantitative standard for the level of 
disease in the area, which would be used as a comparison for when the RTS,S 
vaccine was administered at a later time.  Only then were funds provided to 
purchase a new printer and repair the damage termites had made in the Research 
Centre data management office.  As well, this potential for further research was the 
reason minimal health care was provided at two of the trial dispensaries.   
This situation reveals how dependent research centres in low-income 
countries are on wealthy institutions and organizations to grow and sustain this 
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capacity.  Research centres must provide things of interest—be it a location, willing 
communities, or diseases of interest—to international capital.  When circumstances 
change, these places are disconnected, leading to abandoned sites and decay 
(Harvey and Knox 2008; Okwaro and Geissler 2015; Geissler 2012).   Thus, the 
Korogwe Research Centre experienced times of decay and repair in relation to how 
disconnected or connected it was to outside donors and partners.  However, when 
the opportunity arises, the Korogwe Research Centre has the potential to be 
reanimated but this requires funders who desire to do more research in the area for 
investments in the Research Centre to resume (Geissler 2015b; Okwaro and 




MVI and GSK invested in the Korogwe Research Centre, constructing 
buildings, creating electrical, communication and virtual networks, and setting up 
laboratories and data management spaces.  Northern partners expressed a sense 
of satisfaction with their provision of these gifts and many informants claimed that 
the vaccine trial had value beyond the development of a malaria vaccine through the 
building of capacity, which was thought to improve health care provision and enable 
future medical research.  However, when the RTS,S trial ended, the ambivalent 
impacts of these material things became obvious.  Trial staff saw the potential for 
progress through infrastructure and technology foreclosed at this time.  This evoked 
affect, including frustration, concern and resignation.  The clinical trial was enclaved, 
small-scale and time-limited.  The impacts were of limited value or helped support 
the aims of Northern partners and global capital more than researchers and people 
in surrounding communities, fitting with the ideas about gift giving described by 
Malinowski (2014 [1922]) and Mauss (2011 [1925]).  The infrastructure constructed 
to maintain the cold chain was frozen in time and the trial dispensaries were 
constructed to administer the vaccine and provide health care to trial participants but 
were then left for the government to figure out how to use, with little funding 
provided to staff the dispensaries or supply drugs.  Also, the Korogwe Research 
Centre and the technology inside was decaying, with the rain, sun, termites and 
regular use wearing away at the once bright and new building and functional 
equipment.  Ongoing care and investment were necessary to maintain the 
functionality of the Research Centre.  This made researchers in Korogwe highly 
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dependent on establishing partnerships with wealthy institutions.  These findings 
expose the historically-shaped hierarchies between North and South that continue to 
shape current formations of global health research, as well as the limitations of 
contemporary global health partnerships in bringing about broader and longer-term 
changes in places of need.     
My findings also suggest a new understanding of global health partnerships.  
Northern partners largely disengaged from the partnership once the trial concluded 
but for trial staff in Tanzania, they continued to care for the buildings, technology 
and infrastructure by repairing them and maintain their operability as best they could 
as they sought other research partnerships.  Relating these findings back to 
theoretical ways of understanding infrastructure, trial staff continued to value the 
material things because they viewed them not only as gifts but as an avenue 
towards change, progress and development.  The caring labour that trial staff 
provided to the material things was largely unseen by Northern partners who, after 
the end of the trial, relinquished their obligations to the material things they had 
given Tanzanian researchers.  In this way, staff in Korogwe experienced the 
partnership more fully and in an ongoing way even after the trial ended since they 
had to contend with and care for the materials given to them by their partners.  My 
findings suggest that partnership is not only a rhetoric that disguises inequalities and 
hierarchies.  By focussing on the materiality of the RTS,S clinical trial, I demonstrate 
how the concept of partnership is given meaning as people joined together to care 
for and use these materials to develop a vaccine.  But more than that, partnership is 
an idea that needs only to be fully believed and supported by one side to be 
effective in mobilizing people’s involvement.  In the case of the RTS,S vaccine trial, 
Northern partners could step away from the partnership.  However, trial staff in 
Tanzania derived meaning and motivation from the partnership, and expended 
labour, care and affect in order to feel fully involved and to make the partnership 
come to life.   
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Chapter 4: The Boundaries of Care: Material Exchange 
and Health Care Provision at the End of the RTS,S 
Clinical Trial 
Introduction 
Although the literature is rife with descriptions of how health care systems in 
many Sub-Saharan African countries are struggling, the situation in Korogwe 
diverged slightly from those descriptions.  When it was ongoing, the RTS,S malaria 
vaccine clinical trial received funding from GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) and the Malaria 
Vaccine Initiative (MVI) to provide health care to children in and around the town of 
Korogwe.  The trial constructed health care infrastructure, improved access to 
resources like pharmaceutical drugs and medical devices, and directly provided 
material resources and labour to support public health care facilities. 
The provision of health care was an ongoing activity for trial staff throughout 
the RTS,S trial and commanded a significant amount of time, labour, care and 
resources.  These activities also included many exchanges.  I described a large 
exchange in chapter 3, whereby staff provided their labour and time in return for 
employment and material things—including buildings and technology—from their 
Northern partners.  But throughout the trial, there were many exchanges between 
trial staff and public health care staff, and trial staff and community members.  The 
public health care system allowed the trial to use the pediatric ward of the Korogwe 
District Hospital and facilitating enrolment of participants into the trial, as material 
objects, information, labour, time, and blood samples were exchanged back and 
forth between people.  These exchanges impacted social relationships and the very 
conception of health care. 
The nature of exchange has occupied a considerable amount of thought, 
debate and discussion in anthropology, beginning with Mauss (1990 [1925]).  This 
topic has particularly engaged anthropologists studying Melanesia, where ideas 
about personhood, objects and exchange often differ from Western conceptions 
(Strathern 1988; Knauft 1999; West 2006).  Strathern argues that for some 
communities in Melanesia, objects and people come into being through giving and 
exchange, and people become social actors through their exchange, possession 
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and use of objects (Strathern 1988).  A majority of Melanesianist anthropology 
focuses on the movement of people and objects in relation to the formation of social 
selves and social relations.  However, West (2006) expanded this theory after 
researching a conservation initiative involving the Gimi people of Papua New 
Guinea and a conservation non-governmental organization (NGO).  She found that 
services and labour, as actions, can also be viewed in relation to exchange and the 
reproduction of social relationships.  What can be derived from these examples is 
that objects, people and social relationships can come into being through the 
exchange of objects, labour and services.  I apply these ideas about exchange to 
the RTS,S vaccine trial to explore how the public and privately-funded health care 
services interacted and came into being through exchange.   
In the town of Korogwe, the ability to access private health care was limited 
and the public health care system was largely the only system available.  However, 
during the trial, excellent health care was provided at an internationally standardized 
level in order to minimize the possibility of harm to trial participants.  Trial staff 
provided this care to trial participants and neighbouring children, whether they were 
part of the vaccine trial or not.  The health care provided through the trial operated in 
parallel and, in some cases, within the public health care system.  This situation did 
not blur distinctions between public and private health care.  Instead, I argue that the 
many exchanges between the two services exposed the differences between the 
two, and through exchange, the public health care system came into being, with 
people coming to see and understand this system and its limitations.   
Additionally, after the trial ended, trial staff largely ceased to provide care.  
From the perspective of people at GSK and MVI, ending health care provision was 
necessary because their mandate was to test a malaria vaccine and they could only 
invest in this service as the trial was ongoing.  Moreover, they oriented themselves 
towards the future when thinking about their impacts on Africa, as the development 
of the RTS,S vaccine has the potential to lift all boats, so to speak, once provided.  
However, for many trial staff, the ending of health care provision was problematic.  
Due to the trial, staff had gained a normative view of health care, making it obvious 
what the public health care system should be like, and where it could go in the 
future.  There was expression of loss and a sense of duty to continue to provide 
care.  As well, this ending evoked a “medical imaginary”, to borrow Wendland’s 
(2012b) term, with some trial staff expressing a political demand for a better public 
medical system in Tanzania.  Thus, the RTS,S trial left more than material things 
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behind; it left behind ideas of how the Tanzanian public health care system should 
and could operate.     
In this chapter, I first provide background on anthropological literature about 
health care and medical research.  Second, I describe the rural dispensaries 
operated by the government in communities around Korogwe and highlight how 
health care providers navigated the public health care system.  Third, I explore the 
ways that RTS,S trial staff provided health care, trace the movement of material 
objects, and examine exchanges of labour, care, time and resources between the 
public and privately-funded health care services.  Finally, I focus on the end of the 
RTS,S clinical trial and how a private enterprise helped trial staff to re-think how to 
provide public health care.  Overall, my findings uncover how boundaries and 
differences were created and reinforced through exchange and closures. 
Health Care and Medical Research 
Anthropologists (Fairhead, Leach and Small 2006; Leach and Fairhead 
2011; Geissler 2013, 2014 and 2015b; Geissler et al. 2008; Crane 2013; Whyte 
2011; Nguyen 2015; Marcis 2015; Kelly et al. 2010; Kelly 2011) have explored 
medical research studies conducted in a variety of African countries and each found 
health care was provided in the research studies they examined.  However, health 
care has not always been provided during the conduct of medical research in Africa.  
As described in the introduction of this thesis, the 1990s saw a dramatic rise of 
research carried out in resource-poor settings and ethical codes were revised to 
protect vulnerable people.  But Petryna (2005 and 2009) highlights that adherence 
to ethical codes can be dependent on context.  In some places, ethical codes may 
only be loosely interpreted and followed.  For example, in 1994, an HIV medication 
was tested in Africa to see if it halted transmission of the virus during child birth.  
Researchers followed ethical codes, which stated that “equivalent medication” could 
be given to those in one group of the randomized control trial.  This group received a 
placebo, which was essentially no treatment, as the other half of the participants 
received the experimental treatment.  This was cheaper than having to provide all 
research participants with adequate care and drugs.  This practice led to an outcry 
but it was not breaking any ethical codes.  That researchers could provide little to no 
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treatment in places with weak health care systems indicates that the application of 
ethical codes can vary.   
Despite this variable interpretation and application of ethical codes, many 
research studies follow the Declaration of Helsinki of the World Health Organization 
(WHO) and other ethical codes that specify that research participants not receiving 
the experimental drug or vaccine should be given the best available form of 
prevention or treatment, not a placebo.  As well, these codes stipulate that all 
research participants must receive the best treatment currently available and 
medical research conducted in resource-poor settings must include the provision of 
care that is at least equivalent to that of the sponsoring country.  If research 
participants become ill, treatment must to be provided so they did not suffer unduly 
(Angell 1997; Petryna 2009).   
When health care is provided over the course of medical research, this can 
impact health care services in local contexts.  Health care in many African countries 
has increasingly been privatized and defunded over the last several decades and 
governments have established transnational partnerships with NGOs, charities, 
foreign governments, and industry to provide partial, fragmented and emergency-
focused care.  This situation means that people, a majority of whom continue to 
depend on decaying public health care facilities, must navigate a fractured health 
care landscape, accessing health care where possible.  In some places, medical 
research provides health care (Geissler 2012 and 2014).  This has brought about 
the “experimental subject” (Nguyen 2009), a common figure found in impoverished 
settings in the Global South as people are given the choice of participating in 
research and receiving quality care or refusing to participate and not getting access 
to health care (Marcis 2015). 
Contemporary discussions about medical research tends to frame it as 
distinct from public health care.  However, this distinction may be less than clear in 
some contexts.  Whyte (2011) explores how research and health care can overlap, 
blurring distinctions between the two service providers.  Examining medical research 
in rural Uganda, she finds that it can supplement the poorly funded public system 
and from the perspective of those being researched, medical research was often not 
clearly distinguished from health services.  As well, Whyte found that people showed 
little concern that the research collected knowledge; the provision of health care was 
more significant to them.     
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Exploring people’s perceptions and use of health care provided through 
research, Leach and Fairhead (2011) found that in The Gambia many people 
became experimental subjects.  This helped them gain access to health care 
through clinical trials and medical studies conducted by a British Medical Research 
Council (MRC)-funded field station.  The authors found the distinction between 
medical research and health care was less than clear in contexts where research 
institutions operate over long periods of time.  For the MRC field station in The 
Gambia, it had been in operation for over 50 years, providing health care from within 
a government health centre.  Through its lengthy engagement, the field station 
became part of the health care landscape and people living in the area viewed it 
largely as one amongst a multitude of health care providers, rather than simply a 
research station.   
Although the MRC field station in The Gambia has hosted medical research 
for decades, not every field station or research centre accommodating medical 
research can sustain research activities and the medical care that often 
accompanies it.  In some cases, health care and its attendant resources are only 
offered for as long as the research is ongoing and funding is flowing.  Geissler 
(2014), having conducted research at a public health scientific research station in 
East Africa, found that exceptional medical services were provided to those who 
participated in medical research.  At this research station, enclosed treatment 
spaces functioned in parallel to the public health care system.  When researchers 
were able to draw in funding to support research, there were periods of heightened 
activity along with the provision of health care.  However, there were time limitations 
to this funding, leading to periods when people were cut off from accessing 
resources.  This meant that medical research was not a sustainable source of 
medical care.                                
Crane (2013) writes about global health partnerships and medical research 
in Uganda, finding that foreign-funded research can provide a level of care 
unavailable from public health care facilities.  She explores the growth of a 
HIV/AIDS (human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome) 
clinic in Uganda that began receiving funding from international donors in 2005.  
Staff, infrastructure and patient numbers grew as thousands received treatment for 
HIV, and US-based researchers established partnerships and became involved in 
conducting research in the clinic.  This situation obscured the division between 
humanitarian and scientific activity.  However, this clinic was enclaved from other 
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health care facilities and there was an increasing disparity between the clinic and 
government-funded hospital wards that lacked even basic supplies.  This meant that 
those not suffering from HIV/AIDS could not reliably obtain treatment.  As well, 
although thousands received treatment at this clinic, services ceased when foreign 
grants did not materialize.  Here too, medical research did not offer comprehensive 
health care to those in need or sustainably strengthen the health care system in 
Uganda.   
The examples above are similar to the RTS,S clinical trial in Korogwe, 
Tanzania.  During the trial, the RTS,S clinical trial operated within and alongside the 
Tanzanian public health care system.  But, unlike examples in the literature where 
the boundaries between medical research and public health care were blurred, the 
exchanges between the public and private helped maintain distinctions between the 
two.  Additionally, much like what Crane (2013) and Geissler (2014) found with their 
research, when the RTS,S trial came to a close, it did not sustain access to health 
care or resources because it had a time-limited mandate to test a new vaccine.  
Thus, the health care provided through this clinical trial was circumscribed, bounded 
in space and time.  This had particular effects on how people came to see and 
understand the public health care system in Korogwe.  Below, I provide a 
description of the public health care facilities I visited and health care providers I met 
during my time in Korogwe and Handeni Districts.  
The Public Health Care System 
In the Districts of Korogwe and Handeni, a leading reason people seek out 
medical care—whether public or private, naturalistic or biomedical, formal or 
informal—is due to malaria.  This disease is endemic to the area and most prevalent 
at lower-altitudes, especially during the rainy seasons.  As well, malaria 
disproportionately affects not only children and pregnant women but those in poverty 
(Kelly and Beisel 2011; Desowitz 2002; Mahendi et al. 2014; Mmbando et al. 2010).  
Grace, a laboratory technician, spoke to this issue when I interviewed her at the 
Korogwe Research Centre one afternoon in her office.  She said, “What they say is 
that malaria is equivalent to poverty, poverty is equivalent to malaria….  Once you 
have malaria, you can’t come to work, you can’t produce, you can’t do anything….  
[E]specially when you are poor, [malaria] is even worse.”  Tanzania has widespread 
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poverty (WHO 2009) and poverty can impact health in a variety of ways.  For 
example, people in poverty often lack mosquito-proof housing, something that I 
observed when I visited the homes of a few trial participants.  Lacking housing that 
protects from mosquitoes can lead to a greater chance of contracting malaria and 
thus a greater need for health care provision.   
Different kinds of health care providers existed in Korogwe and Handeni 
Districts.  People sought care through private pharmacies, traditional healers, or, if 
able, private health care facilities in larger metropolises.  However, there was little 
access to private health care services in the area and the public health care system 
was largely the only health care system available.  Therefore, a majority of people 
who sought out allopathic medicine attended a public dispensary or hospital in the 
area.  
Although many people depended on the public health care system to obtain 
care and malaria medications, this system was severely underfunded.  In order to 
get a sense of the health care services, I visited the Korogwe District Hospital and 
several village dispensaries that were located near trial dispensaries.  One morning 
at a RTS,S trial dispensary, I spent some time with Fredy, the clinic officer on duty.  
He suggested we visit the government dispensary situated a few feet away.  The 
government dispensary was constructed of concrete, cracked and eroded, with a tin 
roof.  Windows were dark with dust that had been kicked up from the highway in 
front of the facility, and window screens were rusted and broken.  Entering the dark 
front room of the dispensary, patients were lined up to sign in with a nurse to see a 
health care provider.  Fredy introduced me to this nurse.  She wore a bright blue 
uniform and sat at a wooden desk with a ledger in front of her.  Fredy explained to 
the nurse that I was doing research and wanted to look around the dispensary.  The 
nurse smiled, nodded and said, “Karibu! [welcome]”.  Fredy led me past the people 
lined-up and we walked into the room at the back of the dispensary where there 
were several women, some with infants in their laps, sitting on wooden benches 
around the outer periphery of the room.  This room had a big, barred window and a 
door that led outside, which let in natural light.  A few public health posters in Swahili 
were hung on the walls.  A wooden desk and chair, along with a baby weighing 
station, sat in the middle of the room.   
Fredy knocked on the first door to the right and a man, wearing a white 
doctor’s coat and looking to be in his mid-20s, opened it.  He introduced himself as 
Jonas and said he was the only doctor for the dispensary.  Fredy introduced me and 
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told Jonas that I was conducting research about the RTS,S vaccine trial and wanted 
to look around the dispensary.  Jonas welcomed me and waved us into the room.  I 
saw that the room was cramped and dark.  A woman was lying on a bed covered 
with a plastic sheet and a cloth, wearing a yellow and black patterned khanga cloth 
wrapped around her, her back to us.  Jonas explained that she was in labour.  When 
the woman saw us, she made an effort to cover herself more but with a wince of 
pain she returned to having her arm over her face to keep out the sliver of light 
coming in between the window shutters next to the bed.  The room contained three 
rusted beds, intravenous bag holders and a large wooden desk.  The top of the desk 
held log books, papers and medical supplies, and the walls and floors of the room 
were discoloured from years of use.  On the bed next to the woman in labour, there 
were metal surgical instruments, ready for use.  Once Fredy and I entered the room, 
Jonas asked that I close the door “to protect the confidentiality of my patient,” he 
explained, since the women sitting outside on the room would be able to peer in.  
Jonas explained that the woman on the bed had gone into labour in the village that 
morning and was past due to deliver her baby.  She had been trying to make it to 
the dispensary from her village but was in a lot of pain so dispensary staff picked her 
up in a nurses’ car.    
Jonas said that he had been a doctor for three months and loved the job 
since he felt he was helping people.  He liked working aside the other members of 
staff, including two assistant nurses and a cleaner.  But then Jonas described the 
challenges he faced at that dispensary, with regular drug stock-outs and insufficient 
supplies.  Jonas pointed to the woman in labour and said, “The women are told on 
the radio and on the television that they can give birth in a dispensary or hospital for 
free but when they come they find they must pay for the sheet on the bed and 
medications.  They have to reach into their own pockets.”  He explained he felt torn 
about whether he should help patients when he is trying to scrape by as well.  “You 
know, we are still waiting for the monthly pay-cheque for our salary, even though it’s 
a few weeks into the month now.”   
As Jonas was talking, there was a knock on the door and he opened it.  An 
older woman handed Jonas a black plastic bag and he explained to us that the older 
woman was a relative of the woman in labour.  Jonas then pointing to the plastic bag 
and said, “See, I have to get my patients to buy supplies.  They even have to get 
their own Oxycodone—their own pain medication.”  As he pulled two plastic bottles 
of clear liquid out of the plastic bag, he continued: “And here are some IV fluids, 
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because every delivering woman needs these.”  He shook his head and looked in 
despair.  Jonas told us about how supplies were lacking at the dispensary and how 
he submitted orders for supplies but repeatedly found he was not given what he 
asked for.  “I don’t know why they do this, maybe they don’t have enough money?  
But every time I find I do not get exactly what I ordered, always less.” 
After the RTS,S trial ended, I returned to this dispensary one afternoon.  I 
found the dispensary quiet and remembered that Hassan, a trial fieldworker, had 
said that the heavy rain during the last two days meant people were in the fields 
planting crops.  Walking to the back room, I found it empty except for Jonas sitting 
on a wooden bench usually reserved for patients waiting to see a health care 
provider.  Jonas was wearing his white doctor’s coat and sewing up a rubber device.  
I greeted him and he welcomed me to sit with him as he attempted to sew up an 
aspirator with a needle and string.  As I watched, I could see that his attempts were 
not working and he gave up in frustration.  Pointing to the device, he said, “I use this 
to help babies breathe if their airways are blocked after they are born.  Without it I 
have no way of clearing the airway and babies will die.  I will order a new one but I 
know it won’t come for three or four months.  In the meantime, what will I do?” Jonas 
asked.  “I’m also out of S-P [sulfadoxine-pyrimethamine] to give to pregnant women 
to prevent malaria.”  Although there were trained staff at this dispensary, there was 
a lack of resources to support health care, which evoked frustration, helplessness 
and resignation.   
As Jonas explained, he placed orders for the drugs and medical devices he 
used in his practice.  His orders were filled by the Medical Stores Department 
(MSD), an independent, para-statal organization established by the Tanzanian 
Ministry of Health in 1993.  Supplying health care facilities throughout the country 
(Gerrets 2015), the government health care providers that I spoke to had 
reservations about its ability to adequately serve the country.  With regular stock-
outs of drugs experienced across the country, many health care providers I 
encountered felt resignation about their ability to provide quality care to their 
patients.  Although care for children under the age of five was technically free of 
charge in Tanzania, if the drugs were unavailable in public health care facilities, they 
had to be paid for out-of-pocket at a private pharmacy.  In Dar es Salaam, before 
commencing research in Korogwe, I spoke to two representatives at John Snow 
International (JSI).  This organization was tasked with improving the MSD’s drug 
provision system through a grant from The US President’s Malaria Initiative (PMI).  
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These representatives of JSI attributed the poor delivery of drugs to technical faults 
in the system and explained that JSI was in the midst of digitizing the system so 
health care providers could request and track drugs and supplies using computers.  
However, when I was in Korogwe, this system was not yet in place.   
I visited other government dispensaries as the RTS,S trial was coming to a 
close.  One morning at a trial dispensary in the lowlands of Korogwe District, I was 
speaking to Juma, a clinic officer working for the RTS,S clinical trial.  He explained 
that he helped out at the government dispensary nearby when things were busy 
there.  Juma said he was happy to help as he knew how overworked staff could be, 
while he, on the other hand, had few patients to attend to as the trial wound down.  
Because he shared his time and labour, Juma had come to befriend the staff at the 
government dispensary and said that he would be pleased to introduce me to them.   
Juma took me to an examination room in the government dispensary, which 
was a few metres away from the trial dispensary.  There, Juma introduced me to a 
clinic officer named Godfrey, who was middle-aged and wearing a white doctor’s 
coat.  Juma explained my research to Godfrey and he said he would gladly show me 
around the government dispensary.  We first went to the maternal and infant health 
building.  There, several women and children sat on wooden benches or the floor.  
An infant weighing station was in the middle of the room with nurses placing babies 
in slings and recording their weight.  There were examination rooms off of this main 
room and Juma and Godfrey showed me to the room nearest the entrance.  A nurse 
in white dress was speaking to a woman with an infant swaddled and held to her 
chest with a patterned khanga cloth.  Malaria medications and other drugs were in 
the cabinet near the door of the room and I spotted a voucher for insecticide-treated 
mosquito nets on the desk.  This voucher allowed pregnant women and children to 
receive a bed net for 500 Tanzanian shillings (equivalent to about US$0.30).  
Thanking the nurse and woman for letting us view the room, we moved on to the 
next building. 
Reserved for labour and birth, the next room was large and held two beds.  
Cleaner and brighter than the government dispensary that I visited before, the two 
barred windows in the room had clean glass that let in the morning light.  The walls 
and floor were stained with use and there was no running water; water was held in 
large plastic buckets on the floor.  On the walls were instructions for helping women 
in labour.  The clinic officer working for the government said, “Sometimes women 
come at night and there is no electricity so we must deliver the babies by kerosene 
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lamp.”  He continued: “Some doctors even refuse to treat patients at night.”  He 
explained that bad pay was the reason some were selective about what care they 
were willing to provide to patients.  I asked how many women gave birth at the 
hospital and the clinic officer said, “Around 40-50%, the rest stay at home.”   
Moving onto the pharmacy, located in another building of the dispensary, I 
saw that it was stocked with a supply of malaria medications.  The clinic officer 
explained, “We ran out of mRDTs [Rapid Diagnostic Tests for malaria] a month ago 
so we must treat malaria clinically by looking at the symptoms people present”.  I 
opined that malaria can look like other infections and the two clinic officers looked 
apologetic.  Juma explained, “There is nothing they can do about this, they have to 
make do with what they are given.”     
I visited several other government dispensaries over the two months that I 
was in Korogwe.  Overall, the public health care providers that I spoke to described 
the public health care system as underfunded, leading to overworked and under-
paid staff.  Medical devices were in disrepair and stock outs of drugs were a 
regularly occurrence.  The government dispensaries I visited were in disrepair with 
cracking concrete, rusting metal roofs and bed frames, with paperwork piled up and 
mouldering in corners.  Electricity was often unavailable, as were laboratories, 
leading to a reliance on rapid diagnostic tests for diagnosing malaria and HIV, when 
available.   
People living in surrounding villages had to travel to public health care 
facilities either on foot, pay someone to drive them on a motorbike, or, if they lived 
along a main road, take a dala dala [mini-bus].  One hot afternoon outside of a trial 
dispensary, I sat under a tree with Hassan.  As we gazed up into the Usambara 
mountains, Hassan pointed to buildings that we could see in the distance and said, 
“Some villages are in remote spots since, during colonial times, people moved to 
places to escape German colonial taxation and took for the hills, setting up 
communities in the mountains and difficult to reach places.”  I had visited a few 
mountain villages with RTS,S trial staff when we drove trial participants and their 
caregivers home after trial staff collected health information, biometric data and 
blood samples from trial participants.  One morning, I sat in the front of a trial van 
with Nelson, one of the trial drivers, as we drove people to their homes in the 
mountains.  Although with other drop-offs we were able to bring people back to their 
villages, this time we had to drop off caregivers and trial participants at the end of a 
road.  No cars could reach their mountain village so they had to walk the rest of the 
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way home.  At that time, I gained a sense of how difficult it would be for people in 
this village to access medical care located at lower elevations.   
Poverty and geography can play a role in people contracting malaria, as well 
as their ability to access the public health care system and malaria treatment.  At the 
same time, from what I observed and understand of the literature, the Tanzanian 
health care system is resource-poor.  For the health care providers that I spoke to, 
they felt proud of their contribution to the public health care system as they saw how 
it was saving lives.  At the same time, they were keenly aware of limitations of the 
system, which at times constrained their ability to provide adequate care.  
Nevertheless, although resource scarcity was a big problem, I saw people who were 
not just coping but creatively engaging and adapting to various situations as they 
provided care.  This finding resonates with what Wendland (2012a) found amongst 
Malawian medical students who were gaining clinical experience.  These students 
adapted to circumstances in the resource-poor hospital where they were being 
trained.  They learned to be creative and flexible and felt pride in their abilities to 
make do with less.  For health care providers in Korogwe and Handeni Districts, part 
of their adaptation to circumstances was making use of trial staff and the resources 
they provided during the RTS,S trial.  I now turn to focus on the health care and 
resources provided through the RTS,S vaccine trial, and the exchanges between the 
public and private health services.   
Trial-Funded Health Care, Exchange and the Maintenance of 
Boundaries  
One morning at the Korogwe Research Centre, I spoke to Joseph, an 
administrator and doctor for the RTS,S vaccine trial.  We discussed health care 
provision and he said, “In Tanzania the policy is that all the children under five and 
the pregnant mothers, they get free medical treatment, they don’t pay anything.”  I 
countered this by saying, “But these facilities are not exactly the same.”  Joseph 
smiled and answered, “No, they are not the same (laughter) because in our trial we 
take much more care of those children…. More equipment, we provide them with 
free transport….  [T]his is the trial; we need to get data.”  During a second interview, 
after the RTS,S trial ended, Joseph said,  
[W]e were providing free health care and the government 
hospital was also providing free health care at the same 
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time….  [T]he only difference is that in research we try to 
have all the drugs in stock for treating common childhood 
illnesses,… we tried to provide a minimum standard of care 
that was acceptable at international level.  So, we [had] to 
make sure that we [were] there 24 hours, 7 days in a week, 
including … public holidays.  Whereas in a government 
[dispensary], you maybe see it’s closed. 
As Joseph discussed, the health care provided through the clinical trial was at a 
higher standard than what was available the public health care system, because the 
trial had to meet international ethical standards while also extracting information and 
tissue samples from trial participants.   
Several trial staff spoke about how these resources and activities impacted 
the health of Tanzanians in and around Korogwe.  Hassan said during an interview 
in the conference room of the Korogwe Research Centre,  
The trial [has] a very big impact because this project has 
been helping the people in this area.  Not just the [trial] 
participants but even the people who come from the villages 
to this hospital.  Because we [are] working hand-in-hand with 
this pediatric ward so we are not only helping participants, 
we are helping every child who enters that ward.…  This lab 
here is helping everyone in this area….  [W]e’ve been 
dealing with medical issues, even in the villages.  We don’t 
only treat in the dispensary or people who participate, 
sometimes other people come in and we still have to treat 
them because medically, you cannot let someone go,… we 
have to treat those cases.  So, we are helping the people a 
lot. 
Hassan thought, like many other informants, that the health care provided through 
the trial not only helped trial participants but the wider community, making it a 
valuable and beneficial service. 
Other trial staff also spoke about this subject.  I interviewed Caroline, a 
pharmacist at the Korogwe Research Centre, one morning in the conference room 
of the Korogwe Research Centre.  She said, “There are people who cannot afford 
even 10 paracetamol tablets but because of the project, they are coming and being 
treated for free, whether they are coming as part of the study or not”.   I spoke to 
Emmanuel, a trial doctor, one afternoon in the conference room of the Korogwe 
Research Centre.  He spoke about the technology provided through the trial: 
The technologies have made a big impact, especially in the 
clinical site.  If you take the rapid diagnostic tests for testing 
for malaria, many people, if they know this facility has the 
diagnostic tests,… will come to that facility instead of [going] 
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to the facility where there is no laboratory test.  [If] there is a 
lot of diagnostic tests [being] done in the facilities you will 
see that a lot of people will go to that facility.  Because many 
… facilities, especially in the villages, they don’t have those 
test [and] they don’t have laboratories to diagnose.   
As Emmanuel stated, many of the village dispensaries lack resources like mRDTs 
and laboratories.  However, as Emmanuel argued, the resources made available 
through the RTS,S vaccine trial were available for people to access, which attracted 
people to use those facilities, leading to a “big impact”, as he said, on the care 
people received as the trial was ongoing.  
  A number of trial staff spoke about how the health care provided through 
the vaccine trial positively impacted the community.  It should be noted that this 
service enabled the RTS,S trial to operate and for GSK to adhere to international 
ethical standards and guidelines.  Additionally, although RTS,S had been previously 
tested for safety and found to be safe for use in adults and children, it was important 
to track adverse reaction in participants in order to protect future vaccine users.  
Since health care was free of charge to users, participants were more likely to make 
use of it, allowing trial staff to collect data about the RTS,S vaccine.  Hence, the 
provision of health care was instrumental, allowing GSK to monitor the impact of a 
new vaccine on the health of participants.  The trial-provided health care was not 
provided as a free and charitable service, trial participants had to provide valuable 
information about the RTS,S vaccine in exchange.    
Although several informants perceived the trial-funded health care service as 
socially valuable, its delivery was aided by various resources, including latex gloves, 
mRDTs, syringes and malaria medications.  Caroline described the necessity for 
medical care resources: “There is a time when the kids get sick.  You have to attend 
to them for a period of the study—three years.  So, we have the pharmacy where we 
dispense the drugs to the trial dispensaries and also to the hospital where we have 
our study physician who will tend to them.  So, we have to provide drugs and meet 
their needs, pharmaceutically.”  These materials and devices were made available 
through the establishment of drug and medical device procurement and supply 
networks.  Caroline explained that the drugs and medical devices usually came from 
the nearby town of Tanga.  The two trial pharmacists would locate three places to 
procure supplies and then “select the cheapest out of these three….  [W]e used to 
try as much as possible to get the cheapest supplier that we know, so most of this 
was from Tanga.  And sometimes were used to get them in Dar es Salaam,” 
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Caroline said.  Either she or the other pharmacist had to travel with a trial driver to 
pick up the drugs.  “We couldn’t send any other person [than] us to make sure that 
[the drugs were] genuine,” Caroline said.  “[T]his one time we were supplied with 
fake [drugs] and we returned it because … we actually know what is a fake drug….  
It only happened once and unfortunately it was from the government medical stores 
so it was quite tricky but at the end of the day they had to accept that it was fake and 
they had to take it back and return our money.”  This finding troubled Caroline who 
was concerned that fake drugs were circulating in the public health care system. 
Once the drugs and medical devices were procured, they were stored in the 
pharmacy located in the basement of the Korogwe Research Centre.  The Research 
Centre served as a conduit for materials, both enabling and constraining the 
movement and circulation of material resources (Geissler 2015b).  Medical drugs 
and devices arrived and fieldworkers and health care providers moved them out to 
the pediatric ward and trial dispensaries.  The basement where the pharmacy was 
located also had barred windows and doors that were locked at night.  The entrance 
to the basement had additional protection from a metal gate and a giant lock to 
prevent unauthorized access and theft.      
During the course of the trial, trial staff documented and tracked the 
movement and use of drugs and medical devices in log books and on paper forms.  
When trial staff in the Korogwe District hospital, trial dispensaries or villages needed 
more supplies, they filled out requisition forms to request them.  These forms were 
delivered to one of the pharmacists, who filled the order.  Once filled, fieldworkers 
transported supplies to trial dispensaries on their motorbikes, health care providers 
moved supplies from the pharmacy to the pediatric ward of the hospital, and 
fieldworkers picked up supplies they needed from trial dispensaries to use in 
villages.  Procurement and supply networks made the trial possible and relied upon 
existing infrastructures, including roads, cell phone towers and the internet.        
A site where trial-funded health care and resources were provided was in the 
Korogwe District Hospital, where the trial had been provided with use of the pediatric 
ward.  Located near the Korogwe Research Centre, this made it easy for trial staff to 
move supplies there.  As supplies moved to the District Hospital, filled out paper 
forms and tissue samples from children admitted to the pediatric ward moved in the 
opposite direction.  The provision of health care and resources throughout the trial 
impacted how the hospital ward operated.  Interviewing Simon, the Korogwe 
Research Centre site coordinator, one afternoon in his office, he said, “One of the 
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wards that is performing the best is the pediatric ward”.  Simon explained that the 
ward had been improved by hiring staff who worked entirely for the RTS,S clinical 
trial.  Additionally, the ward had been improved through the regular supply of 
material resources made available through the trial.  Neema, a trial data manager, 
also spoke about the impacts of the trial on the pediatric ward one afternoon in the 
data management office before the trial ended.  She said, “Even the government 
staff used to say about this study, ‘I don’t know what we’re going to do because it’s 
organized, there is material available, there is medicine, compared to before the 
project started.’”  Simon and Neema praised the impacts of the trial on health care 
delivery in the District Hospital and Neema, looking to the end of the vaccine trial, 
expressed concern about the level of care that would be available in the hospital at 
that time.  
I spent time in the pediatric ward, watching how health care providers cared 
for people.  To the left of the entrance of the ward was a small, dark office filled floor 
to ceiling with medical files, small cabinets and a refrigerator to store medicines.  
The main room of the ward was long in length with many screened windows 
spanning its length.  Dusty ceiling fans slowly rotated but the air felt stuffy and hot 
despite them.  Lit with florescent lights, the room contained 30 beds with blue 
mosquito nets hung over them.  A television sat on a metal shelf near the entrance 
of the room, overlooking beds set aside for emergency cases but it was never 
turned on during the times I was in the ward.  A few leafy plants were growing in 
pots around the room.  
A large wooden table, situated near the entrance of the ward, was where 
nurses and doctors generally worked, filling out forms, providing vaccines, taking 
blood, and carrying out other tasks.  The table had files, medical devices, paper 
forms, gauze and rubber tourniquets strewn across it.  There were several wooden 
chairs and a bench around the table and nurses, in their bright pink scrubs, sat on 
these seats with caregivers and children.  Mostly women came in with babies and 
children in their arms.  People lined up to see a health care provider as others sat 





Figure 6: The pediatric ward of the Korogwe District Hospital. 
Since there was no backup generator, the lights would turn off and the 
ceiling fans would stop their lazy rotations when the power went off from time to 
time.  I watched caregivers and children cycle through the ward, leaving after 
treatment or being given a prescription, or being shown to a bed for treatment.  
Nurses with latex gloves used a glucometer to test children and employed syringes 
and sample tubes to collect blood from children.  Caregivers and nurses comforted 
children and health care providers recorded diagnoses and prescriptions in new 
school exercise books that could later be taken to a pharmacist to request drugs.  If 
a child was ill, health care providers asked caregivers questions and filled out paper 
laboratory forms to document information about the patient.  When a child was a 
participant of the RTS,S trial, different paper forms were filled out to record names, 
biometric data and other information.  These forms were then moved, along with 
tissue samples, to the laboratories at the Korogwe Research Centre.  As Whyte 
(2011) argues, writing and recording information on paper are performances that 
transpire during medical research and during health care provision, affirming their 
similarity.  However, the resources and well-paid staff in this ward set it apart from 
the other hospital wards, helping reinforce the differences between the public and 
privately-funded health care providers. 
One morning as I was observing the ward, a man carried in his son who 
looked to be around three years old.  The boy, dressed in jeans and a striped t-shirt, 
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appeared very ill and fatigued, and clung limply to his father.  The boy was a 
participant of the RTS,S vaccine trial and a nurse asked the father information about 
his son as she filled out paperwork reserved for those enrolled in the trial.  Another 
nurse put on a pair of latex gloves, tested the boy with a glucometer and collected 
blood from a vein on the top of his hand, which was placed in a sample bottle.  
Barely conscious, the boy did not make a fuss over the procedures.  A nurse tested 
the boy for malaria with a mRDT and found him to be positive.  He was placed in a 
bed reserved for emergency cases and his father sat worriedly in a chair next to him 
as a nurse treated him.  The blood collected from the boy was tested in the 
laboratory at the Korogwe Research Centre to confirm the malaria diagnosis.  
Asking Elijah, a trial doctor, how long it would take the boy to get better, he 
answered, “We anticipate 48 hours.”  Later that morning I asked Elijah what the 
benefits were of participating in the RTS,S vaccine trial.  The doctor smiled and said, 
“Care. They are provided with quality care.”  What Elijah said echoed what Joseph 
expressed above, that health care was provided in exchange for participation in 
medical research.  This exchange led to access to a high standard of care that was 
typically unavailable in the public health care system.  Although this level of health 
care was provided from within a public health care facility, this standard set it apart 
from other hospital wards, reinforcing boundaries between public and private health 
care.         
Early one morning I met Brayson, a doctor in the pediatric ward, to discuss 
the trial and the pediatric ward.  Brayson was very knowledgeable and explained, 
“Malaria has gone way down in the past few years in and around Korogwe.  Many of 
the children who come in with malaria came from villages far away from Korogwe.  
There is little malaria around here.”  Asking what accounted for the decline, Brayson 
said, “There is greater access to bed nets and ALu, arthemether lumefantrine [a 
type of malaria medication]”.  Although transnational donors have worked with the 
Tanzanian government to ensure access to bed nets and effective malaria 
medications, the RTS,S vaccine trial played an important role in providing bed nets 
and ensuring that the pediatric ward was regularly stocked with malaria medications 
and other drugs.  For its involvement in the RTS,S clinical trial, GSK donated a 
glucometer to the pediatric ward and an X-ray machine to the entire hospital, both of 
which remained after the trial ended.  The vaccine trial also helped people access 
free drugs when they were unavailable at the District Hospital.    
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Caroline thought the care and material resources provided to people in the 
pediatric ward obscured the boundaries between public and private health care.  
She argued,  
For the people who come to Magunga [the Korogwe District 
Hospital],…  they don’t know that those drugs come from 
us….  A lot of patients don’t know where drugs come from….  
They don’t know it is the study purchasing … them.  Once 
you tell the mother to go and buy [drugs], she doesn’t 
understand….  The X-ray, they don’t even know the machine 
doesn’t belong to them, they just believe that it’s the 
government.   
It is understandable that users may have thought the care and drugs they received 
were provided by the public health care system.  With the RTS,S clinical trial 
operating within a ward of a government hospital and providing resources like an X-
ray machine directly to the hospital, there was no obvious division with the rest of 
the hospital.  It would appear that the state was providing health care to children, as 
it had done for decades, only that the service had improved for three years while the 
vaccine trial was being conducted. 
However, for health care providers and trial staff, the exchanges of material 
things made the differences between providers obvious.  For example, I watched a 
few times when a nurse or doctor would come to the pediatric ward to ask trial staff 
to borrow the glucometer.  Trial staff were generous and let people borrow it but 
government staff were unable to reciprocate.  Rather than obscuring difference, this 
unequal exchange high-lighted that one ward had more resources through its private 
funding, while the other wards of the hospital remained resource-poor.  Thus, the 
exchange of material things enabled people to see and understand the public health 
care system because an alternative system served as a comparison.  
Exchange was an ongoing activity in dispensaries as well.  With separate 
dispensary buildings constructed next to government dispensaries, it was obvious 
that different health care providers were in operation.  The differences between the 
trial and government dispensaries were a point of discussion for several trial staff.  
Early one morning, I was sitting on the porch of a trial dispensary waiting for the first 
group of trial participants to arrive to have their blood drawn.  Jackson, a trial doctor, 
came over to chat with me.  At one point in our conversation, I asked him why he 
thought people joined the vaccine trial.  He answered, “Most people join to access 
medical care, the emergency service and free drugs.”  He pointed to the building 
next door, the government dispensary.  “Have you seen the health services 
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available from the government dispensary?”  I nodded and said I had gotten a tour 
of the dispensary.  The doctor nodded and said, “The trial offers better care than 
that.”   
Although health care providers at government dispensaries spoke about 
poor infrastructure, a lack of medications and medical devices, and being underpaid, 
the trial dispensaries functioned quite differently.   As I was spending time at a trial 
dispensary, Fredy explained that a clinic officer was on call at all hours of the day or 
night to diagnose and treat ill children.  If necessary, emergency care was provided 
and a trial car was sent out to dispensaries or homes to pick up sick participants and 
take them to the Korogwe District Hospital.  Money was also provided to trial 
participants after consultations to cover the transportation costs incurred to visit the 
dispensaries.  After Fredy provided care to a trial participant, I watched him give the 
mother some money and she hailed a mini-bus on the highway next to the 
dispensary.  Fredy explained this transaction: “Often more money is given than what 
is needed to travel here and back home”.  This allowed the caregivers of participants 
to make some additional money from the visit.  
The health care, emergency pick-ups, and transport reimbursement were 
material value transferred to trial participants and their caregivers.  The health care 
and emergency pick-ups were services that benefit the RTS,S vaccine trial as well 
as trial participants, and were considered legitimate transfers of value due to their 
positive impacts on health outcomes.  These activities also mirrored the public 
health care system, since health care, and at times emergency pick-ups, were 
provided to people in need.  Money, on the other hand, is generally considered an 
illegitimate transfer of value and regulatory ethics guidelines for medical research 
assert that the provision of money should only occur to prevent cost and it is 
assumed that no personal gain is incurred.  The concern is that payment for 
participation would induce people to participate where participation should be 
voluntary (Geissler 2011).  However, transport reimbursement was a monetary 
transfer, and from what Fredy said, people were regularly given more money than 
what was needed to travel to the dispensary and back home.  This would never be 
provided in the public health care system and this transfer of material value clearly 
distinguished medical research from the public health care system.     




Figure 7: Trial dispensary next to a government dispensary. 
Through the trial dispensaries, trial participants and community members 
could receive enhanced care.  Each of the dispensaries built to support the trial 
were located near a government dispensary and when the government dispensaries 
were busy or experiencing stock-outs of drugs, government staff would direct 
caregivers with children to visit the trial dispensary to receive health care and drugs.  
One afternoon when I was spending time in a trial dispensary, a young mother came 
in with her infant who was breathing heavily.  The baby was not a trial participant but 
the clinic officer examined the baby, placing a stethoscope on its tiny chest to listen 
to its breathing.  He explained to the mother that her baby had an infection.  The 
clinic officer gave the mother a handful of medications and marked the visit and the 
prescribed medications in a log book after they left.  These drugs were provided free 
of charge from the trial’s US$7,000 a month drug budget.   
Much like this interaction in the trial dispensary, health care and drugs are 
supposed to be provided free of charge to all Tanzanian children under the age of 
five when they visit government health care facilities.  However, caregivers of sick 
children often had to see a pharmacist at a government facility or visit a private 
pharmacy to purchase drugs.  Therefore, when people were provided with free care 
and drugs at a trial dispensary, this contrasted with the government health care 
system and made obvious what was publicly versus privately funded health care 
provision.    
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The resources made available through the RTS,S trial also benefitted people 
who visited government dispensaries.  I observed many instances where trial staff 
provided free supplies, including syringes, latex gloves and other medical devices, 
to health care providers at government dispensaries nearby.  One afternoon while 
spending time in the government dispensary, I was speaking with a nurse.  She was 
explaining that she had just received boxes of Rapid Diagnostic Tests for HIV and 
malaria that week.  She wanted to show me how they worked but discovered she 
was out of latex gloves.  She went next door to the trial dispensary to request a pair 
and the clinic office was happy to oblige.  Also, at times trial staff provided 
emergency transport to patients of the public health care system.  For example, one 
morning at a trial dispensary, trial staff were collecting blood samples, biometric data 
and medical histories from trial participants.  In a government dispensary next door, 
a pregnant woman was having trouble giving birth.  A nurse helping with the birth 
went to the trial dispensary to ask for help, explaining that the woman had been in 
labour for hours and had stopped pushing, putting her and her unborn child in 
danger.  The woman needed to have emergency care so the trial drivers and a 
government doctor bundled her up in the back of a trial truck and drove her to the 
Korogwe District Hospital, 45 minutes away.  Once they had left I asked Erick, a trial 
fieldworker, how she could have gotten to the hospital without help from the trial 
staff.  Erick said, “She would have had to take a dala dala [mini-bus] while in labour.  
She is lucky we were here.”  In this and other instances, trial staff provided care, 
time, labour and resources to help support the public health care system.  Through 
these activities, the public health care system became more obvious, as emphasis 
was placed on how it differed in resources to the privately-funded health care 
services of the RTS,S trial. 
The care and resources available from the RTS,S trial also flowed into the 
surrounding villages.  A fieldworker lived in each of the villages participating in the 
trial and were called upon when a participant fell ill.  Fieldworkers were trained in 
first aid and equipped with a thermometer, mRDT and first aid kit so they could 
diagnose children and treat them for non-serious illnesses.  I interviewed Hassan 
and he explained how he and other fieldworkers provided care in villages:   
As a fieldworker, we were doing passive and active case 
detection.  This is when we attend the child at home.  Maybe 
I was passing by and the mother calls me, ‘Oh my son or 
daughter is sick’.  When I go to help, that’s what we call 
passive [case detection].  Then we were checking for 
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temperature and when a child had [a] fever, we were 
checking for malaria.  When we checked for malaria and 
found that the child had malaria,… we [called the] physician 
to help us.… ‘[T]his child is malaria positive, what should I 
do?’...  [I]f the case is complicated, we call the driver to take 
the child to the nearest [trial] dispensary to be checked by a 
[clinic officer]….  [F]or the active case detection,… we … 
visited the child once per month [in their home].  So, we went 
there and asked if the child had any adverse event in the last 
30 days. 
These two ways of providing health care, through passive and active case detection, 
meant that fieldworkers provided care when it was needed and also on a monthly 
basis in the homes of trial participants.  Hassan explained that fieldworkers got to 
know people in the villages and also provided health care to children in the 
community when they fell ill.  In this way, fieldworkers acted like community health 
workers, which have been in short supply in Tanzania in recent decades (Mubi et al. 
2016, World Vision 2015). 
 The trial enabled the provision of care in trial dispensaries to participants and 
community members alike.  Trial staff shared resources with public health care 
providers, care was provided through the District Hospital, and fieldworkers treated 
trial participants and other children in villages.  From free drugs, to the sharing of 
latex gloves with government health care workers, to the diagnosis of every sick 
child admitted to the pediatric ward of the government hospital, the resources 
needed for the practices of care played a key role in health care provision during the 
clinical trial.  Through its activities and placement in the District Hospital and 
villages, the trial was both a parallel health care provider and an embedded one.  
However, the boundaries between the two service providers were not blurred as 
Whyte (2011) and Leach and Fairhead (2011) found.  Instead, through various 
exchanges, the distinction between medical research and health care were 
reinforced, as one service was significantly better staffed and resourced and could 
give more than the public health care staff could give in return.            
Cutting Ties: The End of the RTS,S Trial  
After the RTS,S clinical trial concluded in December 2013, participants were, 
for the most part, left to make use of the public health care system.  Gone were the 
emergency pick-ups and the internationally standardized laboratories which could 
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no longer sustain the diagnosis of children admitted to the Korogwe District Hospital.  
Fieldworkers no longer lived in trial villages to provide care to communities and trial 
staff no longer visited the homes of trial participants to ask about their health.  Most 
of the trial dispensaries were closed until the Tanzanian government decided what 
to do with the spaces.  The pharmaceuticals and medical devices that were once 
provided free of charge to trial participants and children in the community also 
stopped being available.   
Trial staff anticipated the end of the trial and its impacts on health.  Caroline 
remarked about the end of the trial-provided health care service,  
They have been saying that if the study comes to an end, 
trust me, the pediatric ward will change, many deaths will be 
reported.  What can you do?  We can’t do much.… How 
many deaths are going to … happen in the pediatric ward?...  
Surely, they are crying that the deaths will be reported at a 
high rate but you can’t have this every day.  It has come to 
an end. 
When I spoke to Brayson in the pediatric ward of the Korogwe District Hospital, he 
listed the various things the trial had provided to the hospital and then said, “There is 
no way the Ministry of Health can continue that without the trial’s support.”  Both 
Caroline and Brayson described how the RTS,S trial supported service delivery.  But 
that was time-limited, with many of the positive impacts ending when the trial came 
to a close.  Despite the trial operating within the public health care system, Caroline 
and Brayson were asserting that the trial was unable to make long-lasting impacts.  
The trial staff had provided resources, labour and time to the public health care 
system but many of the issues the system faced were systemic, unimproved by 
time-limited medical research.  In this way, boundaries were maintained between 
public and private health care provision since the private service ended as the public 
service, despite its underfunding, continued past the end of the RTS,S trial.    
One afternoon I spoke with Hassan outside of a trial dispensary after the trial 
had ended.  We were sitting in plastic chairs under trees by the side of the highway, 
looking at the government dispensary and the dispensary built to support the RTS,S 
clinical trial.  As cars, trucks and buses rushed by, Hassan said, “Parents [of trial 
participants] are upset that the trial ended.  They say they can’t take their children to 
a good dispensary, there are no more emergency pick-ups.  People have been 
using the trial dispensaries for a long time, they don’t want to use the government 
dispensaries.”  Later he said, “I feel bad but they knew it was going to end.  There is 
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nothing we can do.”  Hassan expressed a mix of loss, regret and defensiveness that 
the trial ended and left trial participants without well-funded health care services.  He 
was also expressing that there was a limit to their responsibility to provide services 
for communities and trial participants.   
I spoke to a malaria researcher working at the Korogwe Research Centre 
one morning as we were driving to the Korogwe Research Centre.  He discussed 
the end of the clinical trial, which would mean the end of high quality medical care.  
He expressed a wish for the government to offer similar services.  I asked which 
services the government should continue and he said,  
There should be community health workers, kind of like the 
fieldworkers now, who could be stationed in each village, 
especially the villages that are far from dispensaries.  These 
community health workers could be people to get care and 
information from, and they could carry out rapid diagnostic 
tests, like the [trial] fieldworkers do now.   
This was a good suggestion and yet, the researcher did not know where the money 
would come for this and other much-needed improvements to the public health care 
system.  The public health care system struggled to staff the health facilities that 
were already in existence and provide drugs.  If the Tanzanian health care system 
were better funded, many of the services offered through the trial might be provided 
to all Tanzanians, regardless if they participated in medical research.  However, 
currently, health system strengthening commands less attention than biomedical 
research to develop new pharmaceutical products (Gerrets 2010, Lachenal 2015, 
Geissler 2013).    
Geissler (2014) and Crane (2013) found that when medical research drew to 
a close, health care provision and flow of material resources into impoverished 
places ceased.  Researchers only provided health care to research participants 
when they were collecting data.  Sustainable access to resources or lasting 
improvements to health care systems did not arise from the research and the 
research organizations did not change their mandates and become health care 
providers.  As Geissler (2015a: 14) states, “research wards cannot change care 
standards in surrounding hospitals or dispense care after the end of a trial”. 
Many of the benefits of the trial were spatially and temporally bounded.  The 
services and resource provided through the trial were not well-integrated into the 
public health care system and when the trial ended, the level of care and resources 
was unsustainable by a health care system that is highly dependent on donor 
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funding.  This funding is usually directed towards disease-specific, vertical 
intervention programs, such as bed net or HIV drug distribution, not health system 
strengthening (THMIS 2013; Sullivan 2011).  With the trial concluded, it became 
obvious that the health care, resources and infrastructures established over the 
course of the trial improved service delivery but were not part of comprehensive 
health system strengthening.  Thus, the RTS,S clinical trial largely supported the 
building of research capacity, not medical capacity (Street 2014). 
And yet, medical research laid the groundwork for demands for a better 
health care system.  This relates to Wendland’s (2012b) article about Malawian 
medical students who interact with foreign medical students who are visiting Malawi 
as clinical tourists.  During this interaction, ideas circulated about how medical 
systems operated elsewhere, making obvious the unevenness of medicine around 
the world.  Students constructed ideas about Malawian medicine against 
descriptions of medicine that clinical tourists provided and gained a vision of 
potential alternative futures.  This created what Wendland calls a “medical 
imaginary”—a morally charged comparison between what is and what should be.  
But, for RTS,S trial staff, they did not need to meet people from abroad to get a 
sense of what an alternative public health care system was like; they saw this for 
themselves as they provided care during the vaccine trial.  At the end of the trial, 
with many of the resources gone, several staff members expressed a desire to 
continue providing health care to people.  As well, they gained a “medical 
imaginary”, to apply Wendland’s (2012b) term.  They understood, first hand, how 
medical care could be provided and made demands for a better public health care 
system.  Therefore, for trial staff, the health care provided through the RTS,S trial 




During the trial, excellent care was provided to trial participants and 
neighbouring children in order to minimize the possibility of harm, maintain 
international standards, and extract data from trial participants.  Working out of the 
pediatric ward of the Korogwe District Hospital, dispensaries constructed for the 
clinical trial, and study villages, the RTS,S clinical trial established health care 
infrastructure and mobilized resources.  Trial-funded health care facilities were 
staffed by well-paid people who had a regular supply of resources, including 
 
177 
medicines, stethoscopes, syringes, and so on.  This health care service stood in 
contrast to the public health care system, which had decaying infrastructure, under-
payed staff and, at times, lacked drugs and medical devices.   
Over the course of the vaccine trial, many exchanges transpired between the 
public health care system and the trial health care service.  Although the public 
system provided space for the trial in the District Hospital and enabled the 
recruitment of trial participants, trial staff provided drugs, medical devices, labour, 
care and time.  These exchanges reinforced differences between the two health 
services.  This relates to theories of exchange that are derived from Melanesian 
ethnography.  In these theories, social relationships, objects and people come into 
being through the exchange of objects, services and labour (West 2006; Knauft 
1999; Strathern 1998).  I argue something similar, that the exchange of material 
objects and labour between health care providers enabled the public health care 
system to come into being.  Although people may have had an idea of how medicine 
operated in resource-rich places, the trial-funded health care service provided a 
direct experience of this kind of medicine.  The privately-funded service had copious 
funding and due to the generosity of trial staff, more was provided to the public 
health care system than could be reciprocated.  These exchanges between the two 
services made people clearly see the public health care system, with all its 
limitations and failings.  
As well, when the clinical trial ended, so too did the health care and 
resources stemming from GSK and MVI, leaving trial participants and communities 
to use the public health care system.  At the end of the RTS,S trial, it was evident 
that health system strengthening was unobtainable through this medical research 
because the medical care and the resources provided by the trial were both 
temporally and spatially circumscribed from the wider community and health care 
system (Street 2014).  For trial staff, this ending of health care provision was 
unsettling.  They had been shown how medicine could be otherwise but then that 
service disappeared.  There was a sense of loss as informants felt unable to offer 
social justice or change social inequality, and some discussed their responsibility 
and its limits in relation to constrained funding and research mandates (cf. Geissler 
2015b).  However, others appeared to develop a “medical imaginary”, seeing how 
things could be different.  Some expressed a desire and sense of duty to continue to 
provide care, while putting forth political demands for these services to be continued 
(Wendland 2012b).  Thus, through the RTS,S vaccine trial, the public health care 
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system came to be seen and understood as people gained a sense of how things 
could be otherwise.  Although the vaccine trial made several material impacts on 
Tanzania, it also had an additional effect: shaping people’s ideas and visions for the 
future.       
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Chapter 5: Blood and Paper: Tracing the Collection, 
Transformation and Movement of Evidence During the 
RTS,S Clinical Trial 
Introduction 
Speaking to Sharon, a representative of the Malaria Vaccine Initiative (MVI), 
via internet video call in June 2015, she explained the aim of the RTS,S vaccine 
clinical trial: 
I always say, ‘The data is the deal’.  You could not justify 
doing a study and potentially putting children at risk with an 
untested vaccine if you weren’t going to have interpretable 
data and complete data that was reliable and accurate.   
As Sharon explains, the central aim of the vaccine trial was to produce data 
that indicated that the RTS,S vaccine protected children from malaria.  This data 
had to be reliable and accurate in order to justify endangering children with an 
untested vaccine.  In order to produce reliable and accurate data, evidence was 
collected about the safety and ability of RTS,S to prevent malaria amongst African 
children.  This evidence needed to be portable, reproducible, comparable across the 
other Africa vaccine trial sites, and generalizable to other places in Africa.  In order 
to produce evidence, the RTS,S vaccine trial was organize into a randomized 
control trial (RCT), as described in chapter 1.  Once every child received three 
doses of the malaria or an alternative vaccine, evidence about the efficacy of RTS,S 
was collected over a two year period (RTS,S Clinical Trials Partnership 2015).  
During this time, trial employees collected blood, biometric data, medical histories, 
and information about the malaria prevention strategies employed by caregivers on 
behalf of trial participants.  Although much of this information was quantitative in 
nature, some was qualitative and/or self-reported and was not statistically analyzed 
like the quantitative data.  However, this qualitative data helped researchers 
understand the impact of prevention strategies and other behaviour on malaria rates 
and health outcomes amongst trial participants.    
Trial staff in Korogwe scrupulously followed the internationally recognized 
procedures and rules for clinical trials set out in documents such as the International 
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Conference on Harmonization-Good Clinical Practice Guidelines (ICH-GCP) 
(Petryna 2009; Simpson and Sariola 2012).  Speaking to Simon, the site 
coordinator, one afternoon in his office at the Korogwe Research Centre, he 
explained GCP and how it impacted trial activities:  
The tool that is driving this trial is guidelines, GCP 
guidelines….  It is important that the staff [are] adhering to 
these guidelines,… instructing us how to work and how to 
behave professionally….  [Y]ou must sign and you must 
document because at the end of the day you can be audited.  
If you do things that which are contrary to GCP … you can 
be questioned.…  To keep that standard is important for the 
accuracy of the data we are collecting.   
Quintiles, a United States (US)-based Contract Research Organization (CRO), 
audited documents on a regular basis to ensure staff were following GCP 
guidelines.  Faithfully following GCP guidelines guaranteed acceptance of the trial 
results by broader scientific publics, including drug regulators and journal audiences.  
Acceptance of the results of the clinical trials allows the RTS,S vaccine to enter 
international markets in the future (Simpson and Sariola 2012).   
Throughout the trial, staff collected evidence in the form of human blood and 
information that was recorded on paper and digitally entered into computers.  This 
blood and information was transformed, analyzed and moved while increasingly 
being refined and abstracted to generate quantitative data.  Blood, a main source of 
evidence in many clinical trials, is laden with evidence.  As Carsten (2013) and 
Whyte (2011) argue, blood is of the highest quality material in medical research, 
thought to reveal the truth about a body.  This truth is borne out by machines, which 
identify qualities of the blood that cannot be perceived by humans.  Although blood 
is often the main source of evidence in medical research, paper is often far more 
universal and helps people record, store and move information (Whyte 2011).  The 
information stored on paper can be digitized using computers, enabling its 
movement and analysis away from sites where the data was collected.  
The production and collection of evidence through the RTS,S clinical trial 
across Africa relates to the growing push for and use of quantitative metrics in global 
health over the last few decades.  Increasingly, global health institutions and 
pharmaceutical companies are reliant on the production of evidence in the form of 
quantitative metrics to develop new drugs or health interventions.  This has been 
accompanied by complex transformations in funding, interventions and audit.  A key 
way that metrics are produced is through statistical measures and experimental 
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research, including clinical trials (Adams 2016a and 2016b).  Generating evidence 
about the efficacy of a new drug or intervention helps build public support for global 
health activities (Rottenburg 2009).   
In search of places to produce credible evidence about interventions and 
drugs, medical experiments are increasingly globalized (Petryna 2009).  Bench 
scientists are linked to sites of critical care, places where socioeconomic 
inequalities—and inequities in health care access and disease that accompany 
them—have produced ideal conditions to conduct research (Adams 2016b; Street 
2014 and 2016; Nguyen 2015).  This research attempts to determine the 
effectiveness of a treatment through something that approaches a ‘real life’ setting 
and situation (Strathern 2011).  The places where experiments are conducted 
become “truth spots” (Gieryn 2006) for the production of credible data.  The 
outcomes of these experiments are imagined to be scalable and reproducible, like 
those carried out in pharmaceutical laboratories.  The knowledge accumulated in 
these experiments can be universally translated and circulated globally as a 
measurement of biological efficacy (Geissler 2013; Adams 2016b; Nguyen 2005; 
Street 2016). 
To support field research, often Northern research institutions and 
pharmaceutical companies set up field stations and laboratories in Southern 
countries (Crane 2013; Okwaro and Geissler 2015).  With this configuration, 
transnational medical research operates on terrains marked by vast inequalities.  
Research stations and laboratories in the South become sites of exchange and 
extraction with objects, people, money, knowledge and other forms of value 
circulating between places (Adams et al. 2005; Crane 2013; Geissler 2013 and 
2015a).  Although this movement and exchange could be conceived of as an open 
flow around the world, there are uneven and historically shaped ways that people 
and things move over space and time and contemporary medical research can 
reinforce historical and existing inequalities (Anderson 2009; Anderson and Adams 
2008; Adams et al. 2005).  Furthermore, some anthropologists (Petryna 2009; 
Crane 2013) argue that research can function as a form of exploitation as Southern 
research sites supply Northern-funded science with knowledge that can lead to the 
development of new medical interventions, drugs, or vaccines. 
While attention to the inequalities and hierarchies that shape transnational 
medical research is important, so too are the social and relational aspects of data 
collection.  Biruk (2012) argues that despite the assumption that the numbers 
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produced by research projects are simply collected from the participants of 
research, quantification is a social and cultural process.  The numbers that are 
produced through research are social artifacts, derived from complex negotiations, 
relations and exchanges with a range of people.  But through the process of 
knowledge production in medical research, complex issues and places are 
transformed into manageable and mobile forms, with much of the information about 
people and places excised or ignored.  This process leads to important aspects of 
social interaction and relationality being disregarded throughout research, and 
unrepresented in the final research findings.    
Examining the collection of evidence in the last month and a half of the 
RTS,S clinical trial, this chapter looks at the process of evidence collection.  
Conducting ethnography, I was well-positioned to observe the social aspects of 
evidence collection.  I slow down the data collection process to describe the ways in 
which RTS,S clinical trial staff collected, fragmented, analyzed and moved samples 
and information.  I draw attention to the exchanges, expressions of affect, and the 
social interactions and relationships that mediated evidence collection, as well as 
the caring labour that trial staff provided to trial participants and the data that was 
collected.  Trial staff were middle figures who were position between their Northern 
partners, who were hierarchically above them, and community members in 
Tanzania, who were hierarchically below them.  Through affect, social relationships, 
exchange and care, trial staff handled a situation that was fundamentally unequal, 
making incommensurate experiences of data collection commensurate.  Trial 
researchers in Tanzania and their Northern partners at GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) and 
MVI did not see these aspects of research, as they were focused on the collection of 
particular kinds of data that could be abstracted and quantified.  However, I argue 
that without social relationships, care, exchange and affect, the development of the 
RTS,S vaccine would not have been possible.    
In this chapter, I first provide background on the epistemology of medicine 
and the process of evidence production and collection.  Secondly, I explore the 
process of evidence collection, with a focus on specific materials—blood and 
paper—which were important sources and recorders of evidence in the clinical trial.  
I also attend to the various social aspects that mediated this evidence collection.  
Finally, I trace blood and paper as they were moved, analyzed, digitized and 
prepared for travel out of Tanzania.  
 
183 
Producing Credible Evidence  
The RTS,S malaria vaccine was tested in a large-scale, double blinded, 
RCT.  In medicine, there is a hierarchy of knowledge and large-scale RCTs are 
considered the “gold standard” for producing knowledge about the effectiveness of 
an intervention (Timmermans and Berg 2003; Kachur 2011; Ecks 2008).  
Randomization of participants in experiments was developed in 1946 by Anthony 
Bradford Hill, a professor of medical statistics and epidemiology at the London 
School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine.  Bradford Hill was exploring the effects of 
various treatments in human experiments and wanted remove confounding factors.  
In order to do this, he placed human subjects of an experiment into random groups.  
He then added blinding into the experiment, where the investigator does not know 
which human subject received the treatment or the placebo (Kelly 2011).  As 
Engelke (2008: S17) argues, the concern about the role of human (i.e. biased) 
intentions in corrupting scientific experiments led to “methodological precautions,” 
including the use of RCTs and blinding, which are thought to take human intentions 
out of the production of evidence.  This form of not knowing is a source of validity for 
experiments, producing knowledge that is regarded as trustworthy and reliable 
(Engelke 2008; Geissler 2013).   
Since the 1980s, evidence has increasingly become fundamental to health 
policy and research (Lambert 2009).  This initially began in Northern countries and 
spread globally in association with economic and political agendas and forces 
(Kachur 2011).  Although the systematic evaluation of data about the effectiveness 
of an intervention was originally promoted through clinical epidemiology, this has 
expanded across the medical discipline and been called “evidence-based medicine” 
(EBM).  The role of evidence in medicine is to determine the effectiveness of 
interventions in order to improve practice and health outcomes.  This evidence 
ideally provides strict comparison across interventions, hence the need for 
quantitative and standardized experiments.  With EBM, clinical practice uses the 
‘best’ evidence available to inform decisions for treatment.  The rise of evidence in 
medicine can be related to a decline in trust of authority and a desire for increased 
transparency and accountability (Lambert 2009).   
Anthropologists have critiqued RCTs—and EBM more generally—
undermining claims of epistemic authority.  Lambert (2006) argues that the 
emphasis on producing credible medical evidence marginalizes or excludes the 
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social dimensions of illness and disease, allowing little understanding of the role of 
social, economic, political and cultural dimensions in shaping health outcomes, 
despite their important role.  Ecks (2008) argues that a weakness of EBM is its 
inability to question disease entities and diagnostic criteria since it carries the 
assumption that everyone understands problems in the same way.  Kachur (2011) 
explores the limitations of RCTs as a form of evidence production when examining a 
clinical trial conducted in Tanzania.  He argues that RCTs are unable to replicate 
real world conditions.  Through the provision of health care and limiting of enrolment 
into studies, trial activities alter settings to a degree that they no longer resemble the 
real-world contexts where the intervention will ultimately be delivered.  This means 
that the experimental design can have little generalizability or external validity.   
Moreover, as Adams (2016a) argues, experimental studies impact how 
people and place are understood and thus intervened upon.  Producing credible 
numbers requires estimation that deliberately erases key specificities about 
mortalities and morbidities crucial for intervention.   Whyte (2011) draws attention to 
paperwork and writing that happens during medical research.  She writes, “Knowing 
about people involves taking an epistemological perspective on them” (30) and that 
the collection of knowledge about people allows for the abstraction of data and 
knowledge about African health.  Experiments therefore do not simply lead to 
observations and recordings of things that are happening out in the world.  Through 
the following of forms and questions that standardize things like disease categories, 
excluding important information for understanding disease and illness, and the 
practices of limiting enrolment and providing health care to participants, RCTs make 
worlds and selves (Ecks 2008; Whyte 2011; Kachur 2011).  However, despite 
anthropologists highlighting issues with RCTs, in global health—and medicine more 
generally—there is an ever-increasing need for credible evidence.  The movement 
for an evidence-based medicine is linked to an ever-growing academic-industrial 
complex, which ensures its continued funding through calls for more experimental 
studies (Kachur 2011).  
Other anthropologists explore issues of power and hierarchy, drawing 
attention to the ways that transnational medical research leads to dependency and 
inequality.  Crane (2013) in Uganda, Tousignant (2013) in Senegal, and Okwaro and 
Geissler (2015) in East Africa have each found in their research sites that 
information and tissue samples were collected, preliminary analysis was conducted 
in African laboratories, and information and samples were exported to Northern 
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institutions for further analysis.  As these anthropologists note, when evidence was 
collected in Southern research sites and moved North to be analyzed, hierarchies 
and inequalities were established.  This situation leads to dependencies, relegating 
Southern scientists to performers of basic tasks of conducting preliminary analysis 
on fresh samples and sending samples and data abroad.  Researchers in the North 
have the technology to conduct complex analysis in the increasingly molecularized 
field of global science and can provide the theories that make the science 
understood to wider audiences.   
Some have argued that since research operates in situations marked with 
inequality, it can be a form of exploitation.  Knowledge has become Africa’s new 
export and its production and movement can benefit Northern institutions because 
they have the means to translate that knowledge into academic papers or products 
(Petryna 2009; Janes and Corbett 2009; Whyte 2011).  This situation relates to the 
Latourian idea of “at a distance,” whereby knowledge collected by the powerful 
about those less powerful creates centres where knowledge is accumulated, leading 
to asymmetries of knowledge and consequently, power (Latour 1987).  More than 
that, medical research produces evidence that can promote new interventions and 
drugs, allowing for the production of wealth.  Once an intervention or drug is found 
to be efficacious through research, companies and organizations can monetize it, 
selling it to global health organizations, health care systems, or users.  Thus, 
experiments and the knowledge produced from them underpin business enterprises 
and profit.  This connection between RCTs, evidence and new health interventions 
expose the connection between neoliberal profit seeking and global health.  By 
drawing this connection between evidence and profit, it is clear why the knowledge 
accumulated through experiments would be considered highly valuable (Adams 
2016b; Erikson 2012).  Yet, this profit does not always equally benefit the people 
and places that provided the knowledge (Crane 2013).   
Beyond this critical perspective on evidence production and collection in 
transnational medical research, it is important to pay attention to the social process 
of evidence collection.  Biruk (2012) contends that the quantitative outputs of 
research are obtained through exchange, social negotiations and relationships with 
many people.  However, the epistemology that underpins medicine gives credence 
to particular kinds of evidence over others.  Thus, the standards that govern data 
collection transform the complexity and dynamics of a place or social engagement 
by ignoring or excising potential information.  Through the process of data collection, 
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researchers do not simply miss information; they see what they aim to see.  
Simplifying complexity and excising social engagement allows for the collection of 
information that is more manageable and mobile.  Research projects simplify 
practices and people because they create representational fixity and stability and 
work to manage uncertainty.  This process means that social relationships and 
interactions are absent from the way people see and understand scientific research.  
Therefore, researchers do not only miss seeing these aspects, they do not 
understand how vital these aspects are to the research. 
This exploration of the literature demonstrates that evidence plays a key role 
in medicine and global health.  Critical perspectives on evidence collection draw 
attention to the inequalities and hierarchies that can accompany transnational 
medical research.  But in particular, it is the literature about the social and relational 
aspects of data collection and scientific research that I build upon by exploring the 
material, social, affective and caring aspects of evidence collection.  Below I explore 
how information was collected during the RTS,S vaccine trial.        
Collecting Evidence during Home Visits  
When I arrived in Korogwe in November 2013, I saw teams of nurses and 
fieldworkers leave the Korogwe Research Centre each morning.  Wondering where 
they went, I asked George, a nurse working for the RTS,S trial, about these trips.  
He explained that fieldworkers and nurses visited each trial participant in their home 
every month to collect information.  These staff were given a one-page paper form 
to fill out during their visits.  This form had a series of questions written on it with 
boxes to check and spaces to write what trial staff found at each home.  These visits 
helped determine if trial participants were in good health and if and how caregivers 
were preventing malaria.  Since the trial was winding down, trial staff only had a 
small window of time to catch participants and their caregivers at home. 
Wanting to observe this trial activity myself, I accompanied Hassan, a trial 
fieldworker, on a hot December afternoon as he visited surrounding villages with a 
motorbike.  On the motorbike, we drove by the tall and green Usambara Mountain 
range and headed away from Korogwe along the highway.  A German construction 
company was rebuilding the highway so there was plenty of dust and gravel.  
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Hassan joked, saying, “Europeans always said Africa is dusty but it’s because we’re 
always fixing our roads!”   
After about 45 minutes on the highway, we turned off and drove quickly up a 
steep dirt road to visit two houses in a village built on the side of the tall hill.  Hassan 
waved and called out greetings to people he saw as we drove by.  We arrived at a 
mud brick house with a tin roof and a number painted in large white writing on the 
wooden entrance door to indicate that a trial participant lived there.  Hassan 
knocked on the door and a neighbor emerged from the house next door and said 
that the mother was away.  Hassan told the neighbor that he would return the next 
day.  During this exchange, many people crowded around, curious about us. 
 People called out to Hassan, saying “daktari” [doctor] to him in greeting.  Hassan 
seemed embarrassed by people calling him a doctor and said to me, “I’m not a 
qualified doctor but people don’t realize this.”  He explained that he had gotten this 
moniker during the second phase of the trial when he used to diagnose and provide 
treatment to children in this village when they became ill.     
Getting back on the motorbike, we moved onto the next house that Hassan 
needed to visit that day, which was by the side of the main highway.  This house 
was made of cinderblocks painted in bright pastel colours and had a tin roof. 
 Hassan explained that the tin roof and cinderblocks, as well as its close proximity to 
the highway, indicated that this was an affluent family, compared to the last home 
we visited.  When we knocked on the door, a teenage girl opened it and, greeting 
us, said, “Mambo”.  Hassan said “Mambo vipi” in return.  Hassan explained who he 
was, showing the girl his trial identification card.  Hassan explained that he was 
there to ask questions about the trial participant who lived there.  The teenage girl 
nodded, said she was the older sister of the trial participant and was willing to 
answer questions about her little sister.   
Hassan pulled out the one-page paper form for home visits from the satchel 
he wore over his shoulder.  The form had a series of questions on it as well as a 
name and number corresponding to the trial participant.  Hassan read off the form, 
asking the teenage girl questions about the home and the trial participant.  The first 
question Hassan asked was about whether the home had received Indoor Residual 
Spray (IRS), an insecticide spray to kill mosquitoes.  If a house has received IRS, 
mosquitoes that land on the sprayed surfaces later die, decrease the mosquito 
population and thus the number of people who become infected with malaria 
(Crawley et al. 2010).  Hassan explained to me that with fewer mosquitoes 
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transmitting malaria, this can make the RTS,S malaria vaccine appear more 
effective in preventing malaria and could thus affect the interpretation of the trial 
data.  Although IRS could affect the results of the clinical trial, trial staff did not 
discourage people from getting IRS in their homes.  GSK wanted to know about use 
of this spray so that it could be included in the interpretation of the trial data.  The 
teenage girl answered Hassan’s question, saying the house had not received IRS in 
the last month and Hassan checked a box for ‘no’ on the form next to the first 
question.   
Hassan then enquired about whether the trial participant slept under a bed 
net each night.   Like IRS, the use of a mosquito net can lower the chances of 
contracting malaria and can make the RTS,S vaccine appear more effective at 
preventing malaria.  GSK needed to know this information to analyze the vaccine 
trial data.  The teenage girl answered that her little sister did sleep under a net and 
Hassan recorded this on the form.  Hassan also wanted to know about the state of 
the bed net, asking if it was ripped with a hole bigger than three adult fingers across.  
He demonstrated to the teenage girl how big that was by holding up his hand with 
his three middle fingers pushed together.  Although the insecticide found in the 
plastic of the mosquito net stops mosquitoes from entering small holes, if a net has 
a tear big enough to allow three fingers through, mosquitoes would be able to get 
into the net.  The teen said the net did not have big holes.  Hassan asked to 
examine the net himself but the teenage girl explained that the bedroom was locked 
and the only key was with her mother.  The mother had left early in the morning to 
plant food crops far away from the home and would not return until the evening.   
Hassan asked if the trial participant was there, if she had been ill in the last 
month and if he could see her.  The teenage girl said that her little sister had been 
well and then brought Mary, the trial participant, out to the porch of the house so 
Hassan could see her and make sure she was healthy.  Mary looked to be about 
three years old and was wearing a lime green dress.  Hassan explained that he 
knew Mary from his many previous visits to the home and she seemed comfortable 
with him.  Hassan picked her up and asked me to take a picture as he smiled 
widely.  I took the picture and Mary burst into tears as she looked at me in doubt. 
 Hassan put her down, trying to comfort her.  The teenage girl put Mary inside the 
home and Hassan told the teen that he would have to return the next morning to see 
the mosquito net.   
 
189 
Hassan showed me the form he was filling in and said that once completed, 
he would deliver it to the data office in the basement of the Korogwe Research 
Centre.  Data managers in the office would type the information Hassan collected 
into computers, which would be uploaded to a server made available to data 
cleaners in India and data analysts at GSK in Belgium.  Completing this online 
process triggered an invitation to the next visit, which would involve the collection of 
information and a blood sample from Mary and her caregiver the following week. 
The monthly visits to the homes of participants produced information about 
their health and use of malaria prevention methods.  As part of the ongoing 
collection of evidence throughout the RTS,S clinical trial, the information produced 
from home visits helped account for factors that could affect the interpretation of the 
trial data.  These visits were also a way to monitor the health of participants on a 
regular basis and allowed trial staff to keep in regular contact with participants and 
their caregivers.  At the same time, the work that trial staff like Hassan were doing 
was being counted and becoming a metric.  For example, Hassan and other 
fieldworkers had to visit homes, fill out paper forms and deliver them to the Korogwe 
Research Centre on time or find themselves unemployed.   
Visits to the homes of every participant every month produced piles of paper 
which became digital information that moved away from Tanzania and became 
evidence about RTS,S.  However, this paperwork had a narrow list of questions and 
boxes to fill in.  In this way, the paper form allowed for knowledge to be recorded 
and stabilized while not allowing for other information to be recorded.  For example, 
there was no room to record how Hassan interacted with people, despite the 
importance of this in enabling the trial to be conducted.  Therefore, the process of 
collecting a small subset of information while eliding the rest shapes how the world, 
people, and the research itself are known and understood (Whyte 2011; Biruk 
2012).     
Paper Forms and Invitation Cards 
Once home visits were completed, the next step in evidence collection could 
occur.  After visiting Mary’s home, Hassan needed to deliver invitation cards to the 
homes of participants.  We stopped at a hotel beneath a steep mountain that 
provided a rest stop for bus passengers traveling between Arusha and Dar es 
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Salaam.  There, Hassan showed me the invitation cards.  They were printed on 
thick, yellow card paper and were meant for participants who had already received a 
home visit in the last couple of weeks and were ready to have blood and information 
collected as part of the final step of the RTS,S trial before it ended.  Hassan filled 
out these invitation cards with the names and date of birth of the participant, names 
of the caregivers, name of the village, and the date and time of the dispensary visit 
using a list that the data managers at the Korogwe Research Centre provided.  As 
Hassan carefully filled in the invitation cards, he explained that people got their last 
names from the first name of their father, pointing out that pattern on the invitation 
cards.  Hassan then said that caregivers had to bring these invitation cards with 
them to the upcoming dispensary visit to aid trial staff in finding paperwork for 
participants.  These cards were printed on thick, brightly coloured paper so they 
could both stand up to wear and tear and enable caregivers to spot them easily.  
Thus, the material composition of the invitation cards was chosen to convey its 
importance to those who received them in hopes that they might remember to bring 
the card along with them to the dispensary.  
Hassan and I set out on the highway again until we reached a village that 
was built on the side of a steep hill.  Hassan was able to gun the motorbike enough 
to get us up most of the way but the hill became too steep for the motorbike so we 
parked by a path and walked the rest of the way up to a house.  There, we found a 
woman and her child by their mud brick house.  Hassan waved and said, “Mambo!” 
in greeting.  He whispered to me that the parents were hearing impaired.  We were 
approaching the mother and child when the father joined them from a nearby field 
that he had been tending.  Hassan needed to see the child’s identification card, 
which had been issued to them by trial staff at the beginning of the study, to provide 
the invitation card to the parents.  In order to communicate this, Hassan brought out 
his identification card and then pointing at the child.  There was some confusion for 
a few seconds and then the mother started nodding and ducked into the house and 
came out with the card.  Hassan checked that the numbers on his form and on the 
identification matched.  He showed me this and I was able to see that the child was 
named Abasi and that the picture on the card was of the mother holding the child 
when he was an infant.  Now Abasi could walk and shyly stood behind his mother 
looking up at us.  Hassan returned the identification card and gave the mother the 
invitation card, pointing to the date and time he had written on it.  The mother 
nodded and Hassan and I waved goodbye to the family and left the village.  We 
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continued on motorbike until we had delivered five invitation cards to homes in two 
different villages.  After this, we returned to the Korogwe Research Centre in late 
afternoon.   
In order to understand the data collection process better, I spoke with 
Neema, a data manager.  It was an afternoon in December and I visited Neema in 
the basement of the Korogwe Research Centre.  Data managers were hard at work, 
typing information into laptops.  The air was stuffy and the office loud but not 
wanting to disturb the staff, Neema spoke softly.  She showed me the different forms 
for collecting information about participants during different kinds of visits and the 
thick, yellow card paper used to print invitation cards, which were kept behind her 
desk on shelves.  She also showed me the computer programs used to track 
participants.  Neema explained that different groups of participants were on slightly 
staggered schedules for home visits and dispensary visits based on when they were 
first vaccinated.  She said that once a participant was vaccinated three times, that 
information was typed into the computer program and the program indicated when 
home visits and dispensary visits should occur.  The computer programs made it 
easy to keep track of trial participants and plan for each step of the trial.   
For example, in Abasi’s case, Hassan had visited the participant’s home to 
collect information on his health and use of malaria prevention methods.  Hassan 
dropped off that filled out form to the data management offices and data managers 
typed that information into computers.  This triggered the computer program to 
produce a date for a dispensary visit and a date for invitations to be delivered to 
Abasi’s parents one to two days beforehand.  We then delivered the invitation card 
to Abasi’s parents and Hassan reported that to a data manager who typed that 
information into the computer program.  The program then instructed data managers 
to prepare paperwork for the upcoming dispensary visit, including a five-page form 
to collect biometric data and health history, and a one-page laboratory form.  Each 
step involved paperwork and digitization and allowed for the collection of evidence 
about Abasi.  However, there was no room in this process to represent the 
importance of social interaction in the collection of this data, leaving this aspect 
undocumented and unseen by researchers at GSK.  Next, I explore the collection of 
biometric and health information from trial participants.       
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Collecting Biometric and Health Information 
With home visits completed and invitation cards received, it was time for trial 
participants to visit a trial dispensary near their home.  Anywhere between 10 and 
40 of the 1,500 trial participants were invited at a time, each accompanied by a 
caregiver, until eventually almost every participant attended a dispensary.  The 
purpose of this dispensary visit was to update records with new height, weight and 
upper arm circumference data, medical histories, and blood samples.  A team of 
doctors, nurses and fieldworkers carried out the data collection.  After these 
activities were completed, a small sample of blood and some numbers and letters 
written on paper forms were produced.   
At the Korogwe Research Centre before heading out to a dispensary, trial 
staff placed paper forms, blood drawing devices, plastic furniture and other things 
needed for data collection into a large white van and two pick-up trucks.  Tagging 
along with the team one morning, I squeezed into the back of a truck with two 
nurses and a beat-up Styrofoam box holding over-stuffed binders filled with 
information about participants.  The Styrofoam box had been filled to the top with 
two layers of binders and I could see that each binder had a number on its spine 
corresponding to a participant identification number.  As we drove up into the 
Usambara Mountains, the air cooled as the grey skies overhead threatened rain.     
Arriving at the trial dispensary, I saw that it was situated close to a 
government dispensary and shaded by a number of trees.  The trial dispensary was 
painted white with an open-air porch surrounded by a low concrete wall where 
people could sit.  There were three rooms in the dispensary and wooden benches 
were arranged on the porch in rows facing the rooms.  A few trial staff had arrived 
earlier and had set up plastic chairs and tables, as well as a scale and several 
thermometers.  Several binders filled with participants’ files had been laid out on the 
plastic table.  After dropping off staff at the dispensary, trial drivers left to pick up trial 





Figure 8: Trial dispensary. 
Once caregivers and participants arrived at the dispensary, they sat on the 
wooden benches and waited for their child’s name to be called by a nurse.  At the 
table set up on the porch, a nurse and fieldworker filled out the first page of the five-
page form with information found in participant files, including the name of the 
participant and their caregiver, name of their village and sub-village, name of the 
village leader, house number, and date of birth.  Once this was completed for each 
participant, the nurse and fieldworker began calling out the name of participants.  
This was a signal for caregivers to bring their child to be seen by the nurse and 
fieldworker who took each child’s temperature by placing a thermometer under their 
arm.  Once taken, the temperature was recorded on the form.  If a fever was 
discovered, that was noted in the file, which signalled to trial staff that the child 
would need to be tested for malaria using a Rapid Diagnostic Test for malaria 
(mRDT) after their blood was drawn.  Each child was weighed on a scale, and their 
height and their arm circumference were measured, with this information recorded 





Figure 9: Trial participant files in Styrofoam box. 
Most children were calm during this process but some cried.  A few children 
looked scared but the nurse was able to reassure them or make them laugh as she 
weighed and measure them.  One little boy became very upset when the nurse tried 
to take his temperature.  His mother looked embarrassed and apologized to the 
nurse while trying to get the child to accept having his temperature taken.  The 
nurse gave the boy a lollipop in an attempt to appease him, but in the end the 
mother and nurse had to hold the boy down so they could get a reading from the 
thermometer.  A few children cried when the nurse approached them and refused to 
step on the scale to be weighed.  Caregivers helped calm and reassure these 
children by holding their hands or speaking softly to them.  All of these interactions 
slowed down the process of collecting biometric data and trial staff attempted to 
conceal their frustration and calmly deal with participants and caregivers, even as 
they felt the pressure to complete the process quickly so participants could move 
onto the next stage.  
After biometric data was collected and recorded, children and caregivers 
return to the benches to wait for their turn to be called by a trial doctor.  The nurse 
and fieldworker matched the partially filled-out forms with participant binders and 
added them to the back of the binders.  A fieldworker then moved each of the 
binders into the consultation room of the dispensary.  The two trial doctors in the 
consultation room received the binders and called out the names of participants, one 
after another, to enter the consultation room.  Caregivers responded by bringing 
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their child to see the doctor and would usually sit in a seat next to the doctor, placing 
their child in their lap.   
Watching one interaction, I saw Joseph, a trial doctor and administrator, 
greet the participant and her mother with a big smile.  Joseph said, “Habari ya 
asubuhi [Good morning]”.  The mother responded with “Shikamoo,” an expression 
used by an inferior to greet a superior.  The doctor responded with “Marahaba”, the 
usual response after someone says shikamoo.  The doctor then looked at the child, 
a little girl, and greeted her with “Mambo, habari yako [Hello, how are you?]”  The 
child was shy but with encouragement from her mother she responded with “Nzuri 
[good]”.   The doctor had the girl’s binder open to the second page of the five-page 
form and asked the mother about any health issues the child might have had 
recently.  She responded and the doctor wrote the information he was given on the 
form.  Joseph then examined the child and wrote his findings on the form.  Finding 
the girl had an infection, he wrote information about the medications he prescribed 
to her on the third page of the form.  Speaking with the mother, Joseph also 
collected information on the administration of non-licensed drugs, including 
traditional remedies.   
A little later, Joseph called out the name of a participant, a little boy, and 
found the child was accompanied by his older sister, who looked to be about ten 
years old.  Joseph asked the sister about the health of her little brother but she was 
unable to answer him, not knowing if the boy had been ill within the last month.  
Joseph appeared annoyed as he began examining the boy but remained calm.  In 
the end, he filled out the form as best he could but sections remained empty.  
Speaking to Erick, a fieldworker, after this interaction, he explained that sometimes 
siblings and other family members bring participants to the dispensary because 
parents are busy or away farming that day.   
A few children put up a fuss during the consultation, making it difficult for 
doctors to examine them.  Caregivers and doctors tried to sooth and console 
children during the process or cheer them up with a joke or a hug and these actions 
helped smooth the process.   
This collection of data involved trial staff engaging in particular kinds of 
labour, including the expression of affect, provision of care, and socially interacting 
and negotiating with children and caregivers in creative ways.  As described in 
chapter 2, trial staff were trained to interact with trial participants and community 
members in calm and caring ways, which is what I observed of trial staff, even in 
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situations that might have been frustrating or annoying.  These interactions were not 
represented in the final results of the trial or seen by people at GSK or MVI but were 
integral to helping the RTS,S vaccine come into being.  
After doctors completed their consultations, they placed the nearly 
completed five-page form back into the participant’s binder.  Next, a fieldworker 
moved the binders into the small room next to the consultation room.  This room 
was where blood was drawn.  Many children grew increasingly upset as they heard 
the wails of other children having their blood drawn in this room.  Caregivers 
comforted children but eventually each participant was called to provide blood.      
Drawing Blood 
A child whimpered and then cried out as a nurse inserted a needle into the 
top of his hand.  The child pulled back his hand and his mother, who was holding 
him in her lap, grabbed his hand to hold it in place and allow a trial nurse to finish 
collecting the child’s blood.  The child stared at his hand and wailed and then started 
to repeat, “Pipi, pipi”, over and over, begging for a lollipop in Swahili.  His mother 
whispered in his ear, trying to comfort him.  The nurse, with a look of concentration 
on his face, removed the tourniquet from the top of the child’s hand.  Dark red liquid 
filled the thin, long plastic tube connected to the needle and the blood flowed into a 
small plastic sample bottle.  Once the sample bottle contained enough blood for the 
laboratory technicians to conduct analysis, the nurse withdrew the needle from the 
child’s hand.  The nurse stoppered the bottle and a fieldworker placed a piece of 
cotton swab on the child’s injection wound and applied pressure to stop the blood 
from flowing.  The child quieted down and was happy when the nurse gave him a 
lollipop.  A fieldworker showed the mother how to gently apply pressure to the child’s 
wound.  With tears still on his face, the mother led the boy out of the small, cramped 





Figure 10: A nurse drawing blood from trial participant. 
The four men in the small dispensary room, a nurse and three fieldworkers, 
had anxious looks on their faces as they dealt with the 38 children who needed their 
blood drawn and laboratory paperwork filled out.  They felt constrained for time as 
they worried that trial participants and caregivers may grow frustrated with waiting 
and agitate to leave.  As well, they were all aware of the necessity to collect blood 
quickly and deliver it to the laboratory before it degraded.  Once a child had their 
blood taken, the fieldworker who was filling out laboratory forms, called out for the 
next child to enter the small room.  A little girl in a shiny orange dress entered with 
her mother.  The mother sat on a chair facing the nurse and placed the girl in her 
lap.  With the needle coming close to her hand, the little girl demanded a lollipop.  
Usually children were given a lollipop only after their blood was drawn so the nurse 
was hesitant to comply.  However, he wanted the girl to cooperate.  About to hand 
the little girl a lollipop, she suddenly demanded two lollipops, sensing she might 
continue to get her way.  The nurse gave the girl what she wanted and everyone in 
the room laughed.  A fieldworker remarked, “What a future business woman!” and 
smiled at her with admiration.  This little girl was aware that this situation was a 
transaction and she sought the best exchange she could get. 
Though children were not often as demanding as that little girl, many 
expected a lollipop after their blood was drawn.  “Nataka pipi! [I want a lollipop!]” 
many would yell or demand, seeing the sweets on the counter in front of them.  Staff 
found giving into the children’s demands made the whole operation run smoother.  
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However, not every child cried, some were quiet and others were fascinated to 
watch the blood leave their hand and flow into a clear plastic tube.  But most ended 
up in tears when they realized what was about to happen.  This was not their first 
time experiencing a blood draw but given their age, many did not remember the last 
time they had blood drawn for the trial.  Hassan sat at a plastic desk in the room to 
fill out paperwork and said, “They are lucky this time to have only one vial of blood to 
give.  During other times, they had to give two vials of blood or get a vaccination.” 
During this process, trial staff provided care to participants.  There was 
always an additional fieldworker in the room to help distract an upset child about the 
prospects of having their blood drawn by joking or commiserating with them.  If a 
child resisted having their blood drawn, this extra fieldworker would hold the child’s 
hand steady so the nurse could insert the needle.  This fieldworker also held 
younger siblings of trial participants when they accompanied them into the room.  
This freed caregivers to hold trial participants in their lap as their blood was drawn.  
Parents appeared to appreciate this caring labour, often thanking the fieldworker as 
they left the room.   
 
  
Figure 11: Lollipops and instruments for drawing blood.  
After each blood draw, the nurse moved the sample bottle to the table where 
Hassan sat.  Hassan had pages of barcode stickers that corresponded to each 
participant and he matched each bottle of blood with a barcode.  He then filled out 
the part of the five-page form that ordered laboratory test.  This part of the form 
included spaces to indicate how many bottles of blood were taken and what 
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laboratory tests needed to be carried out.  Since sample bottles contained an anti-
coagulant that lasted four hours, there was a space on the form to indicate when the 
blood was drawn, which was crucial information for laboratory technicians to know 
how much time they had to analyze and process the blood.  Hassan also filled out 
laboratory forms with the name and identification number of participants and where 
the blood samples were taken.  Matching barcodes were stuck on the laboratory 
form and the blood sample so laboratory technicians could later connect the blood 
samples with the participant’s paperwork.  Hassan moved quickly, calling on a trial 
nurse to give him more binders filled with participant files.  At the same time, Erick, a 
fieldworker, was testing the blood of participants who had a high fever using a 
mRDT.  If the child was found positive for malaria, a trial doctor prescribed 
medication to treat the infection and the positive test results were packaged with the 
blood samples to be taken to the laboratory at the Korogwe Research Centre.   
Only a small subset of information about the participant was of interest to the 
trial and the aim was to collect vast amounts of data about this narrow subset.  What 
was left of the encounter was a small vial of blood and some numbers and letters 
written on paper detailing biometric and health information.  Although this process 
involved many people, social interactions and exchanges, these details were 
unimportant to trial funders and not recorded (Whyte 2011; Biruk 2012).  Within 
hours, the collected blood and information was fragmented, refined and transported, 
moving further from the source.   
The Movement and Fragmentation of Blood  
Once every participant had their blood drawn, Erick transported the blood 
samples, positive mRDTs and laboratory forms to the haematology laboratory at the 
Korogwe Research Centre via motorbike, taking special care of these things.  He 
delivered them to laboratory technicians who had to sign a form that they received 
them.  Blood was an important substance for the production of evidence.  It was a 
substance exchanged at great cost, or so it seemed as I watched children cry and 
whimper in fear and pain during the blood drawing procedure.  Laboratory 
technicians, aware that the anti-coagulant chemical in the small sample bottles was 
only active for a few hours, carried out blood analysis and preparation in the early 
afternoon, only a few hours after the blood was drawn.   
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As described in chapter 3, there were two laboratories at the Korogwe 
Research Centre.  Located at the front of the Research Centre, the haematology 
laboratory was where blood samples were tested.  Wearing white laboratory coats 
and latex gloves, laboratory technicians conducted different parts of the blood 
processing, analysis, and documentation.  Wilson, a laboratory technician, 
supervised three other laboratory technicians.  Much of the paperwork was 
completed in the entrance room where there were two long tables and several 
chairs positioned against the two walls.  To the left of the first room was where blood 
slides were stained with dye and examined through a microscope for malaria 
parasites.  The room contained a purple stained ceramic sink for washing and drying 
the slides.  There were two long tables along the two walls, two microscopes, files, a 
log book, two small, metal tally counters for counting the number of parasites found 
in the slide.  Floor to ceiling shelves spanned half of one wall and was filled with 
plastic cases for storing blood slides.  The room to the right of the entry room was 
large with several grey tables.  The tables held a centrifuge and two blood analysis 
machines and space to prepare blood slides.  Several barred windows allowed 
natural light into the space.  Instructions for handling blood samples and other forms 
were tacked to walls and bulletin boards and there were two tall metal filing cabinets 
full of folders, binders and forms.   
Given a white plastic laboratory coat and a pair of latex gloves, I observed 
the blood analysis process.  Nathaniel, a laboratory technician, carried out the first 
stage of the analysis using a machine to test the blood samples.  The samples Erick 
had brought in were in a plastic bag.  I noticed that some samples looked dark red in 
colour, others quite light.  I pointed this out to Nathaniel and he explained that the 
difference in colour related to the level of haemoglobin: the darker the colour, the 
more haemoglobin present and healthier the participant, indicating not only that they 
were not suffering from anaemia but that they may have better nutrition.  Although 
Nathaniel could observe this blood characteristic visually, he waited for the blood 
analysis machine to determine a quantitative measure of this characteristic so it 
could be included in the documentation sent to GSK in Belgium.        
Taking one of the small blood sample bottles out of the plastic bag, Nathaniel 
shook it ten times between his thumb and index finger to mix the anti-coagulant in 
the sample bottle with the blood.  He then removed the purple stopper of the bottle.  
The blood analysis machine sat on a table in the laboratory and Nathaniel keyed the 
identification number of the participant into the machine so the resulting paper 
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printout would be properly labelled.  Placing the open sample bottle beneath a long 
needle, the machine sucked up a small amount of blood from the bottle with an 
audible sucking sound.  Waiting a few minutes, the machine printed out results on a 
small, thin piece of paper.  It detailed 19 numerical blood characteristics, including 
white blood count and haemoglobin level.  Once all the blood samples had been 
analysed by the machine, Nathaniel matched and glued the resulting printouts to the 
corresponding laboratory forms that Hassan had filled out at the trial dispensary in 
the morning.  As the print-out from the blood analysis machine was photosensitive 
and would later fade, the forms were photocopied twice, with one copy kept on file in 
the laboratory and another copy taken to the data management office in the 
basement of the Research Centre to be entered into computers.    
Once the blood was analysed by the machine, Paul, another laboratory 
technician, affixed drops of blood to small pieces of filter paper.  Shaped like 
miniature greeting cards, filter paper was thick and absorbent.  Blood was placed on 
the inner part of the filter paper, which was closed with a sticker on the outer edge to 
prevent tampering.  The filter paper would later be analyzed in a laboratory outside 
of Tanzania to determine the malaria parasite genotype that infected the participant.   
Afterward, Nathaniel made blood slides from the remaining blood in the 
sample bottles.  Using a thin needle to suck up some blood, he placed a drop of the 
liquid on a small, thin and rectangular shaped piece of glass called a slide.  He 
quickly swiped the blood across the slide using the long side of the needle, making 
the blood transparent and easy to look through with a microscope.  Two slides were 
made per trial participant and then left to dry overnight, to be stained with purple dye 
the next morning.  After this, the slides were ready to be analysed.  Nathaniel used 
one copy of the slide to count the concentration of malaria parasites in the blood 
using a microscope, documenting on paper forms the number of parasites he found.  
Once the slides, filter paper and paperwork were completed, each item was labelled 
with a participants’ identification number and barcode to identify who the samples 
and paperwork belonged to.  One copy of the slide remained in Korogwe.  Another 
copy of the slide—along with the filter paper—were sent to a laboratory in 
Johannesburg, South Africa run by Quintiles, the US-based Contract Research 
Organization (CRO), that oversaw the RTS,S vaccine trials.  There, the results 
found in Korogwe would be verified and samples would be analyzed at the 
molecular level to find malaria parasites.   
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Wilson checked the paperwork for errors and signed off on the work.  The 
paperwork was in duplicate; a copy remained in the laboratory for future auditing, 
and another copy was sent to nurses, doctors and administrators to review before it 
was sent to the data management office in the basement of the Research Centre to 
be digitized.  Thus, as the blood was being subdivided, the data representing the 
trial participants was also being subdivided with only bits of information transported 
out of Korogwe.   
As Nathaniel and Paul worked, I asked them if they had visited a trial 
dispensary or any of the study villages and they smiled and said no.  Nathaniel said, 
“The blood we test is not connected to the people who give it.”  I said to the 
laboratory technicians, “At the dispensaries, some children cry and fight, not wanting 
to get their blood drawn.  But others are fascinated with seeing their blood flow out 
of their hand.”  Paul and Nathaniel laughed at this description, surprised.  Nathaniel 
said, “I never think about the people who provide the blood.  I only know 
[participants] as … numbers, which helps with confidentiality and objectivity.  I like it 
that way because I can get on with the work, concentrate on doing the tests.”  Thus, 
the person who provided the blood did not need be known personally, the ‘truth’ 
about him or her was in their blood, born out of the refinement and analysis carried 
out in laboratories (Carsten 2013). 
Tanzanian children provided blood samples and the resulting blood became 
increasingly fragmented and processed.  This resulted in the production of paper 
forms, quantitative data and blood that could be stored and analyzed later in 
laboratories outside of Tanzania.  Blood was a kind of evidence that held ‘proof’ 
about the efficacy of RTS,S since it contained information about participants’ health 
and immunity to malaria.  This richness of information made blood important for the 
production of evidence.  However, this blood needed to be modified, transformed, 
moved abroad, and analyzed at the molecular level.  The haematology laboratory at 
the Korogwe Research Centre was not equipped to do molecular analysis.  The 
need for sophisticated molecular analysis of blood samples required clinical trial 
funders to invest in expensive machines.  GSK and MVI decided that rather than 
supplying African research centres with these machines, African researchers would 
prepare and send blood samples abroad to laboratories that were better equipped.   
The entire process of blood analysis and completion of paperwork involved 
hours of work.  Although the focus of the RTS,S trial was on the production of 
quantitative findings, the laboratory technicians demonstrated care for the materials 
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they worked with, carefully moving, fragmenting and transforming the blood as they 
documented their procedures and findings.  Laboratory work is usually conceived of 
as the dispassionate manipulation of objects.  However, care and affective labour 
played important roles in the laboratory work for the trial, enabling evidence 
production (de la Bellacasa 2011).      
Following the Files: Paperwork, Movement and Digitization 
As laboratory technicians analyzed and fragmented blood in the 
haematology laboratory, other trial staff completed paperwork.  At the trial 
dispensary, staff had filled in most of the five-page form.  Once the first four pages 
of the form were completed, Angela, a trial nurse, matched each form to a 
participants’ binder and placed the form inside.  Then Angela looked through 
participant files for mistakes.  Showing me what she was looking for, she came 
across typos and boxes unfilled.  One of the trial doctors, Brayson, had written the 
wrong date on a number of pages of a form.  Exasperated, Angela yelled out in a 
friendly way to Brayson, who was in the room next door, that he needed to fix his 
mistakes.  When Brayson arrived, she pointing them out, saying “QC” repeatedly.  
Brayson smiled and fixed his mistakes.  Angela laughed and Brayson explained to 
me that “QC means quality control.”  Angela continued to check that the forms were 
completed properly and once satisfied, the binders were placed into Styrofoam 
boxes and loaded into a trial van to return to the Korogwe Research Centre.   
At the Research Centre, the Principal Investigator (PI) filled out the fifth page 
of the form to document any adverse events that participants had experienced, if 
participants were withdrawing from the study, and if so, the reasons why.  The PI 
then signed and dated each form and placed them back into their corresponding 
binders.  Afterwards, trial nurses, doctors and the principal investigator checked the 
files for mistakes.  Once all the forms were completed, Hassan, Erick and other 
young and able-bodied staff members moved the overstuffed binders to the data 
management office in the basement of the Research Centre.   
Once the paperwork was moved to the data management offices, a team of 
six data entry employees typed the information into computers, digitizing it.  There 
was constant movement in this office as staff shared forms, flipped pages and 
picked up heavy binders filled with paperwork.  Electronics hummed, an air 
conditioner pumped cold air into the room, and people typed on keyboards.   
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When I was observing this office, I asked Victoria, one of the data 
management staff, what she was typing.  Victoria explained that she was dealing 
with “anthropometric data”.  The computer page she was filling in had boxes and 
spaces for a name, weight, height, and body temperature.  Victoria looked at a 
patient file beside her to find the information to type into the computer.  Two other 
women were typing data into laptops using forms that came from the laboratory that 
detailed the blood analysis results.  Other staff members were entering data that 
had been collected earlier in the clinical trial or typing in information about past 
vaccine use in children, so that people at GSK knew what vaccines were provided to 
participants along with RTS,S. 
I spoke to Neema, a data manager, about activities in the data management 
office.  She explained that some staff entered data and others took care of the files 
to ensure they were stored properly in the archive.  Another staff member cared for 
the archive by organizing files and monitoring the temperature and humidity in the 
room.  Ibrahim, the head data manager, and Neema managed the staff and 
organized the data management spaces.  When there was a lot of paperwork after a 
dispensary visit, all the staff pitched in to help digitize the data.  But on days when 
there were few children, a few staff members worked on digitizing data collected 
from previous years of the trial.   
Neema said that data managers tried to avoid making errors as they entered 
data into computers but errors were difficult to avoid completely.  In order to catch 
errors, the data typed into computers was “cleaned”, meaning mistakes and 
inconsistencies were found and corrected.  Each piece of information was typed into 
computers twice by two different staff members, which allowed inconsistencies to be 
found between the entries.  Ibrahim showed me the program that helped clean the 
data.  This program searched for duplicate entries and inconsistencies in those 
entries.  If inconsistencies were found, staff went back to the source document to 
find the correct data.   
Once cleaned, the data was uploaded to a central server.  The central server 
made data instantly available to data managers at GSK in Belgium via a satellite 
connection.  Through this connection, GSK monitored ongoing data entry activities 
in Korogwe.  The central server also had a physical backup on a hard drive locked 
away in the Korogwe Research Centre.  The data was sent to a data cleaning 
company in India for additional cleaning.  From India, the more polished data was 
sent to GSK for review and further analysis.  
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Data management staff in Korogwe spent a large part of their time answering 
queries made by data managers and researchers at GSK and in India.  Neema said, 
“There are [queries] that are automatic, others … review the data and they send the 
queries.  So, we reply to them and correct what they want us to correct.”  Trial staff 
received upwards of 100 queries a day to answer.  When queries were sent, staff 
had to look up information in files or seek blood slides to help resolve discrepancies 
between what was on record in Belgium and what was on record in Korogwe.  
Neema found a list of queries on a piece of paper on Ibrahim’s desk to show me an 
example of a query.  The paper had a list of questions written on it and she pointed 
to one question that asked about the time a blood sample was taken.  Data 
managers in Belgium found a discrepancy between the time on record there and 
what was on record in Korogwe.  To answer this query, staff looked up the patient 
file to find the original paper form and confirm the time written there.  Then they 
updated the digital file with the correct time.  Neema shrugged and explaining that 
the query was commonplace, saying, “It is easy to make little mistakes or typos.”  
After staff digitized the information that had been recorded on paper, the 
paper files were moved to the data archive room, a space filled floor to ceiling with 
shelves for all the binders of patient files.  Visiting the archive with Neema, I could 
see that the paper files were protected with doors that had heavy locks.  I had to 
sign a visitor’s log book when I entered the archive and Neema explained that entry 
into the archive had to be monitored by a member of senior staff to make sure no 
information was tampered with or removed.  The space was cool and an air 
conditioning unit worked at all times to keep the files protected from the heat and 
humidity outside.  The archivist who oversaw the archive had already pulled out 
binders for the participants attending the dispensary visit the next morning and 
placed them in a couple of Styrofoam boxes.  Beside the shelves of patient data, 
there was a small desk and two laptop computers set up with a direct connection to 
Belgium so if staff at GSK posed a query about a patient file, staff in Korogwe could 
answer the query in the archive, without having to remove files from the room.  At 
the end of the basement hallway was another room that held participant binders for 
the second phase of the RTS,S trial.  These files had been digitized years before but 
the paper files were preserved.   
Every month, staff from Quintiles visited the Korogwe Research Centre for 
further verification of the data.  When staff from Quintiles arrived in Korogwe in 
December, there was a palpable tension at the Research Centre.  Quintiles staff 
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spent four days at the Research Centre, with most of their time spent in the archive 
in the basement.  They compared paper records to the computers records, trying to 
find mistakes or inconsistencies.  If these were found, staff at the Research Centre 
corrected them.  Observing some of this work through the door of the archive, I 
could see Quintiles staff looking through laptops and files, tersely asking data 
managers questions.  Once the staff from Quintiles left, the principal investigator told 
me that the staff at the Korogwe Research Centre had done a good job and that not 
many mistakes had been found.  With the audit finished, staff returned to normal trial 
activities.   
Paperwork was an important aspect of evidence production and its creation 
was an ongoing process throughout the trial.  Trial activities were documented in 
detail, according to what GSK and drug regulators wanted to know about the RTS,S 
vaccine.  Trial staff collected data at several points during the trial, including during 
the signing of consent forms, vaccinations, monthly house visits, and dispensary or 
hospital visits.  Staff completed forms, checked boxes, fixed mistakes and stored 
information on paper.  Following GCP guidelines, each of those forms was signed 
by a member of staff so the work could be traced and audited if ever there was a 
mistake.  And at each step, trial staff put caring labour into the paperwork.  From 
forms being filled out, to paper being moved, digitized and stored, staff were 
meticulous and careful.  They moved it, handled it, cleaned it and kept it cool.  
These caring practices were necessary for the conduct of the trial and for RTS,S to 
be developed.     
Although the information that was recorded on paper was eventually 
digitized, the paper files remained important.  Paper served as stable source of 
information, a way to trace trial activities after they occurred and keep staff 
accountable to their work.  In these ways, paper was ubiquitous and essential 
material in the vaccine trial.  Also, writing research findings on paper objectified the 
knowledge that was collected and allowed it to be published and circulated amongst 
scientists who weighed the findings against existing knowledge found in other 
published papers.  Furthermore, the value and significance of the scientific 
knowledge collected throughout the trial may continue into the future, even after its 
creators have died (Whyte 2011).  However, due to the international nature of the 
vaccine trial, paper had its limitations.  Since the trial was being conducted at eleven 
sites and in seven African countries, digitization of the information recorded on 
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paper was necessary so the data could be collected and analyzed in one place.  I 
now explore why blood and information was moved abroad.      
Moving Evidence  
RTS,S trial staff spent a lot of time preparing blood samples and information 
to be sent abroad.  The blood moved from the trial participants, to the Korogwe 
Research Centre, and some moved onto South Africa and Belgium.  The further 
away it got from the source, the more the blood was analyzed and refined.  The 
information collected and recorded on paper was later digitized moved from 
Tanzanian to India and then onto Belgium.  Through movement and transformation, 
the evidence collected in Tanzania built credibility and authority as medical 
evidence.  The evidence was valuable and allowed RTS,S to be evaluated by drug 
regulators, a necessary step towards entering the market.    
Why did further analysis need to be conducted outside of Africa?  Grace, a 
laboratory technician, discussed the limitations of the laboratories at the Korogwe 
Research Centre in her office one afternoon after the trial had ended: 
[E]ven in this lab, we don’t have the molecular [facilities] and 
now, most of the research goes to the molecular level but we 
don’t have the molecular.  We still have to ship things 
abroad.  But if we had the molecular facilities here, we would 
be doing everything here.  Even the immunological parts, we 
have to send them to GSK, they are [doing] the immunology 
research there and we don’t have it here.  Even some of 
these machines, they require a lot of money to maintain and 
reagents [come] from abroad, that can be an issue.  Most of 
the machines are coming from abroad, so we were having 
issues with [border] clearance.   
Here, Grace explains what is missing in the laboratories at the Research Centre and 
the difficulties with obtaining machines that can do molecular and immunological 
analysis.  During our discussion, she cited barriers at border control for obtaining 
machinery and the steep costs of maintaining scientific equipment when reagents 
need to be bought and machines need to be maintained by technicians from abroad.     
There were also limitations for analyzing the data produced by the trial.  
Speaking to Ibrahim one afternoon in his small office in the basement of the 
Korogwe Research Centre, he touched upon the collection, digitization and cleaning 
of data and its movement to India.  He speculated that trial funders had outsourced 
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the cleaning of the data to India because of the cheap labour cost there.  But it was 
more than labour costs that led to the movement of data out of Africa.  Curious why 
the data was sent outside of Africa for further processing, I spoke to Michael, a 
representative of MVI.  He said,    
Maybe [the data processing] could have been done in Africa 
but we were getting hit with budget limitations….  Also, it 
would involve trying to create a system when there was 
already one that could handle it.  These contractors in India 
were set up … and they had the track record.  
Moving evidence out of Tanzania to be analyzed in established centres for evidence 
analysis made financial sense to funders.  Why build scientific capabilities in Africa 
when those capabilities existed elsewhere?  Not only was it cheaper to do this, it 
was considered a safer choice because the Indian data centres had a history of 
producing quality data cleaning services.      
By applying a critical perspective on the process of evidence collection, 
transformation and movement at the RTS,S vaccine trial in Korogwe, I find 
similarities in what Tousignant (2013), Crane (2013) and Okwaro and Geissler 
(2015) found in their field sites when scientific samples collected in Africa are 
shipped abroad.  By not building the capacity of researchers in Tanzania to conduct 
molecular analysis, or creating data analysis centres, Tanzania largely served as a 
place where raw materials were collected and prepared for export.  Tanzanian 
children provided blood and they and their caregivers provided information.  
Researchers at the Korogwe Research Centre were given just enough scientific 
capability to process the blood in a preliminary fashion before it degraded.  It was 
then sent to laboratory technicians at Quintiles in South Africa to conduct molecular 
analysis of blood samples and verify results found in Korogwe.  As well, despite the 
blood and digital data first flowing south and east after leaving Tanzania, the data 
ultimately moved to GSK in Belgium.  There, researchers completed the analysis 
and polished the end product, preparing it for presentation to drug regulators, policy 
makers and scientific journals.  This complex analysis and synthesis in Europe 
increased the value of the evidence with the blood and information recorded on 
paper shifting from material product to intellectual property.  Knowledge, data, 
money, drugs and other kinds of value circulated beyond Tanzania and researchers 
in Korogwe were unequal players in this global health research (Geissler 2015a; 
Tousignant 2013).  The means of producing credible data largely remained in 
wealthy places in the North, while researchers in Tanzania had little capacity to 
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conduct the same analysis, making them dependent on wealthy donors and partners 
(Crane 2013; Okwaro and Geissler 2015).  This production of evidence holds 
similarities to relationships of production during colonialism and could be construed 
as similarly exploitative (Turshen 1984; Crane 2013; Biruk 2012).   
However, by taking a feminist approach to science, I uncovered that 
scientific knowledge production is more than materiality or inequality.  Science, 
including the process of evidence collection, refinement and movement during the 
RTS,S trial, is mediated by a range of social interactions and experiences.  Although 
unrepresented in the research findings, social relationships, affect, exchange and 




In this chapter, I attended to the material and social aspects of evidence 
production, collection, analysis and movement.  Trial staff collected blood and 
information from trial participants and caregivers and transported them to the 
Korogwe Research Centre.  There, the blood was fragmented, analyzed, translated 
into letters and numbers, and prepared for transportation, and the information was 
checked for accuracy and digitized.  The information and blood were transported to 
laboratories and computers outside of Tanzania for further analysis.  In many ways, 
this arrangement helped maintain unequal relationships between Northern and 
Southern partners.   
With only a subset of information recorded throughout these proceedings, 
this simplified data collection (Biruk 2012).  But what was missed in this data 
collection was an attention to the social aspects of science, which I was well-
positioned to observe.  Trial staff interacted and connected socially with trial 
participants, caregivers and other staff members.  A multitude of exchanges 
occurred between trial staff, trial participants and caregivers, some of which 
facilitated or created difficulties in social relationships.  Staff experienced affect, with 
moments of connection, misunderstanding, frustration, annoyance, joy and laughter.  
They also cared for trial participants, paper forms, laboratory equipment and blood.  
These aspects, although unrecorded during the trial and largely unseen by Northern 
partners at MVI and GSK, were of great importance because they enabled not only 
the RTS,S clinical trial to operate in situations of inequality but for the RTS,S 




By exploring the development of the RTS,S malaria vaccine, this dissertation 
examined global health partnerships.  There has been a meteoric growth of 
partnerships in global health over the last two decades.  Gaining popularity in the 
late 1990s, partnership has ascended as a guiding principle, becoming a dominant 
mode of engagement and encouraged by new funding models.  It derives from the 
idea that complex health issues in low-resource countries cannot be dealt with by 
individual organizations working in isolation but necessitates partners collaboratively 
combining strengths, pooling resources, and sharing burdens and benefits.  
Partnership has played an important role in transforming global health and even 
critics have come to see partnerships as an “unavoidable necessity” in combating 
infectious diseases amongst the world’s poor (Richter 2004: 45; Gerrets 2010; Buse 
and Walt 2000).            
Forming a new governance structure, partnerships have commanded great 
financial resources and come to be highly influential, transforming thinking and 
practices (Gerrets 2015; Buse and Walt 2000a and 2000b).  Until the rise of 
partnerships, life-saving products were either unavailable to a majority of 
impoverished people or had not been invented.  During the decades before 
partnerships, health issues afflicting the poor were largely ignored by private and 
public sector institutions that failed to devise solutions or develop much-needed 
products (Gerrets 2010).  Partnerships have been promoted as a way to overcome 
the weaknesses of the private and public sectors.  Since coming to prominence, 
partnerships have advocated for disease interventions; improved access to drugs 
and other health interventions; and advanced research and development of 
interventions and products (Buse and Harmer 2007).   
A considerable amount of partnership activity has been around product 
development which aim to develop vaccines and drugs for diseases that primarily 
affect the poor.  Linking products to markets where there is a need but lack of 
economic incentive or resources, product development partnerships have made 
great progress in developing vaccines and drugs for infectious diseases (Widdus 
2005; Chataway et al. 2007b; Buse and Walt 2000a).  At the same time, the 
development of vaccines, drugs or medical devices has necessitated medical 
research in the places where they will be deployed.  In order to support this, 
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partnerships have been formed between Northern and Southern institutions (Street 
2014; Chataway et al. 2007b; Crane 2013). 
  Although many global health partnerships are recognized for saving 
numerous lives, transforming drug and vaccine development for infectious diseases, 
the partnership model raises some important questions and concerns (Gerrets 
2010).  Partnerships can shift the distribution of power amongst organizations and 
may not lead to mutuality and equality between partners.  The use of the term, 
‘partnership’, which has an ambiguous meaning, may disguise unequal power 
relations and allow for the perpetuation of Northern domination over the South (Buse 
and Harmer 2007; Abrahamsen 2004; Crewe and Harrison 2008).  Criticism has 
been raised about the role of the private sector, including industry and philanthropic 
organizations, in global health.  This involvement may shape the global health 
agenda to benefit industry or the wealthy few over health systems (Birn 2014; 
McGoey et al. 2011).  There is also concern that partnerships tend to focus on 
technical problems and single diseases.  Related to this is the push for the 
development and delivery of technical solutions and targeted interventions to tackle 
ill health, which accounts for the considerable funding channelled towards product 
development partnerships.  However, this situation can lead to a narrow focus on 
vertical programs, which can undermine holistic approaches to illness and primary 
health care services (Petryna 2009; Biehl 2016; Birn 2014). 
Despite these concerns, little empirical research has been conducted on 
global health partnerships, though there is a small, albeit growing, body of 
anthropological literature about global health partnerships.  Anthropologists have 
examined global health partnerships from various perspectives: a few (Brown 2015; 
Street 2014; Sullivan 2011) have explored public-private partnerships from within 
hospitals located in the South.  Others (Gerrets 2015; Crane 2013; Okwaro and 
Geissler 2015) investigate the role of North-South partnerships in medical research.  
And Nading (2015) examines a product development partnership.  While some of 
these anthropologists focus on the narratives of the people involved in partnerships, 
or examine partnerships as they are ongoing, none look at partnerships when they 
are in the process of ending.  This is a culminating moment when affect, meaning 
and ethics are heightened.  My anthropological investigation of partnerships formed 
between GlaxoSmithKline (GSK), the Malaria Vaccine Initiative (MVI) and a 
Tanzanian research institution to develop the RTS,S malaria vaccine provides an 
approach to understanding how people engaged with and reflected upon 
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partnerships as they were winding down and after they had ended.  This period of 
time evoked reflections amongst informants about the past, present and future as 
they tried to understand the impacts of the RTS,S trial, the partnerships, and their 
involvement in these activities and relationships.     
Central to many anthropological accounts of global health partnerships are 
the themes of hierarchy and power.  This critical perspective is important and salient 
to many aspects of partnerships.  But what is often missing in institutional readings 
of partnership is a close-up exploration of partnerships.   
I was able to conduct ethnographic research as partnerships were in 
operation and catch moments of affect and exchange, explore people’s imaginaries 
for the future, and observe caring labour.  Through this thesis, I have explored 
questions about partnerships, including: How do global health partnerships operate 
and what happens as they end?  What kind of impacts do partnerships have on the 
places where they operate?  What are the roles of infrastructure, technology, social 
relationships, affect, exchange, and practices of care in the operation of 
partnerships?  These questions inspired a critical materialist and feminist analysis of 
partnerships and are addressed in each of the chapters of the thesis.   
Chapter 1 contributes to the social science literature about product 
development partnerships (Nading 2015; Chataway et al. 2007a; Chataway et al. 
2010; Kale et al. 2013).  I explore through first-hand accounts and secondary 
literature how product development partnerships operated as they were ending and 
after they concluded.  This chapter provided historical and scientific background on 
RTS,S vaccine development and described technical and scientific advances over 
time.  I also uncovered the social relationships that enabled the RTS,S vaccine to be 
developed.  Partnerships were formed between various institutions and companies 
to fund, research and test the vaccine.  Many of these partnerships were formed 
among Northern actors but later in the development of the vaccine, partnerships 
were established between North and South in order to test the vaccine in Africa.  
These North-South partnerships engendered particular kinds of relationships as 
people navigated hierarchy and vast differences in wealth and expertise.  Although 
these later partnerships were largely perceived and portrayed as equal, many 
informants referenced relations of power by speaking to the inequalities and 
hierarchies between partners.  However, some trial staff demonstrated the ways 
they contended with the incommensurate aspects of partnership.  This included 
downplaying inequality or looking to a time when the RTS,S vaccine would save 
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lives.  This chapter builds on anthropological accounts (Crane 2013; Okwaro and 
Geissler 2015; Gerrets 2015) of research partnerships between Northern and 
Southern institutions and researchers while it expands our understanding of how 
differently positioned people reflect on partnership and rationalize inequality. 
In chapter 2, I add to the scholarship on international development projects 
(Mosse 2005; Li 1999; Crewe and Harrison 2008), which examine the technical and 
social aspects of intentional and time-bounded projects that bring together a variety 
of people around development issues.  As well, by drawing out the perspectives of 
Southern researchers and their Northern partners, this chapter builds upon 
anthropological research and bioethical debates (Kelly and Geissler 2011; Kelly 
2011; Molyneux and Geissler 2008; Chantler 2012; Emanual et al. 2004) about the 
value and ethics of medical research conducted in resource-poor settings.  The 
focus of this chapter was on how informants perceived the impacts of the RTS,S 
vaccine partnerships and clinical trial on Tanzania.  Several spoke about the 
success and value of the trial, beyond the development of a malaria vaccine.  These 
included the building of human and material capacity, improving the health and 
education of communities, providing bed nets, and the establishment of social 
relationships and partnerships with community members.  I argue that people were 
enrolled in an “interpretive community”, to apply Mosse’s (2005) term, whereby 
people had an interest in portraying events and activities as successful because 
they each benefited professionally or personally from the RTS,S partnerships and 
clinical trial.  As well, since my research was conducted as the partnerships and trial 
were winding down or after they had ended, this impacted narratives as people 
shared their hopes, aspirations, and imaginaries for the future.  Through interviews 
and discussions with me, informants may have desired to reassure themselves that 
they had engaged in valuable and meaningful work.  This may have helped people 
grapple with endings, ambiguous outcomes, and unequal relationships with their 
Northern partners.   
Chapter 3 builds upon theoretical and anthropological analyses of 
infrastructure and technology by exploring the material impacts of the RTS,S clinical 
trial and partnerships in Korogwe and surrounding areas.  GSK and MVI funded the 
provision of technology and the construction of infrastructure and buildings.  By 
drawing on Mauss (1990 [1925]] and Malinowski (2014 [1922]), I argue that these 
investments were gifts.  Although Northern partners expressed satisfaction with 
providing these material objects and several trial staff members claimed they 
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improved research and health care capacity, these material things had ambivalent 
impacts.  This became obvious at the end of the RTS,S trial when funding from 
Northern partners ceased to support research activities and health care services.  
The material things were enclaved, decaying, and required ongoing care and 
maintenance.  This exposed hierarchies between Northern and Southern 
institutions, whereby African researchers were dependent on wealthy funders to 
conduct research.    
Tanzanian trial staff experienced the materials things given to them by their 
Northern partners in an ongoing way and continued to maintain them in hopes of 
attracting new research partnerships.  This relates to theoretical understandings of 
infrastructure as a way to progress and develop.  But Northern partners disengaged 
from their obligations to the material things.  This chapter contributes to the 
scholarship on global health partnerships by demonstrating a new understanding of 
partnership.  First, partnership is not simply a rhetorical device that is empty of 
meaning; partnership can become meaningful as people come together to care for 
material things and develop a technology.  Second, only one side of a partnership 
needs to be fully believed in and inhabited to mobilize people’s affect, care and 
labour in supporting it and its material manifestations.   
The fourth chapter contributes to the anthropological literature about 
exchange, medical research and health care provision.  Throughout the trial there 
were numerous exchanges between the RTS,S trial health care service and the 
Tanzanian public health care system.  I draw on anthropological theories of 
exchange that uncover that people, social relationships and objects can come into 
being when services, objects or labour are exchanged (West 2006; Knauft 1999; 
Strathern 1998).  I extend this theory to argue that the exchange of labour and 
material objects between the public and private health care providers allowed the 
public health care system to come into being.  The trial-provided health care service 
was well-resourced and shared with the public health care system in exchange for 
use of the pediatric ward of the Korogwe District Hospital and enabling the 
recruitment of trial participants.  However, these exchanges were not reciprocated in 
an equal manner, with the private health services providing more than the public 
health care system.  This made the differences between the two health care 
services obvious to people.   
Moreover, at the end of the RTS,S clinical trial, health care services and 
resources largely ended, demonstrating that the trial had not strengthened the public 
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health care system in a sustainable way.  Trial staff expressed a sense of loss at 
this time.  Some discussed the limitations of their responsibilities to communities but 
others seemed to have developed a “medical imaginary”, a morally charged 
understanding of what medicine is and what it could be (Wendland 2012b).  Through 
this imaginary, political demands were made that health care services continue after 
the trial.  Overall, trial staff gained a sense of how things could be otherwise through 
the RTS,S trial, meaning that the clinical trial made more than material impacts, it 
impacted people’s ideas and conceptions of the future.     
Chapter 5 adds to the social science literature about evidence production 
and collection in medical research (Adams 2016a; Biruk 2012; Crane 2013; Kachur 
2011; Whyte 2011; Erikson 2012).  I trace over space and time the blood and paper 
used in the RTS,S trial.  These materials held and communicated evidence and 
throughout the data collection activities, they were moved, transformed, fragmented 
and digitized.  This process exposed the material inequalities between Northern and 
Southern partners as trial staff extracted data from trial participants and sent this 
data abroad.  While this critical perspective is important, I built upon Biruk’s (2012) 
focus on the social processes of evidence collection during research to examine the 
roles of social relationships, care, affect and exchange in data collection.  These 
aspects of data collection allowed trial staff to negotiate unequal relationships as 
middle figures.  These aspects of data collection were not included in research 
protocols or the research findings and they remained unseen by Northern partners 
at GSK and MVI.  People, places and practices were simplified and only a small 
sub-set of information was collected.  This meant that social interactions and 
relationships, exchange, care and affect were absent from how people understood 
the scientific research.  Yet, Northern partners and researchers do not understand 
that without these aspects, there would be no RTS,S trial and therefore no RTS,S 
vaccine. 
The implications of this finding are, how can we build into research protocols 
a recognition of the human aspects of research?  How might there be room to 
acknowledge the frustrations, expectations, joy, misrecognitions, anger and doubt?  
I observed trial staff negotiating challenging relationships and situations by using 
care, affect and exchange to strengthen social relationships, which enabled the trial 
to function.  These aspects of the research were not included in the research 
protocols and they cannot be modeled since they are pragmatic.  They also would 
not simply disappear if institutional arrangements were more equal.  There will 
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always be inherent hierarchies and inequalities between people and institutions 
because of the nature of research, which includes a need to have people oversee 
activities, resources not benefiting all people equally, and some activities being 
more valued than others.  RTS,S trial staff had to make sense of the contradictions 
inherent in the partnerships and clinical trial; they had to be content with its 
arrangement.  In order to contend with the inequalities, people thought to the future 
when the RTS,S vaccine would be saving lives, which made their labour meaningful.  
Since affect, care, exchange, aspirations and social relationships are fundamental to 
medical research and research partnerships, they require recognition as such.  This 
could lead to a shift in research protocols that make room for these aspects of 
medical research to be acknowledged, anticipated and suitably rewarded.  
The aim of this thesis has been to trace the development of the RTS,S 
malaria vaccine as a route to explore partnerships in global health.  While other 
anthropological studies examine institutional arrangements (Sullivan 2011; Street 
2014; Brown 2015) or track research studies over years (Crane 2013), I looked at 
the end of global health partnerships, at a time that was laden with meaning and 
reflection.  Conducting research at this time provided me the opportunity to gain an 
understanding of people as they were coming to terms with the inequalities, the 
impacts of the trial, and their expenditure of caring and affective labour.   
What might this research mean for broader understandings of global health, 
international development, and medical research?  How might ideas about 
partnership contribute to various areas within anthropology?  And what might be the 
implications for future research about partnership? 
Understanding particular global health partnerships does not allow all global 
health partnerships to be understood.  Each partnership has its own particular 
configuration and generates different kinds of relationships and reflections.  
Nevertheless, this thesis explored diverse academic areas, including care, 
exchange, affect, power, materiality, medicine, labour, development, scientific 
knowledge production, infrastructure and technology.  By having these areas of 
study address the topic of partnership, I have expanded the conversation to include 
people working in a range of places and contexts.  I have also attached the concept 
of partnership to particular people and places, making it more tangible and specific 
and thus easier to approach analytically.   
Although my findings are contextual and the specifics may not fit with other 
field sites or partnerships, my findings about infrastructure, technology, medicine, 
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power and exchange resonate with findings about medical research and 
partnerships elsewhere in Africa.  And the observations I have made about the role 
of care and affect in medical research could be further explored in other contexts.  
As well, an interest in care, affect, exchange and people’s aspirations can enrich 
anthropological understandings across various areas.  I suggest that research which 
attends to the material, social and experiential aspects of partnership can contribute 
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